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Executive Summary 
 
 
CGIAR (formerly known as the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research) 
envisions a world where rural poverty is 
eliminated, all people are food-secure, and 
even the poorest enjoy good nutrition and 
health. CGIAR is resolved to work to realize 
this vision by functioning as a unified global 
system and working with partners to facilitate 
more productive and sustainable agriculture 
through international public goods research. 
In 2008, CGIAR donors and other 
stakeholders agreed to embark on a change 
process to improve the engagement between 
stakeholders in international agricultural 
research for development – donors, 
researchers and beneficiaries – and to 
refocus CGIAR on the major global 
development challenges. The broad objectives 
were to integrate the work of the research 
centers, enhance collaboration with partners, 
ensure effective governance, and improve 
efficiency in providing and using resources.   
 
The key features of the reform are: (i) the 
implementation of results-oriented research 
focused on issues of high relevance to 
achieving development impact; (ii) the 
creation of a research environment that 
attracts the best scientists; (iii) clarified 
accountabilities with distinct roles for “doers” 
and “funders”; (iv) strengthened culture of 
partnership both within CGIAR and between 
CGIAR and external entities; and (v) reduced 
bureaucracy to achieve greater cost 
effectiveness.  The initiation of the reform 
included a decision to undertake an 
independent evaluation of the progress in 
three years. In mid-2013, the CGIAR Fund 
Council commissioned an independent review 
of CGIAR reform to assess progress and make 
recommendations for course correction. The 
Mid-Term Review Panel began its works in 
January 2014 and focused on the following: 
 
1. The appropriateness of CGIAR’s current 
goals and strategies in supporting the 
fundamental purpose of agricultural 
research to deliver the development 
solutions needed to create a world free of 
hunger.  
2. CGIAR’s effectiveness in generating and 
delivering solutions for reducing rural 
poverty, improving food and nutrition 
security, and advancing the livelihoods of 
users of its research while protecting vital 
natural resources.  
3. The efficiency and effectiveness of 
CGIAR’s architecture/structure, 
operations, and mechanisms for 
managing and funding research programs 
and building capacity, including its internal 
systems and issues related to risk 
management, governance, and 
accountability.  
4. The extent and quality of partnerships 
within the CGIAR network and with 
external collaborators and stakeholders.  
5. The structure of the CGIAR Fund, including 
the challenges of increasing the 
proportion of commitments that are in the 
form of pooled funding (i.e., contributions 
to Windows 1 and 2), the prospects for 
firm multi-year pledges, and the roles of 
Window 3 and bilateral funding. 
6. Measures needed for CGIAR to continue to 
play its critical role in global public goods 
research and national capacity building 
and maintain its relevance in a rapidly 
changing global environment of ODA, 
more complex and crowded global 
research architecture, evolving roles of 
public and private research investment, 
and competing demands on donor 
funding.  
 
Recommendations 
Following a comprehensive review of available 
information, analysis of specifically-
commissioned studies on particular issues, 
and extensive interviews with CGIAR 
representatives and outside partners, the Mid-
Term Review Panel prepared a Consultation 
Draft Final Report. A number of preliminary 
comments, in particular from the Consortium 
Board and Directors General of the Centers, 
were issued prior to the development of the 
Consultation Draft, largely based on 
discussions between the Panel and the 
Reference Group at the second meeting of the 
Panel in London in July 2014. These 
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discussions and comments were duly 
considered in the development of the 
Consultation Draft. Many of the rather critical 
initial comments from the Consortium Board 
have now been superseded by the joint 
response and comments from the Consortium 
and Centers on the Panel’s nine 
Recommendations presented in the Draft. 
Several donors and other stakeholders also 
provided comments and suggestions 
regarding the Panel’s draft findings and 
recommendations (see Supplementary 
Appendix). The Panel has taken these inputs 
into consideration in this report, particularly in 
order to improve clarity of conclusions and 
recommendations. The Panel proposes the 
following key recommendations. 
 
1. Develop a clear CGIAR Vision and Mission 
A clear and focused vision and mission should 
be developed to guide the decisions on priority 
research objectives, facilitate the 
development of strategic approaches to 
reaching those objectives, and provide 
adequately detailed expectations of results. 
The Panel recommends that the vision for 
CGIAR be oriented towards agricultural 
research required to meet immediate and 
long-term nutrition needs and achieve 
equitable food security by 2030. Likewise, the 
Panel recommends that the CGIAR mission 
should include how it will achieve these short 
and long term societal challenges through its 
mission statement – through its strengths as 
a global network; a network that harnesses 
other relevant capabilities from organizations. 
 
2. Prioritize to achieve maximum impact with 
the least cost 
A CGIAR task force should undertake a 
systematic process of prioritization, with the 
objective of providing a menu of options for 
CGIAR and its partners to determine how they 
can maximize impacts with the least costs for 
both upstream and downstream research. 
This would assist donors in identifying where 
they might achieve the largest benefits for the 
least costs in addressing the drivers of food 
insecurity, including productivity, water 
scarcity, and climate change; determining an 
appropriate balance of systems and breeding 
research, for example; and further 
strengthening gene bank management; as 
well as identifying potential high risk-high 
reward research areas. The Panel identified 
the following five major research challenges 
with potential for very high payback. The list is 
by no means definitive- but this level of 
prioritization is needed to sharpen focus and 
impact. 
1. Nutrition. All CGIAR food crop and 
livestock research should include 
nutritional improvement as an embedded 
objective, with a specific focus on 
reducing stunting and related impacts 
based on local needs and conditions. 
2. Degraded Lands. Research should focus 
on increasing sustainable agricultural 
productivity or healthy agro-ecosystems 
for the world’s agricultural degraded 
arable land. 
3. Reduce Food systems waste. Research 
should focus on reducing food system 
waste by considering the food value chain, 
as well as opportunities to use waste for 
other co-benefits related to sustainability 
and profitability – enhancing soil 
condition, energy generation, etc. 
4. Resilience. Recognizing that the poorest 
smallholder farmers are generally the 
most vulnerable and least resilient to 
shocks, agricultural research needs to be 
targeted to keep pace with the growing 
global, regional and local impacts of 
climate change, water shortages and 
other shocks. 
5. Big data. Investing in open data 
architectures, high performance 
computing and visualization facilities and 
big data analytics capabilities is of direct 
relevance to CGIAR’s outcomes and its 
aspiration to be a global leader of 
networks. CGIAR is well positioned to 
develop a global agri-informatics network 
focused on “evidence based management 
of agro-ecosystems” by partnering with 
like-minded regional and global networks 
and organizations to leverage existing 
infrastructure and capabilities, improve 
the access and utility of agri-related data 
and save significant resources. 
 
3. Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) 
The Fund Council and Consortium Board 
should establish clear criteria by which they 
determine whether the SRF under preparation 
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meets their needs. It must primarily enable 
prioritization of outcomes being sought and 
consequently the research and partnerships 
required to deliver against these.  This will 
enhance stakeholder confidence in that the 
limited financial resources are being used for 
the greatest impact, and that those resources 
are sufficient for achieving the research goals. 
In this regard, it is timely to consider piloting, 
within the next round of CGIAR Research 
Program (CRP) proposals, a more open and 
competitive platform to allow a non-Center to 
lead on a proposal if it is uniquely qualified to 
do so, and piloting a performance-based 
financing mechanism.  
 
The preparation of the SRF must have 
sufficient stakeholder participation to ensure 
joint ownership of the final product. The 
process should take as much time as is 
required to get it right. The call for the second 
round of CGIAR Research Program proposals 
should only be issued after the Fund Council 
is fully satisfied with the SRF, including an 
assurance from CGIAR stakeholders that there 
is broad support. 
  
4. Governance structure 
The Panel strongly recommends that a single 
CGIAR Board be established to replace the 
Fund Council and the Consortium Board and 
be supported by one Administrative Unit, 
replacing the Fund Office and Consortium 
Office, with the aim of eliminating current 
governance ambiguities, strengthening the 
ability of CGIAR to deliver its mission of 
research and development impact, and 
accelerating and scaling up solution-driven 
public-private collaborative partnerships.  
A number of comments on the Consultation 
Draft have urged caution, a slower pace, and 
minor changes as being preferable to the 
major governance change that we have 
proposed. We believe that those comments 
seriously underestimate the urgency of the 
need for such change and the significant 
problems that were identified in the evidence 
that the Panel was able to review. 
 
The proposed Board would need to adequately 
and effectively represent key stakeholders, 
with clarity on the rationale for inclusion of 
stakeholders and the expectations of them. 
Consideration should be given to the size of 
the Board - limiting the number of members to 
ensure that it is manageable. This will 
inevitably lead to a constituency-based board.  
The Panel believes that the key stakeholders 
requiring representation on the CGIAR Board 
are the donors, CGIAR Centers, NARs, 
agricultural private sector representatives, 
civil society development organizations, and 
recipient countries. The ISPC Chair, who is 
essentially the chief scientist of CGIAR, should 
be an ex-officio member of the Board.  
 
Based on legal advice provided to the Panel, it 
understands that the proposed Board could 
operate with or without its own legal identity. 
 
The Board should focus on high-level, 
strategic issues, articulating accountabilities 
but allowing each Center and CRP to manage 
the on-the-ground work of CGIAR, and the 
Board’s administrative unit to focus on day-to-
day management issues, such as 
administrative efficiencies, regulatory 
compliance, and reporting. High-level issues 
for the Board are likely to include establishing 
the overall strategy and principles that govern 
funding decisions; governance decisions, such 
as appointing the Board and Board Committee 
leadership; establishing policies for fiduciary 
and risk management and other key policy 
elements of governance; management 
oversight; stakeholder participation; and 
review and approval of funding proposals.  
 
The Panel considers that, in order to avoid 
perceived or real conflicts of interest, the 
Board Chair should represent the mission of 
the CGIAR partnership and therefore should 
not represent a constituency. Further, it 
considers that the Board Chair should have 
sufficient time to commit to that role to 
effectively lead the Board, which in addition to 
chairing Board meetings, could include 
serving as the principle spokesperson, 
advocate, and fundraiser for CGIAR and 
leading the Board’s inter-sessional work. 
 
The Board should establish a donor council, 
which would advise and serve the Board, and 
provide views of the broader CGIAR donor 
base (e.g., regarding operations, fundraising, 
etc.).  The CGIAR Centers should establish an 
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                        Diagram 1: How CGIAR Works 
Source:  Selçuk Özgediz, The CGIAR at 40: Institutional Evolution of the 
World’s Premier Agricultural Research Network, 2012, pg. 88. 
advisory committee to advise the Board on 
new advances in research, and new or 
emerging challenges and risks requiring 
urgent action by CGIAR.  The design of the 
Board should be undertaken in parallel with 
the completion of the SRF and preparation of 
the second round of CRP proposals.  The new 
governance structure should be in place prior 
to final selection of the next round of CRPs. 
 
5. Optimize the strengths of partners  
There is considerable room for expanding 
existing and establishing new partnerships 
globally. To avoid transaction costs, risks, and 
other inefficiencies and engage partners as 
equal stakeholders so that joint decisions can 
be taken on when and how to partner, the 
Panel recommends that the Fund Council 
seek the assistance of donors (e.g., World 
Bank) and key organizations engaged in 
research with global reach (e.g. EMBRAPA, 
CSIRO, and private sector representing inputs 
and the food and beverage industry) to assist 
CGIAR in developing guidelines for identifying, 
establishing, managing and reviewing 
partnerships. The guidelines should be clearly 
tailored to meet the strategic objectives and 
results delineated in the SRF.   
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6. Scale up partnerships capable of tackling 
mega-challenges 
Once the new SRF is adopted (outcomes as 
the focus) and the next round of CRP 
proposals (multi-disciplinary research required 
as a focus) are approved, CGIAR should 
assess the extent to which its own research 
programs and those of other leading 
institutions and companies are sufficient to 
address priority food security and nutrition 
challenges, with a view to identifying major 
gaps that require new global partnerships, 
special-purpose, internationally-coordinated, 
and long-term mega-programs designed to 
solve the problems, rather than put dents in 
them. CGIAR is likely to play a key role in 
identifying what future partnerships are 
needed to tackle the world’s food security 
mega-challenges and propose a 
commensurate framework for action.  
 
CGIAR Centers and other potential partner 
organizations need to be adaptive in how they 
work with partners so as to assure their long-
term relevance as coalition partners. They will 
need to engage in both leadership and non-
leadership (or supporting) roles, taking on 
responsibilities that are best suited to CGIAR’s 
strengths and comparative advantages. CGIAR 
can play a leadership role by bringing top-level 
global leaders together to tackle challenges 
(beyond the reach of individual partners) in a 
collaborative manner.  
 
7. Scale up financing 
The Panel was asked to review the current 
challenges of rationalizing funding through the 
three Windows of the CGIAR Fund and the 
additional bilateral funding to individual 
Centers. The Fund Council has not been able 
to resolve issues related to such 
rationalization, probably because each 
contributor is “sovereign” and has its own 
priorities. There is no evidence for the Panel to 
consider that this situation is likely to change. 
The Panel considers that, while the balance 
between Windows 1 and 2 and the 
contributions channeled through Window 3 
and other bilateral funding may not be ideal 
for maximizing the focus on CRPs, the Fund 
Council and other CGIAR partners should be 
primarily focused on maximizing the total 
amount of funding available for high-quality, 
high-priority research. In this regard, CGIAR 
would benefit from an agreement on relatively 
tight criteria that define what counts, and 
what does not count, as CRP funding. The 
reality, however, is that the Fund Council and 
other donors have doubled the total funding to 
CGIAR over the past five years.  
 
Several donors indicated to the Panel that 
continued funding is conditional on 
performance and highlighted the difficulty of 
securing long-term, predictable commitments 
to fund CGIAR Research Programs, as well as 
the uncertainties around maintaining, let 
alone significantly increasing, funding. The 
Panel considers that there is additional 
potential for more innovation in funding and 
recommends that the Fund Council should 
organize a special session in early 2015 to 
discuss innovative financing options. Some 
potential approaches include development 
impact bonds, a capital formation investment 
fund, the Green Bond concept, public-private 
strategies, and pursuing high risk-high reward 
impact investors. 
 
8. Optimize political impact 
CGIAR (not just individual Centers) should 
establish specific objectives of and 
procedures for engaging in relevant global and 
regional policy formulations, negotiations and 
actions. CGIAR has tremendous knowledge 
and could contribute to and influence 
international and regional policy debates on 
many highly emotive issues, such as climate 
change, food security, food safety, water 
management, fisheries management, and the 
Sustainable Development Goals, among many 
others.  
  
9. Optimize knowledge impact 
The responsibilities of the Independent 
Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) should 
be elevated to empower it to be proactive in 
terms of providing strategic guidance, 
foresight analyses, and assessing and 
reporting on quality of research results across 
the system. The review and reporting 
functions should be at least as rigorous as 
was previously provided by the pre-reform 
Science Council. Currently, the ISPC does not 
have a role in monitoring research quality 
once the research is funded; this function is 
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left to the Independent Evaluation 
Arrangement (IEA). It is critically important to 
ensure that high-quality research review and 
advice is consistently provided by qualified 
researchers. The Panel considers that the role 
the IEA is playing in reviewing the governance 
of CRPs is appropriate, but that the review of 
the quality of research should be under the 
oversight of the ISPC. At a minimum the Fund 
Council and Consortium Board (and later the 
CGIAR Board) should establish independent 
research panels comprising world-class 
research leaders to advise on particular 
issues, as required, under the overall 
guidance of the ISPC Chair. A detailed 
proposal for the new functions of the ISPC or 
its replacement should be prepared 
immediately by a task force established by the 
Fund Council.  
 
Further, regarding knowledge impact, the 
CGIAR should strengthen its structured 
knowledge sharing by replacing the Funders 
Forum (which would no longer be required if a 
single multi-stakeholder Board is established) 
with a partnership forum that brings partners 
together to share lessons and knowledge. 
Numerous successful examples of such 
institutionalized fora have demonstrated 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
in knowledge sharing, as well as in facilitating 
dialogue among partners that might otherwise 
not have a periodic opportunity to compare 
lessons.
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                1.   Introduction  
 
1.1  The CGIAR System Post-2009 Reform 
Established in 1971, CGIAR (formerly known 
as the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research) is a global agricultural 
research partnership that seeks to achieve 
food security and advance research and 
technology for the benefit of farmers and 
other poor smallholders in developing 
countries. In 2008/2009, key CGIAR 
stakeholders agreed on and initiated a 
substantive reform process to refocus its 
strategy and streamline operations, so as to 
avoid fragmentation of research and funding 
and strengthen the ability of partners to 
support the development of a global food 
system that meets the needs of all, 
particularly the poor. The donors’ broad 
objectives were to integrate the work of the 
research centers, enhance collaboration with 
partners, ensure effective governance and 
improve efficiency in providing and using 
resources.   
 
As part of the reform, CGIAR developed a 
system-wide Strategy and Results Framework 
(SRF),1 which sets out common goals, 
objectives and priorities, and shifted from an 
institutional to programmatic approach to 
research centered on large, cross-cutting 
CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs). There are 
currently 16 CRPs – including a program of 
long-term support for the CGIAR genebanks, 
most of which have been operational for only 
two to three years. The CRPs are intended to 
be guided by and generate results in 
accordance with the SRF and are driven by 
their potential impact on four critical 
development outcomes: reduced rural 
poverty, increased food security, improved 
human health and nutrition, and sustainably 
managed natural resources. In the initial 
stages of the reform process it was not 
possible to fully align decision-making on 
CRPs with the SRF since they were developed 
in parallel.  
 
The foundation of the CGIAR system continues 
                                                        
1 http://www.cgiar.org/our-research/ 
to be its 15 independent, non-profit research 
Centers,2 each of which operates under the 
authority of its own Board. Under the new 
arrangements of the reform, the CGIAR 
Consortium3 was established as an 
international organization to integrate 
research across the Centers, minimize 
duplication of effort, and streamline funding. 
The Consortium is made of the CGIAR 
Consortium Board, the CEO of the CGIAR 
Consortium, who heads the Consortium Office, 
and the 15 Centers that are members of the 
CGIAR Consortium. The Consortium Office, 
located in Montpellier, France, is responsible 
for the day-to-day functions of the Consortium.  
 
In December 2010, the CGIAR Fund4 was 
launched as a multi-donor trust fund to 
finance research carried out by the 15 
Centers in collaboration with hundreds of 
partners worldwide through the CRPs. The 
Fund aims to provide reliable and predictable 
multiyear funding to enable research planning 
over the long term, resource allocation based 
on agreed priorities and the timely 
disbursement of funds. The CGIAR Fund is 
administered by the World Bank, as Trustee, 
and governed by the Fund Council, a 
representative body of Fund donors and other 
stakeholders. The Fund Office, located at 
World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., 
supports the Fund Council and its Chair in the 
conduct of its business and meetings. The 
Head of the Fund Office also serves as the 
Executive Secretary of the CGIAR Fund 
Council. 
 
Two independent bodies were established to 
support the work of CGIAR. The Independent 
Science and Partnership Council (ISPC),5 a 
standing panel of scientists, provides expert 
advice to Fund donors and aims to strengthen 
the quality, relevance, and impact of CGIAR 
                                                        
2 http://www.cgiar.org/cgiar-consortium/research-
centers/ 
3 http://www.cgiar.org/cgiar-consortium/ 
4 http://www.cgiar.org/who-we-are/cgiar-fund/ 
5 http://www.sciencecouncil.cgiar.org 
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science and research. The Independent 
Evaluation Arrangement (IEA)6 commissions 
and manages evaluations of CGIAR Research 
Programs and institutions, which are 
conducted by independent teams.  
 
1.2  The CGIAR Mid-term Review (MTR) 
The approval of the document “A Revitalized 
CGIAR—A New Way Forward: The Integrated 
Reform Proposal” at the CGIAR Annual 
General Meeting in 2008 included a decision 
to undertake an independent evaluation of 
the reforms of the new CGIAR in three years. 
This was reaffirmed in subsequent 
discussions during the transition period, with 
CGIAR donors and stakeholders being assured 
that a review of the reform would be 
undertaken about 18-24 months after 
initiation of the CGIAR Trust Fund in late 
2010. 
 
The governing and structural elements of the 
reformed CGIAR, as described above, are now 
in place. Two biennial events, the CGIAR 
Funders Forum and the Global Conference on 
Agricultural Research for Development 
(GCARD), were held in 2010 and 2012, and 
the new CGIAR research portfolio of 15 CRPs 
is being implemented. Given the significant 
reform activity to date, the Fund Council 
commissioned the review of reform in mid-
2013.7 
  
1.3  MTR Review Panel 
A Chair and individual panel members were 
selected and appointed by the Chair of the 
CGIAR Fund Council based on their ability to 
independently, and without bias, consider the 
challenging and often controversial questions 
which must be addressed. These issues 
related to the progress of the CGIAR reform 
process and its impact, and whether CGIAR is 
well positioned to lead the international 
agricultural research community in tackling 
the interlinked, mega-challenges of food, 
energy, and water security, climate change, 
and degrading natural resources, biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. The MTR Panel 
                                                        
6 http://iea.cgiar.org 
7 The Terms of Reference of the MTR Panel can be 
found at: http://bit.ly/1rWQxam  
 
members together represent a diverse set of 
nationalities and expertise, and all of them 
have extensive experience relevant to the 
Panel’s mandate. (See Appendix 1 for brief 
CVs of the nine MTR Panel members.) The 
Panel was supported on a part-time, demand-
driven basis by the Fund Office. 
 
1.4  The Reference Group 
A joint Fund Council-Consortium Reference 
Group assisted the MTR Panel in accessing 
information, gaining in-depth understanding of 
the internal workings of CGIAR, and fielding 
specific queries as they arose. The Reference 
Group includes Frank Rijsberman (Consortium 
CEO), Mohamed Ait Kadi (Consortium Board 
Member), Fawzi Al-Sultan (IFPRI Board Chair), 
Ruben Echeverria (Director General, CIAT), 
Nick Austin (Australia/Fund Council), Carmen 
Thoenneisen (Switzerland/Fund Council), 
Andrew Spezowka (Canada/Fund Council), 
and Maxine Garvey (Fund Office). 
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                2.   Scope and Methodology of the MTR Review 
 
 
2.1  Priority Questions 
Conclusions and recommendations presented 
in this report are intended to address a 
number of questions posed to the Panel 
relating to the ability of CGIAR to be efficient 
and cost-effective and to produce results that 
are useful to small-scale farmers in 
developing countries and other poor 
smallholders and beneficiaries of international 
collaborative research.  
 
The Panel review primarily focused on the 
following: 
1. The appropriateness of CGIAR’s current 
goals and strategies in supporting the 
fundamental purpose of agricultural 
research to deliver the development 
solutions needed to create a world free of 
hunger.  
2. CGIAR’s effectiveness in generating and 
delivering solutions for reducing rural 
poverty, improving food and nutrition 
security, and advancing the livelihoods of 
users of its research while protecting vital 
natural resources.  
3. The efficiency and effectiveness of 
CGIAR’s architecture/structure, 
operations, and mechanisms for 
managing and funding research programs 
and building capacity, including its internal 
systems and issues related to risk 
management, governance, and 
accountability.  
4. The extent and quality of partnerships 
within the CGIAR network and with 
external collaborators and stakeholders.   
5. The structure of the CGIAR Fund, including 
the challenges of increasing the 
proportion of commitments that are in the 
form of pooled funding (i.e., contributions 
to Windows 1 and 2), the prospects for 
firm multi-year pledges, and the roles of 
Window 3 and bilateral funding. 
6. Measures needed for CGIAR to continue to 
play its critical role in global public goods 
research and national capacity building 
and maintain its relevance in a rapidly 
changing global environment of ODA, 
more complex and crowded global 
research architecture, evolving roles of 
public and private research investment, 
and competing demands on donor 
funding.  
 
The Panel addressed the following specific 
questions relating to CGIAR’s effectiveness 
and efficiency: 
 
Research 
 Does the research commissioning process 
and incentives comply with best practices 
globally?  
 What should CGIAR be doing to improve 
the way research is managed and 
integrated across its Centers?  
 Is CGIAR effectively building diversity, 
including gender, into its research 
programs?  
 Does CGIAR have the appropriate balance 
of research for development and a focus 
on delivery for end-users?  
 How can CGIAR better deliver its research 
to the field and what model(s) should it 
employ to do so?  
 
Partners 
 Does CGIAR engage with the appropriate 
partners to deliver high-quality research 
and impact?  
 What CGIAR incentives weaken or 
strengthen partnerships?  
 How can CGIAR enhance its accessibility 
to and collaboration with partners?  
 How can CGIAR best engage with national 
agricultural research systems?  
 
Funding 
 Is the structure of CGIAR’s entire funding 
system appropriate for the purpose, or 
does it create perverse incentives for free-
riding or other sub-optimal practices?  
 What are the implications of misalignment 
among all funding sources (i.e., 
contributions to the Fund and other 
support to CGIAR) for the governance and 
management of the system?  
 Is the concept of fully pooled funding a 
realizable goal, or will Window 3 and 
bilateral funding increasingly dominate?  
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 What mechanisms can enhance donor 
participation in pooled funding?  
 Does CGIAR have a clear understanding of 
the total funding needed to meet its 
goals?  
 
Structure and governance 
 Has the separation between funders and 
researchers led to a more efficient and 
effective CGIAR?  
 Are the roles of the various CGIAR entities 
(e.g., the Fund Council, IEA, ISPC, and the 
Consortium) distinct, clear, and well 
aligned to ensure accountability?  
 Are the current governance arrangements 
consistent with best practices?  
 Have the reforms increased overall costs 
and, if so, is that increase justified by 
better, more relevant research resulting in 
greater impact?  
 
2.2  Methodology for the Review 
The Panel drew on as many sources of 
evidence as was possible during the course of 
its work, with the primary source of 
information being interviews with individuals 
representing various CGIAR entities and a 
survey of associated stakeholders (e.g. 
donors, research partners, industry). The 
sources of evidence included: 
 Reviews of relevant literature. 
 Interviews with members of the Fund 
Council, Fund Office staff (including the 
Head), the Consortium Board Chair, the 
Consortium CEO, all 15 Center Directors 
General, a number of Center staff, and 
some of the Center Board chairs. 
 Special background studies and meetings.  
 Survey of peers using a modified version 
of the 2012 GlobeScan stakeholders’ 
perception survey.8  
 Review of extent to which ISPC 
recommendations are followed. 
                                                        
8 Some Panel members approached peer 
organizations requesting them to complete the 
2012 GlobeScan stakeholders’ perception survey 
(see: http://bit.ly/10Q3p9t). A summary of a 
modified version of this survey is provided at 
http://bit.ly/1nZUa19. Please note that this is an 
indicative survey of the views of peers. It is not 
intended to be comprehensive; the GlobeScan 
survey serves that purpose.  
 Two meetings with the Reference Group. 
 Joint meetings with most of the CRP 
directors, including discussions with a 
group of CRP leaders9 at which all 16 of 
the CGIAR Research Programs, including 
the genebanks initiative, were 
represented. 
 Discussions with associated stakeholders 
mainly included research organizations, 
including universities and industry 
engaged in CGIAR research activities. 
 
2.3  Interviews and discussions 
Panel members engaged with key 
stakeholders in order to understand the many 
diverse views on what is working, what is not 
working, and what needs to be done to 
strengthen CGIAR. It became clear at an early 
stage that a special effort was needed to seek 
inputs from each CGIAR Center and their 
Boards, as well as CRP leaders, in addition to 
staff and members of all other CGIAR entities.  
 
Panel members’ discussions with each of the 
15 CGIAR Centers,10 the Consortium Board 
Chair, and the Consortium CEO were 
structured around the following questions: 
 
Centers’ relationships with other CGIAR 
system entities 
 What have been the effects and benefits 
of the CGIAR reforms, particularly with 
regard to relations with the Fund Office, 
Fund Council, Consortium Office, and 
Consortium Board? 
 How is the relationship between the 
Director General/Center management and 
the Center Board?  
 How does the Director General’s 
obligations to the Center Board compare 
to his/her obligation to the Consortium 
Board? 
                                                        
9 Warren Evans and Howard Shapiro met with 
them on the sides of the May 2014 Consortium 
meeting in Montpellier. 
10 Warren Evans and Howard Shapiro had separate 
meetings with the Directors General (DGs) of IWMI, 
ICRISAT, WorldFish, CIFOR, ICRAF, ICARDA, and 
CIP. Warren Evans had separate meetings with the 
DGs and senior staff of IRRI, CIMMYT, Bioversity, 
and IFPRI, as well as Skype or telephone meetings 
with DGs and senior staff of CIAT, IITA, ILRI, and 
AfricaRice. 
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       Diagram 2: Map of 15 CGIAR Centers 
 How important is it to the Center to be part 
of CGIAR?  
 Does being part of CGIAR enhance the 
Center’s reputation and ability to attract 
funding and key partners? 
 
Research and funding 
 What are the short- and medium-term 
versus long-term challenges of designing 
research programs? 
 What is the Center role in strengthening 
the NARs (National Agricultural Research 
Systems)? 
 Do scientists feel encouraged to take risks 
in research? 
 Do Centers have the ability to attract top 
scientists? 
 What are the possibilities for more 
innovative financing for agricultural 
research? 
 What are the greatest transaction costs 
across the system and where could 
savings be achieved without 
compromising CGIAR’s "new" mission? 
 
 
 
Panel members’ discussions with Fund 
Council members11 were structured around 
the following questions: 
 
General assessment 
 What are the key achievements of the 
reform efforts? 
 What expectations have not been met to 
your satisfaction? 
 Should the Fund Council play a more 
proactive role in strategic planning, such 
as guiding the development of the new 
SRF? 
 Has separating the doers from the funders 
achieved the expected results, particularly 
with regard to potential benefits, the 
relationships between the Fund 
Office/Council and Consortium 
Office/Board, and the role and position of 
the Centers?  
                                                        
11 Fund Council members that provided verbal or 
written responses to questions from the Panel 
include representatives from Australia, Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, Canada, European 
Union, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States of America. 
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Funding and pooled resources 
 Have individual donors changed their 
behavior since reforms, particularly with 
regard to pooled funding and channeling 
contributions through Windows 1 and 2, 
versus cherry-picking which Centers and 
projects or programs to support?  
 Is there potential for collective pressure to 
improve harmonization? 
 How does your agency decide what 
funding will go through Windows 1 or 2 
and what support will be provided through 
an essentially bilateral arrangement? 
 Given donors’ responsibilities to taxpayers 
and the public at large, what is the 
potential for more innovative use of ODA 
and ODA-like contributions to support 
agricultural research through CGIAR? 
 
What is the role of the Fund Council on the 
following issues? 
 Centers have expressed concern 
regarding the growing demand of donors 
for short-term results when dealing with 
long-term research 
challenges, compounded by frequent 
changes in the rules of the game, raising 
the issues of how donors view short- or 
medium-term versus long-term challenges 
in designing programs. 
 CGIAR’s role in strengthening NARs versus 
focusing on longer-term international 
public goods. 
 Minimizing transaction costs across the 
system. 
 Encouraging risk-taking and “blue sky” 
research where there exists high potential 
for breakthroughs and big rewards. 
 
2.4  Additional meetings and sources of 
information 
The Panel met twice to discuss the evidence, 
draw conclusions, and formulate 
recommendations. The first meeting was held 
in Berlin in January 2014 and the second 
meeting took place in London in July 2014.12 
                                                        
12 Following the January meeting, the MTR Panel 
produced an Inception Report (see here: 
http://bit.ly/1rWQxam). A summary of the July 
meeting can be found here: http://bit.ly/1sdfO2H.  
A number of Panel members also participated 
in Fund Council and Consortium meetings. 
 
Prior to the formation of the MTR Panel, the 
Consortium Office had carried out a review of 
CGIAR governance and the Fund Council had 
commissioned an external consultant to 
conduct a more comprehensive governance 
review, recommendations from which were 
shared with the Panel. In addition, the IEA 
completed a governance review of CRPs 
during the course of the Panel’s review, which 
informed its work. Around the time when the 
Panel began its work, three other important 
analyses and planning exercises were initiated 
or in-progress: the development of a new SRF, 
which has been led by the Consortium Office, 
a resource mobilization study, and a delivery 
study, both of which were carried out by 
consultants and managed by the Fund Office. 
Drafts of each of these studies have been 
provided to the Panel for their consideration, 
but none are yet final. 
 
Special assessments were requested by the 
Panel and provided by the Consortium and 
Fund Offices, including a summary of key 
accomplishments over the last few years, a 
sample of ISPC recommendations and 
responses from Centers on CRPs, and an 
assessment of publications by Center staff. 
The Panel also requested that two special 
studies be undertaken by non-CGIAR experts: 
one on the potential for more financial 
innovation to support agricultural research, 
which became part of the broader resource 
mobilization study, and a paper on agricultural 
research priorities, which was supported by a 
workshop with several scientists and 
development experts in Oxford in May 2014.  
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                3.   The Importance of Accelerating and Scaling-up Agricultural 
                Research for Sustainable Development - Why Getting CGIAR Right 
                is so Critically Important 
 
 
 
 
About 70 percent of the world’s poorest 
people rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, 
and most of the growing demand, about 80 
percent, for increased food production up to 
2030 will be in developing countries. The 
world is not currently equipped to meet this 
demand, particularly considering the 
increasing risks. Several scenario studies 
published in the last few years discuss the key 
drivers of global food insecurity and conclude 
that increased demand for food, water, and 
energy—each linked to the others—will result 
in scarcities, all worsened by climate 
change.13 
 
The September 2014 report by the Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate14 
reports that by 2050 the agriculture sector will 
need to produce 70 percent more calories 
than in 2006, mainly due to population 
growth, rising incomes and changing diets in 
developing countries. Meeting this demand 
will be essential for sustained economic 
growth and food security. The Commission 
recommends a doubling of financing for 
agricultural research by 2030 for agricultural 
development in developing countries.   
 
Key drivers of food insecurity are likely to 
include: 
 Population increase. The current global 
population of 7.2 billion will increase to 
8.1 billion by 2025 and to 9.6 billion by 
2050. Most of the increase will occur in 
developing countries, rising from 5.9 
billion today to 8.2 billion in 2050, with 70 
percent of the population living in cities 
(Clay 2011). The world’s 49 least 
developed countries are projected to 
double in population from 900 million in 
                                                        
13 Beddington 2009; NIC 2012; Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014. 
14 The Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate, “Better Growth, Better Climate: The New 
Climate Economy Report”. September 2014. 
2013 to 1.8 billion in 2050 (UNDESA 
2013). 
 Increased availability of disposable 
income and urbanization resulting in 
changing consumption patterns. There will 
be about 600 million new consumers 
living in 440 cities in emerging markets by 
2025 (McKinsey 2012). This increase in 
per capita disposable income will increase 
consumption of energy and water and 
generate waste. Demand for food is 
expected to rise by 35 percent and energy 
by 50 percent over the next 15–20 years 
(NIC 2012). 
 Loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
productivity and services and land 
degradation. The 2104 New Climate 
Economy report estimates that about 25 
percent of agricultural land is degraded. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(UNEP 2005) concluded in 2005 that 
about 60 percent of ecosystem services 
studied are degraded or being used 
unsustainably. In 2010, the third Global 
Biodiversity Outlook (CBD 2010) also 
concluded that biodiversity was continuing 
to decline. Conversion of land for 
agriculture continues to be the leading 
cause of biodiversity loss. About a third of 
global freshwater biodiversity has already 
been lost, and this is expected to 
continue, particularly in Africa, Latin 
America, and parts of Asia. By 2070, fish 
extinction will occur in about 30 percent of 
the world’s rivers due to climate change 
and increasing water withdrawals (Pereira 
et al 2010). 
 Increased water insecurity. Agriculture 
accounts for about 70 percent of 
freshwater withdrawals today, and about 
30 percent (Foresight 2011) to 45 percent 
(NIC 2012) more water will be needed to 
meet 2030 food production needs (NIC 
2012, Foresight 2011). By 2030, about 
half of the world’s population will live in 
water-stressed areas, most notably in 
north and southern Africa and in south 
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and central Asia, and about a third of all 
people will face water deficits greater than 
50 percent of their needs. Total demand is 
expected to increase by about 40 percent 
by 2030 (NIC 2012; WRG 2009) and by 
55 percent by 2050 (OECD 2012). 
Perhaps the most significant threat to 
agriculture water supply is the depletion of 
aquifers due to extraction rates far 
exceeding recharge rates (OECD 2012). 
Increased efficiency is not providing 
sustainable improvement in water use. 
Since 1990, improvement was one 
percent across both rainfed and irrigated 
areas, a rate that would account only for 
20 percent of the supply-demand gap in 
2030. River basins in India could face the 
severest deficit, with the Ganga, Krishna, 
and Indus facing the biggest absolute gap 
in water supply (WRG 2009). 
 Demand for increase in agricultural 
productivity.15 The 2011 Foresight study 
estimates that about 925 million people 
suffer from hunger and perhaps another 
billion suffer from lack of adequate 
minerals and vitamins. With an eight 
percent increase in land brought under 
agricultural cultivation from 1967-2007, 
crop yields increased by 115 percent. To 
satisfy the world’s food needs by 2030, 
agricultural productivity will need to 
increase by about 80 percent. Current 
improvements in productivity are not 
keeping up with the increased needs. 
Africa already spends about $30 to $50 
billion/year to import food and this could 
reach $150 billion by 2030. Of about 11.5 
billion hectares of vegetated land, 24 
percent is affected by human-induced soil 
degradation. Meat production provides a 
stark example of the dramatic increases in 
production expected to meet future 
demands. Global cattle production is 
expected to increase by 70 percent, and 
sheep and goat production is expected to 
rise by 60 percent by 2050.  
 Climate change impacts. Without 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas 
                                                        
15 Projections from Foresight study on the “Future 
of Food and Farming,” 2011, and IFPRI, 
“Increasing Agricultural Productivity and Enhancing 
Food Security in Africa,” 2011. 
emissions (GHGs), global mean surface 
temperature increase in 2100 will range 
from 3.7 to 4.8C compared to 
preindustrial levels (IPCC WGIII AR5 
2014). The National Intelligence Council 
projects a 2C increase by 2050 and 
estimates that a 6C increase is more likely 
than a 3C increase by 2100 given the 
current and projected emission 
trajectories (NIC 2012).  More frequent 
incidences of climate extremes 
exacerbate the vulnerability of food 
insecure people and reduce incentives to 
invest in agricultural production, 
particularly among smallholders who have 
little access to credit and insurance. Some 
current and projected impacts of climate 
change on agriculture include: 
o Increased frequency of unusually hot 
nights since 1961 is damaging crops, 
with the greatest impact on rice yield 
and quality. 
o Increased daytime heat extremes can 
be lethal for crops. 
o Tropospheric ozone has very likely 
suppressed yields, with an estimated 
10 percent reduction for wheat and 
soybean and 3-5 percent reduction for 
maize and rice (IPPC). That value of 
global crop losses in 2000 are 
estimated at $14-$28 billion, with the 
greatest losses in India (28 percent) 
and China (19 percent) (Royal Society 
2009). 
o In addition to temperature change, 
acidification, sea level rise, flood, 
drought, and other extreme events will 
impact fisheries and aquaculture, 
particularly in low-lying areas. 
o Climate change will alter potential 
losses to pests and disease, 
suggesting a need for research on 
system-specific risk assessment. 
o Cereals grown under elevated CO2 
conditions show a decrease in protein, 
with a 10 to 14 percent decrease in 
edible portions of wheat, rice, barley, 
and potato. 
o Increasing heat and water stress are 
negatively affecting livestock. 
o For tropical systems affected by 
moisture availability and heat 
extremes, it is likely that the growing 
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season and overall suitability for crops 
will decline.  
 
Taking into consideration key “game 
changers” such as climate change, threats to 
food, water, and energy security, the global 
economy, governance, and regional instability, 
resource scarcity could play a role in 
increased intrastate and interstate conflict. 
Fragile states are most susceptible and need 
the most outside help, but even countries like 
China and India are vulnerable (NIC 2012). 
The most recent World Economic Forum 
Global Risks insight report, which has a 10-
year outlook, sees unmanaged migration due 
to resource scarcities as one of the top 10 
social risks, with linkages to a number of other 
risks, such as climate change, food shortages, 
and water supply crises (World Economic 
Forum 2013). 
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                4.   Panel Findings 
 
 
4.1 The Reforms 
The reform design retained four of its pre-
reform principles and introduced three new 
principles.  
 
The first principle carried over from the “old 
CGIAR” is maintaining donor sovereignty. 
However at the same time the reform sought 
to improve harmonization among donors in 
order to maximize pooled, fungible research 
funds. The original intent was that the CGIAR 
Fund would only finance agreed CRPs through 
two funding windows, one for unrestricted 
(pooled) contributions (Window 1) to be 
allocated to CRPs by the Fund Council and the 
second (Window 2) for contributions targeting 
specific CRPs. This objective was not achieved 
since several donors want or need to also be 
able to direct funding to Centers through the 
Fund, thus the establishment of a third pass-
through mechanism (Window 3) was 
established.16  
 
The second principle retained was the 
provision of independent scientific advice. 
However, the ISPC mandate is considerably 
reduced as compared to the earlier Technical 
Advisory Committee.  
 
Center autonomy was the third retained 
principle. Centers continue to have autonomy 
and are no longer accountable to the donor 
group. Accountability is achieved through 
contractual tools. As discussed further below, 
a key source of concern and confusion is the 
continuing lack of clarity of relationship and 
responsibilities between the Centers and the 
Consortium Board and Consortium Office. 
 
The fourth principle retained in the reformed 
CGIAR is the use of consensus decision-
making for the Fund Council. Decisions by the 
Fund Council are made by consensus of its 
Members (excluding the Chair).  
 
The 2008/2009 CGIAR reforms introduced 
                                                        
16  Selcuk Ozgediz. “The CGIAR at 40: Institutional 
Evolution of the World’s Premier Agricultural 
Research Network”. CGIAR Fund Office. 2013   
three new principles. A key objective of the 
current Panel is to review how well these have 
or are working and how well they position the 
CGIAR to meet the challenges of the future. 
They include: 
 Separation of funders from “doers” (the 
Centers and CRPs and Consortium) - this 
is the most fundamental shift, resulting in 
a two-pillared governance structure. The 
collective of funders as the Fund Council 
has an arms-length working relationship 
with Centers and CRPs, relying on the 
Consortium (Board and CEO) to represent 
the Centers interests at Fund Council 
deliberations.  
 Harmonization - the governance changes 
and a change management process were 
expected to stimulate a culture of 
collective action by funders and doers and 
improve efficiency and effectiveness.  
 Managing for results - funding approved 
by the Fund Council is based on 
performance agreements for specific 
results (outputs to outcomes to impacts). 
The shift from institutional (Center by 
Center) to programmatic funding (CRPs) 
provides the results orientation. The 
Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) is 
intended to provide the system-wide 
coherence for prioritization of research 
questions and delineation of expected 
outcomes. 
 
The reform of the CGIAR is, according to most 
stakeholders consulted by the MTR Panel, a 
work-in-progress. This is not surprising since it 
was carried out without a structured change 
management process17.  
                                                        
17 Several stakeholders, particularly Fund Council 
representatives, and the recent analysis, “The 
CGIAR Reforms: Old and New Challenges” by Uma 
Lele, Kendra White and Sambuddha Goswami in a 
new yet-to-be-published book, “International 
Organizations and Transformation of Food and 
Agriculture” (working title) emphasize that 
implementation of the reforms is not completed 
and that CGIAR may be going through a necessary 
evolution. 
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       Diagram 3: CGIAR Research Programs  
4.2 What We Heard – What Has Worked 
Well and Why? 
One of the initial questions of the Panel was 
“what are the Centers most proud of and how 
do they stand relative to other agricultural 
research institutions?” In response the 
Consortium Office prepared a note,  “Charting 
progress within CGIAR research programs,” 
that highlights a number of accomplishments, 
regarding its research, capacity building, 
translational research, products and genetic 
resources, its influence on policy decision-
making, and the development of a number of 
partnerships with the private sector.  
 
The following summarizes the feedback from 
stakeholders on the positive outcomes, such 
as those mentioned, of the reform process. 
 
 
4.2.1  Cross-cutting research programs 
The adoption of cross-cutting research 
programs - the CRPs – has generated some of 
the most important improvements in the 
CGIAR. The CRPs have:  
 Improved CGIAR’s focus on delivery of 
solutions and development impact by 
strengthening the structure of 
research for development impact 
pathways, including a better focus on 
gender and inclusion. 
 Increased collaboration among 
Centers. All of the stakeholder groups 
interviewed (funders, Consortium, 
Centers) and recent independent 
reviews of the CGIAR consider that 
one of the most important positive 
changes that has taken place as a 
result of the reforms has been the 
collaborative partnerships established 
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by Centers, with improved planning, 
coordination and joint work to 
undertake the CRPs. While the CRPs 
were the impetus, there has also been 
a tangible increase in scientific 
collaboration across Centers as 
evidenced by increased joint planning, 
implementation and publications. 
Another stimulus for the Centers to 
elevate collaboration has been a 
result of the new governance structure 
which largely leaves the Centers out of 
the decision-making process – hence 
increased collaboration to be 
proactive in addressing concerns 
about efficiency and effectiveness. 
 Led to improved conceptualization of 
how the CGIAR approaches delivery 
and impact, often through greatly 
improved geographic alignment. 
 Indirectly highlighted some of the 
comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of the centers, their 
organizational capacity, and 
robustness of their respective 
governance systems. 
 Significantly deepened CGIAR’s 
capacity and approaches to gender 
equity. 
 Broadened partnerships. In addition to 
continuing the practice of partnering 
with developing country partner NARS, 
some of the CRPs have been highly 
successful at establishing 
partnerships with outside 
organizations that not only enhances 
the quality of the research but also 
strengthens the linkage to scaling and 
delivery mechanisms.  
 
In addition, the Genebanks maintained by 
CGIAR Centers continue to be a core function 
of the partnership, providing a unique global 
public good. 
 
4.2.2 Strategy and Results Framework 
The decision to have a single, system-wide 
Strategy and Results Framework is certainly a 
positive outcome of the reforms. The fact that 
the first SRF was rushed in order to be able to 
proceed with the first round of CRPs could, in 
a perverse sense, generate positive results. In 
spite of the largely legacy-based first round 
CRPs, the collaborative approach to their 
management has improved coherence among 
them. Perhaps most importantly, is that the 
experience up to now points to the essentiality 
of having a well thought through SRF – 
focused on desired outcomes, so that the next 
round of CRPs can consequently address the 
highest, most urgent priority research 
questions. This could also provide confidence 
that sufficient funding will be available over a 
long enough period of time made possible 
because of clearly defined impact pathways 
with clearly defined, measurable intermediate 
development outcomes. In the long-term, this 
will further solidify the collaboration of Centers 
and other partners to focus and work 
collaboratively on common global research 
objectives.  
 
4.2.3  Resource mobilization 
The establishment of the Fund Council and 
the structure of the Fund (Windows) have 
improved Resource Mobilization. The level of 
funding has doubled since the reform process 
started, at least in part as a result of the 
collective commitment of the donors to 
channel scaled-up research funding through 
CGIAR if the reforms take hold. While still 
challenging, predictability of funding has 
improved. Unrestricted funding and multi-year 
commitments appear to be increasing in 
volume. Some donors have been encouraged 
to participate because of the funding leverage 
for CRPs, as well as the role in governance as 
a Window 1 and 2 donor. Views remain mixed 
on the viability of the current Window 
1/Window 2 and Window 3/bilateral funding 
system though. 
 
4.2.4 Effective oversight 
While not yet fully achieved, there are already 
improvements in Oversight of System-Wide 
Performance that should in-turn strengthen 
results-based management. The mandate of 
the Fund Council has improved the focus on 
fiduciary management at the CRP-level and 
Window performance. Monitoring for system-
wide issues such as gender and capacity 
development is improving as well, in part to 
the CRP review process.  
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4.2.5 Operational Efficiency 
The CRPs and Fund Windows serve as a 
platform for operational efficiency with the 
potential to drive further efficiencies in the 
system by linking supply of research expertise 
across the system to research needs, 
deploying and assembling talent to drive the 
emergence of research and delivery 
breakthroughs and address challenges such 
as intellectual property.  The CRPs provide a 
good platform for further gains in operational 
efficiency, such as joint finance, HR-planning, 
procurement, monitoring and evaluation, 
communications, resource mobilization and 
outreach. The Consortium Office and Fund 
Office are intended to facilitate such efficiency 
gains. The Consortium Office and Centers 
have assessed, partially implemented and are 
considering additional opportunities for (i) 
shared services, (ii) rationalizing co-locating of 
staff across countries/regions, (iii) managing 
security and related risks, and (iv) 
harmonizing practices where appropriate and 
building stronger communities of practice in 
capacity development, communications and 
knowledge management, and human 
resources. 
 
4.2.6  A focus on gender 
At the corporate level there is an increased 
focus on gender equality being considered in 
funded project activity.  While implementation 
across different CGIAR entities has been 
uneven, the corporate commitment has 
facilitated stronger efforts to mainstream 
gender equity at many levels in the 
commissioning of relevant research activities.  
 
4.3 What We Heard - What Has Not 
Worked Well and Why? 
Shortly after the MTR Panel was formed, in a 
meeting with some of the Panel members, 
Fund Council members and senior managers 
from across the CGIAR, a Center Director 
General (DG) pointed out “where you stand 
often depends upon where you sit”. This is 
clearly the case when it comes to views on the 
reform. There are varying views about what 
has been successful or unsuccessful, and 
whether it is simply a matter of requiring more 
time to achieve results anticipated by the 
reform design team.  
 
For example, several of the positive 
assessments by stakeholders recorded in the 
previous Section 4.2 included caveats. 
Similarly other stakeholders have expressed 
views opposite to those above. Furthermore, 
there are clearly grounds for argument on 
many of the views expressed above and 
below, if for no other reason than that many of 
the positive actions stimulated by the reforms 
have been uneven across the Centers and 
CRPs.  
 
4.3.1  Need for an effective Strategy and 
Results Framework 
There still is not an agreed overarching and 
focused CGIAR Vision, Mission or strategic 
guidance on critical outcomes from the SRF. 
The Mission reflected in the SLOs (reducing 
rural poverty, increasing food security, 
improving human health and nutrition, and 
ensuring the sustainable management of 
natural resources) is remarkably broad. It 
would not be too difficult to justify almost any 
research and development proposal as fitting 
this mission. Hence the lack of a high-quality 
Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) – 
focused on outcomes - is a key reason for 
many of the challenges facing the CGIAR 
partnership.  
 
One of the consequences of not having an 
effective SRF is the inability to prioritize 
outcomes and consequently the research 
undertaken; ensuring that budgets are 
allocated and adequate for successful 
implementation of the highest priority 
research activities. Similarly it is more difficult 
to establish robust metrics across the portfolio 
(beyond the individual project) and therefore 
to assess value as a system. Current work on 
the SRF is being undertaken in parallel with 
the work of the MTR Panel. Some 
stakeholders expressed agreement with the 
interim Panel recommendation that the 
preparation of the SRF should not be rushed 
so that donors and Centers can be fully 
engaged and that there is a sufficiently 
scientific basis for determining priorities. 
Views of the Panel in this regard are 
discussed in Section 5. 
 
Another example of varying views is that ISPC 
has registered concern that the lack of cross-
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CRP linkages is compromising one of the 
important objectives of the reform, that of 
greater collaboration leading to added value in 
the contribution to the SLOs. The ISPC review 
concluded that potentially synergistic research 
is being undertaken by CRPs without 
significant exchange of knowledge and 
experience between CRPs.18   
 
4.3.2  Governance ambiguities 
One of the objectives of the reform process 
was to reduce transaction costs and improve 
effectiveness and efficiency by simplifying the 
overall governance. This has not happened. 
The entities in the reformed CGIAR include the 
Fund Council (FC) and Fund office (FO), the CB 
and CO, the ISPC, the IEA, and the 15 Centers 
each with their own respective Boards.  There 
are also currently 16 CPRs – partnerships with 
their own governance structure and 
systems19.  
 
The lack of clarity of relative roles and 
responsibilities of the Fund Council, the 
Consortium, the Centers, and the CRP 
directors has led to a number of Governance 
ambiguities. There are also differing 
interpretations of the Consortium’s 
Constitution which defines the relationship 
between the Consortium Board, the 
Consortium Office and the Centers.  
 
Recent reviews of the CGIAR governance and 
the views expressed by the Centers in their 
joint submission to the Panel and by some 
donors emphasize that (i) the “doers” - the 
Centers - have been too far removed from the 
planning and decision-making processes, (ii) 
the sovereignty of the Fund Council members 
                                                        
18 This is particularly true in areas such as value 
chain approaches, livestock research, systems 
analysis and policy. (June 2014 review of 
extension proposals) 
19 The joint submission from the Centers states 
that “each CRP has a program management 
committee with an average size of roughly 10 
members thus engaging 150 people (15 CRP X 10 
members) at the management level with statutory 
meeting roughly four times per year. In addition, 
each CRP has an advisory committee/panel/board 
of roughly 10 people each, thus engaging about 
another 150 people at the advisory/governance 
level, meeting on average twice per year.” 
makes it difficult for the Council to provide 
guidance and govern the partnership20, and 
(iii) the Consortium is approaching 
management in a centralized corporate 
fashion as opposed to serving the collective of 
the Centers. 
 
Interviews with Centers and their joint 
submission make it clear that the tension 
between the CO and Centers, especially in the 
area of governance and management of the 
CRPs could significantly affect the overall 
system performance. The joint submission 
from the Centers to the Panel (Appendix 2) 
and the submission from the Consortium 
(Appendix 3) each highlight that the current 
interpretation of the legal relationship 
between the Consortium Board/Consortium 
Office (CB/CO) and the Centers leads to 
ambiguities in governance. The joint Center 
submission expresses that “ambiguity about 
whether the Centers are part of the 
Consortium or not and the uncertainty 
concerning the obligations in both directions 
have severely impeded the building of trust 
and cohesion between the Centers and the 
CB/CO.” The Centers “envisaged that the CO 
would be a convener, facilitator, and 
advocate, providing intellectual support in 
areas such as the quality of CRP 
submissions.” However, as a result of the 
ambiguity above, different expectations have 
emerged between the Centers and the CO 
over its role as facilitator or regulator, with 
significant lack of empowerment and hence 
potential loss of opportunity occurring for the 
CGIAR.  
 
A contrary view expressed by a few donors 
was that the reforms have not successfully 
shifted the Centers from being “independent 
kingdoms” and that the balance of 
centralization (CO) and decentralization 
(Centers) has yet to be found.  
 
Several Centers expressed the view that a 
concerted effort of the Centers working with 
                                                        
20 Lack of predictability in timing of receiving funds 
and slow decision-making on reserve policy were 
given as demonstrations of lack of accountability 
of Fund Council/Office. 
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the Fund Council and with support of 
Consortium Board for resource mobilization 
could dramatically improve levels of 
fundraising and could improve Fund Office 
performance and reduce transaction costs. 
There is concern regarding accountability of 
the Fund Council - from some donors as well 
as Centers - and a desire to see it become 
more active in strategic guidance and more 
decisive in its decision-making role. The 
improvements in donor coordination are not 
transparent to external stakeholders because 
the decision-making role of the Fund Council 
is largely that of periodically reviewing and 
approving the proposals for CRPs. Several 
CRP Directors expressed concern about the 
lack of transparency on CRP funding decisions 
and lack of clarity/definition of what Center 
actions count as CRP versus non-CRP. As a 
Council, the donors did not provide strategic 
direction to the SRF, though several individual 
donors have engaged in the process. Perhaps 
most telling is that after four years, while 
doubling the total funding for the CGIAR, the 
Fund Council has not been able to achieve 
harmonized funding at the desired level 
through Windows 1 and 2.  
 
Phase 2 of the CGIAR Governance Review, 
carried out by Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PwC) for the Fund Council, was finalized in 
September 201321. It included a number of 
conclusions and recommendations that have 
been reviewed and responded to in detail 
separately by the Consortium and the Fund 
Council Governance Committee. The general 
conclusion from the review was that “overall 
the reform is making progress: governance 
initiatives advance at different speeds. 
However, CGIAR has yet to address core 
questions such as the articulation of its 
strategy and operational model, how it intends 
to engage with Centers, donors and other key 
stakeholders and how it can concretely use 
governance to advance its strategic direction 
and coherence.” 
 
The PwC governance recommendations are 
grouped by (i) strategy, (ii) oversight, (iii) risk 
management, (iv) policy framework, (v) 
finance and operations, and (vi) fiduciary 
                                                        
21http://bit.ly/1nZRHnc  
oversight and audit. Most of the 
recommendations were accepted or partially 
accepted. Three of the recommendations that 
were rejected and are particularly relevant to 
the Panel TOR include: 
 Fund Office to prepare, Governance 
Committee to oversee, and Fund Council 
to approve a revised appointment 
process for Fund Council members to 
ensure an appropriate level of seniority 
at the Fund Council meetings (rejected 
because it is up to each donor to 
determine who will be on the Fund 
Council. 
 Legal and governance offices at Fund 
Council, Consortium and Center level to 
work more proactively together to ensure 
consistent governance advice to their 
respective governing bodies and offices 
about system (governance) challenges. 
 Expand the Consortium delegation at the 
Fund Council temporarily with Center 
representatives in addition to the 
Consortium Board and Consortium Office 
representatives (rejected because the 
Consortium is responsible for representing 
the Centers). 
 
PwC concluded that “At present, while 
operating in a dual board structure, one of the 
cornerstones of the reform process, there are 
insufficient mechanisms in place to ensure 
strategic alignment between both bodies. 
Good practice also generally raises the 
question of the appropriateness of the current 
dual structure. One of the main reasons for 
this structure was greater efficiency while at 
present many challenges (see below) are likely 
to be resolved more effectively by a single 
board structure:  
 Reduced accountability, transparency and 
coherence of decision-making; 
 Misallocation and duplication of roles 
within two boards and secretariats;  
 Higher costs to maintain two boards and 
two secretariats; and  
 Increased number of communication 
problems and misunderstandings and 
greater distance between the donors and 
Centers. “ 
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4.3.3 Ensuring quality research 
One of the high-level questions posed to the 
MTR Panel was whether the CGIAR is effective 
in generating and delivering solutions for 
reducing rural poverty, improving food security 
and advancing the livelihoods of users of its 
research. The ability of the CGIAR to deliver is 
dependent on a number of factors, but the 
quality of the research is considered by the 
Panel to be of highest priority. The CGIAR’s 
reputation is built on its research excellence 
and rigor.  
 
Some external reviews have considered that 
the reform, which replaced the Technical and 
Advisory Committee (TAC) with the ISPC, 
somewhat diluted the ability of the internal 
research review process to adequately guide 
strategy and prioritization and assess 
research quality. The primary role of ISPC is to 
ensure scientific rigor in the CRPs. Indeed a 
review by the Fund Office of the responses of 
Centers to ISPC comments on CRP proposals 
shows that the ISPC advice is generally acted 
on (more so for the substantive 
recommendations and less so on 
recommendations regarding institutional 
arrangements).  
 
But as is pointed out in the joint Center input 
to the Panel, “foresight studies, exploratory 
initiatives, novel discoveries are not now being 
sufficiently addressed.  Research oversight is 
essentially focused on the CRPs; and yet 
research quality, new research capacities and 
design of research programs are essentially 
managed by the Centers.   Centers are of the 
view that some of the current modalities of 
executing the CGIAR’s agenda erode their 
capacity for global scientific leadership.” The 
Panel concurs with this view. 
 
4.3.4  Uneven progress on efficiency 
The reforms were expected to improve 
efficiency but by all counts there has been 
uneven progress on efficiency.  In its 
submission to the Panel, one of the donors 
succinctly summarizes the issues as follows: 
the uneven progress on efficiency is a result of 
the “lack of system-wide coherence, 
coordination and improvement respecting 
operational, governance, and policy issues.  
The system operates more as a network than 
a corporate enterprise.  A deep dive diagnostic 
on the architecture of the system is needed to 
ensure the structure of the CGIAR is conducive 
to deliver its mandate.   We are hearing from 
Centers that transaction costs from individual 
bilateral projects remain high, and that the 
efforts to participate and manage reporting to 
different Boards and programs through the 
CRPs also has a high cost on staff time.  
Unlike other international organizations, there 
are few metrics substantiating the cost 
savings resulting from the reforms, and how 
these have been managed throughout the 
system.  There also appears to be little 
incentive to put such systems in place and an 
absence of accountability for their absence.”  
 
Many stakeholders consider that the burden 
of the bureaucracy, efficiency, and 
transactions costs have considerably 
worsened since the reforms. Many also noted 
that the reform process has not led to an 
adequate agreement on accountabilities. 
 
4.3.5  Remaining needs for gender 
commitments in research activities 
undertaken 
While one of the positive outcomes of the 
reforms listed above is attention to gender 
equity in the planning and conduct of research 
activities, others have expressed that the 
reforms have not resulted in the 
implementation of gender commitments. At 
best the implementation, and capacity to 
implement, has been uneven across Centers 
and CRPs.  
 
ISPC review of CRP extension proposals saw 
little evidence that CRP proposals had really 
incorporated gender-linked constraints in the 
research commissioned and concerns into the 
prioritization of research at the level of 
specific traits and problems that research 
should aim to address. Integration of gender 
equity into results and accountability 
frameworks is also inconsistent across the 
CRPs. Discussion with senior HR staff of one 
Center revealed data that gender balance 
remains a critical challenge in terms of Center 
employment. 
 
4.3.6 Enabling strategic partnerships 
Similar to the gender equity issue, the ability 
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of the CGIAR to establish strategic 
partnerships, has been improved as a result 
of the CRPs, but how CGIAR engages partners 
outside the system and the strategic choices it 
makes about linking with delivery agents 
remains unclear. The ISPC, while 
complimenting the progress made, noted that 
“it was difficult to interpret from the extension 
proposals, how much strategic thinking had 
gone into the selection of partners in some 
CRPs. The quality of partnerships was another 
area of concern. The CGIAR might not have a 
strong comparative advantage in all desired 
areas of research/activity but it has the 
potential to form effective partnerships with 
leading organizations that provide 
complementary capacities, thereby generating 
collaborative advantage. For most CRPs, 
however, the rationale for selection of 
research partners was not clearly stated.”  
 
4.3.7  Communicating with one voice 
Given the numerous challenges described 
above, it is not a surprise that several 
stakeholders consider that the reforms have 
not led to improved communications. CGIAR 
speaks with multiple voices and messages are 
often inconsistent. There is no single voice for 
CGIAR. Center DGs most often represent their 
particular Center, not CGIAR, and not 
surprising since they each answer to their own 
Board and in many cases the Center brand is 
more effective at generating financial support 
then the CGIAR brand. There is little incentive 
for corporate coherence or strategic 
messaging about the objectives of the reform 
by the Centers, the global challenges being 
addressed or the solutions being provided to 
the global community. 
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                5.   Conclusions 
 
 
Sustained poverty reduction, human well-
being and economic growth, particularly in 
developing countries, requires a rapid and 
intensive scaling-up of agricultural research. 
Without the support of carefully targeted 
agricultural research, the international 
community faces some major global public 
liabilities—the medium- and long-term risks 
posed by food insecurity; the loss of 
biodiversity and the degradation of 
ecosystems and the services they provide; 
water scarcity; and depleted or collapsed 
oceanic fisheries. Moreover, the rapid 
acceleration of urbanization will, under 
business as usual, drive corresponding 
increases in consumption and waste 
generation. Furthermore, if climate change 
goes unchecked over the next 20 years, global 
risk profiles move into largely uncharted 
territory.  
 
Improvements in human welfare achieved 
over the last few decades have been 
substantial, but the gains are at least partially 
deceptive given the risks outlined above. The 
development and dissemination of knowledge 
and innovation, the cooperative management 
of common-pool resources, the mobilization of 
large-scale public and private investment in 
agricultural research relevant to developing 
countries’ needs, and well-managed and 
networked research programs, are all 
important elements in mitigating global risks.  
 
Since the initial Panel meeting in January 
2014, a large volume of existing and new 
information has been provided to the Panel to 
provide the evidence needed to draw 
conclusions regarding CGIAR’s ability to lead 
global agriculture research necessary to 
address the aforementioned challenges. 
Appendix 4 summarizes the Panel’s views on 
the aforementioned questions included in the 
Panel TOR. The following presents our key 
conclusions. 
 
5.1 CGIAR leadership in global agriculture 
research  
CGIAR has the opportunity to provide 
important global leadership to address the 
issues summarized above. CGIAR should be at 
the center of a global effort to scale-up 
targeted research to meet global needs. If 
such an organization did not already exist, 
then it would be necessary to establish one in 
order to systematically engage the broader 
agricultural research communities to identify 
and prioritize research infrastructure and 
research investments.  
 
The current system-wide reporting on the 
results of CGIAR research - from Centers and 
from the CRP partnerships - does not provide 
a clear answer as to whether CGIAR is capable 
of taking such a leadership role. Questions 
remain regarding the key qualities that are 
needed to take such a leadership role, such 
as the CGIAR’s ability to articulate a clear 
value proposition, prioritize the use of limited 
funds, avoiding centers’ self-interests; 
undertake research meeting the highest 
standards; identify and undertake critically 
needed blue-sky research and recognizing the 
need to take risks and reward failure; optimize 
value for money by strengthening the linkages 
between discovery and delivery; establish 
collaborative partnerships that facilitate the 
needed scale and speed to address growing 
global challenges; and finding innovative 
financing mechanisms to double funding for 
targeted priority research. It is the Panel’s 
view that CGIAR has the potential to play this 
global leadership role, but not as it is currently 
structured and managed.  
 
The 2008/2009 reforms have generated a 
number of positive outcomes as described in 
Section 4.2, above. But the continuing and in 
some cases growing challenges outlined in 
Section 4.3 must be addressed, and soon. 
The Panel concludes that the five “big 
challenges” are: 
 
1. Developing an SRF that effectively guides 
system-wide decision-making, including 
periodic adjustments in strategy based on 
effective feedback, identification of 
strategic partners and that provides 
adequate confidence to existing and 
current donors to enable them to increase 
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overall funding for CRPs, in particular 
through Windows 1 and 2;  
2. Removing the governance ambiguities so 
staff at all levels are empowered to deliver 
on CGIAR’s vision, that stakeholders’ 
voices are heard and count, expected 
efficiency gains can be realized, and the 
collective actions of the Centers and 
partners do indeed exceed the sum of the 
parts;  
3. Strengthening research oversight; 
4. Establishing strategic partnerships that 
will lead to the delivery of the agricultural 
research required to transform agriculture 
to meet nutritional requirements and a 
food secure future; and 
5. Innovating financing to leverage the 
current grant financing provided to CGIAR. 
 
5.2 Strategy and Results Framework  
The preparation of the first post-reform 
Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) by the 
Consortium Office in 201122 provided an 
initial framework for CGIAR’s strategic 
planning, management and communications 
in support of results-based management. The 
agreed system level outcomes (SLOs) included 
reducing rural poverty, improving food 
security, improving nutrition and health, and 
sustainable management of natural 
resources. The guidance for CRPs in the first 
SRF was recognized as being insufficient for 
guiding strategic decision-making on the 
selection of CRPs and for guiding the 
measurement of performance of CRPs against 
clear targets. The SRF was nevertheless 
accepted as meeting the requirement of 
having an SRF as a condition for providing 
funding for CRPs.  
 
In 2012 an SRF Action Plan provided 
additional guidance on how to prioritize CRP 
proposals and quantitatively measure 
progress towards meeting SLOs by 
establishing a list of prioritized intermediate 
development outcomes (IDOs). It also added a 
foresight dimension to the strategic 
framework. This was supplemented December 
2013 with an SRF Management Update 2013-
2014 that further clarified an accountability 
                                                        
22http://bit.ly/1pRMYio  
framework to assist in resource allocation for 
CRPs. The Update, essentially a bridging 
exercise between the original SRF and the 
second SRF to be considered for approval in 
2015 (currently under preparation) also 
proposed targets intended to align with 
forthcoming post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and to ensure 
that gender, foresight, partnership and 
capacity building dimensions be incorporated 
in CRPs as cross-cutting themes. Metrics for 
targets and indicators were not included.   
 
The Consortium Office also circulated draft 
Guidance for the Second Call for CRPs in 
parallel with the SRF Update. This was needed 
because the CRP contracts for the first three 
CRPs expired in mid-2014 and the remaining 
CRPs will expire late 2015. The Fund Council 
in May 2014 endorsed the Consortium Board 
recommendation for extension of all of the 
CRPs to the end of 2016.  
 
An initial Panel observation of the preparation 
process of the new SRF was that the 
preparatory process did not provide adequate 
opportunities for inputs from various 
stakeholders. The donors, while initially 
providing little guidance in terms of their 
collective or bilateral strategic priorities, have 
more recently engaged in its development. 
Several donors have made it clear that future 
funding is dependent on a high quality SRF. 
Participation of Centers and non-center 
partners has been sporadic but the 
opportunities are improving.  
 
Based on a briefing on the SRF preparation at 
the July Panel meeting and subsequent 
consultations, but noting that the Panel has 
not had an opportunity to review the latest 
version of the SRF, the Panel’s conclusion is 
that the risk is high that the final SRF may not 
facilitate determination of the critical 
outcomes the CGIAR should be addressing, 
the highest priorities for research and the 
minimum funding required to enable each 
priority CRP to reach its agreed objectives. The 
Panel would be reassured if by this time the 
Fund Council had made clear the detailed 
criteria upon which it would judge the 
adequacy of the SRF. 
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5.3 System architecture and governance  
Ambiguities in leadership, responsibilities and 
accountabilities are a major drawback of the 
reformed CGIAR. A range of ambiguities in the 
post-reform CGIAR governance have been 
described in a number of evaluations solicited 
by the Fund Council and Consortium Board, 
and independent studies. This issue has come 
up in most of the consultations with 
stakeholders and surfaced in Panel 
discussions with the Reference Group. Some 
of the sources of problems and most troubling 
ambiguities include:  
 The objective of the reform was to 
separate the “doers” from the “funders” 
because it was felt that donors interfered 
too much and micro-managed their 
projects in the Centers; and that Centers 
had become too expert at lobbying donors 
to get projects funded that they wanted to 
do regardless of CGIAR priorities. This has 
resulted in the opposite of coordinated or 
harmonized stakeholder engagement. 
Centers do not consider themselves 
adequately represented in key strategic 
discussions and decision-making. Other 
key stakeholders, such as NARs and 
private sector partners, are not adequately 
represented, largely relying on the biennial 
GCARD process. 
 The Consortium has a constitution that 
was commented on by funders but was 
never intended to be approved by them.  
Parts of the constitution are not in 
alignment with the Fund establishment 
documents leading to ever more ambiguity 
and lack of clarity regarding 
accountability. This contributes to 
ambiguities relating to leadership, 
partnership and fundraising roles. 
 The current set up of two boards 
(Consortium Board and Fund Council is 
not effective in delivering: 
o Strong and coordinated strategic 
leadership; 
o Clear accountability and 
ownership; 
o Transparency and coherence of 
overall decision-making; 
o Efficient, lean and low cost 
decision-making processes. (See 
PwC governance report). 
 The two-pillar model leads to much 
duplication, inefficiency and unease, 
between the Consortium Board and Fund 
Council and their respective secretariats 
(Consortium Office and Fund Office). This 
has led to the constant need for back and 
forth communication, even for something 
like a mid-year request for an increase in 
budget by the Consortium Office for a 
specific area of work.   
 What is the CGIAR and who comprises it? 
CGIAR has yet to address core questions 
such as the articulation of its strategy 
and operational model, how it intends to 
engage with Centers, donors and other 
key stakeholders and how it can 
concretely use governance to advance its 
strategic direction and coherence (PwC). 
 Lack of a business plan. Currently, the 
Centers and the various entities in CGIAR 
have to deal with the development of new 
roles, policies and procedures without a 
business model and with insufficient 
clarity regarding strategic direction.  
 There are different views on the 
operationalization of principles guiding 
the reform process and funding for 
CGIAR. 
 There is no collective agreement on the 
balance of CGIAR effort to address longer-
term regional and global food security 
issues or shorter-term national research 
needs including building capacity, or both. 
Rather, the balance is derived in an ad 
hoc fashion by individual donors making 
their own decisions – it is unplanned and 
therefore random.  
 Fund Council decision-making is limited to 
approval of the CRPs when they are 
contracted (every 3-5 years).  The Fund 
Council does not have a mandate to make 
any real funding decisions once the CRP 
contracts have been signed with the 
Consortium.  Since the development of the 
SRF is the Consortium’s responsibility, it 
appears that the FC has very limited 
accountability or strategic responsibility,  
 The “doer” partners, the Centers, are legal 
entities governed by their own Boards- not 
by the Consortium Board or FC. Centers 
raise about 65 percent of the total CGIAR 
funding as Window 3 and bilateral, largely 
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on the basis of the individual Center’s 
brand and reputation. If they do not feel 
they are a part of the Consortium, then 
much of what the Consortium is doing to 
increase efficiency, effectiveness and 
harmonization is not well received or 
implemented. 
 The status of Consortium Board in terms 
of relationship to Fund Council remains a 
source of dispute. For example, are they 
equal partners or is the Consortium Board 
subordinate? 
 The authority of the Consortium CEO vis-à-
vis Center DGs is not clear.  
 The array of CRP governance bodies is 
complex and duplicative. The CRP 
governance review identified a total of 23 
active CRP governance bodies; these 
varied in terms of composition, size, 
function and degree of independence. 
Some CRPs have a single governance 
body, while others were found to have the 
functional equivalent of two or more (CRP 
Governance Review). 
 External CR P  partners had limited roles 
at the governance level,  
 There is a lack of a common 
understanding about roles and relative 
authority of CRPs at the system level, 
among the Fund Council, the Consortium 
and Centers (CRP Governance Review). 
 The current reporting line, which for the 
most part is through the Lead Center DG, 
as well as the number and structure of 
CRP governance and management 
committees, limits the scope and authority 
of CRP leaders to manage effectively (CRP 
Governance Review). 
 
The Panel found the two-pillared structure to 
be a part of the overall governance problem of 
the CGIAR.  A new structure and suggested 
transition arrangement are presented in 
Section 6, Recommendations. 
 
5.4 Research – strategic guidance and 
quality assurance 
The Panel found ambiguities in the 
institutional responsibilities for research-
based strategic guidance and research quality 
assurance. The recent Elsevier studies 
commissioned by the Consortium Office are 
encouraging, as are the reports from 
individual Centers and CRPs on 
accomplishments. However, the Panel is 
unable to assess the overall quality and rigor 
behind the scientific research of CGIAR 
because there is no routine credible 
assessment being undertaken. As noted 
above, the Panel is concerned with the lack of 
research-based guidance in setting priorities 
for the SRF. There is no single body charged 
with the overall responsibility to carry out 
foresight research to guide strategy and 
prioritization and to assess the scientific 
quality of the research across the CGIAR. The 
ISPC, Consortium Office Chief Science Advisor, 
IEA and each Center have research quality 
assurance roles. 
 
Some external reviews have considered that 
the reform, replacing the Technical and 
Advisory Committee (TAC) and later the 
Science Council with the ISPC, somewhat 
diluted the ability of the internal research 
review process – the Panel concurs with this 
assessment. The primary role of ISPC is to 
ensure research rigor in the CRPs. The Panel 
is not criticizing the ISPC - it seems to have 
carried out its designated functions. But its 
authority is limited to the extent that the Fund 
Council supports and acts on its 
recommendations.  
 
Up until the end of 2010 the CGIAR used to 
conduct a verified, self-reported performance 
assessment that included research and 
impact aspects. This exercise, overseen jointly 
by the CGIAR Secretariat and the Science 
Council, assessed the quality of research 
based on indicators such as number of 
externally peer-reviewed publications per 
scientist, output targets and outcomes in 
terms of degree of achievement, and degree 
of impact culture at the Center. Centers also 
undertook external research and research 
reviews which reported to their respective 
Boards of Trustees. This stopped in 2011 
when CRPs became operational and now the 
Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA) 
carries out a consultant-led review of CRPs 
once every 5 years. 
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5.5 Broadening partnerships - building on 
CGIAR  
The CGIAR Centers have for many years been 
global leaders in agricultural research for 
developing countries. The reforms, particularly 
the adoption of the CRPs as the key research 
vehicle, encouraged the Centers to strengthen 
their partnerships among each other and with 
external partners. Many major national 
agriculture research programs in developing 
and developed countries - government, 
university and private - are similarly improving 
their focus and effectiveness.  
 
The multiple roles of multilateral 
organizations, particularly the World Bank, 
IFAD, and FAO, have been of critically 
important in facilitating many of the CGIAR 
successes to date. As development 
organizations, these CGIAR partners, as well 
as many donors, are very well positioned to 
support the Centers collectively to reach new 
heights when it comes to leading agricultural 
research at the international level.   
 
The critical question, if one takes a longer-
term view, is whether the Centers, working 
with World Bank and others that have a 
development delivery role, can provide the 
research required to transform agriculture to 
meet nutritional requirements and a food-
secure future. The Panel considers that the 
current approach leads to incremental and 
essentially marginal impacts in consideration 
of the complexity of food security and nutrition 
challenges.  
 
The Panel concludes that, in addition to the 
current effort to improve the strategic focus 
and results of the CGIAR system, new 
partnership models will be required, designed 
to optimize the capabilities and strengths of a 
broader range of partners. This should be 
done with CGIAR at the center, with coalition 
governance geared toward achieving 
“collective impact” at a large-scale. Some 
suggested approaches to developing 
collective impact partnerships are presented 
in Section 6, Recommendations. 
 
5.6 Innovative financing 
One of the early questions the Panel raised 
was whether the CGIAR was considering more 
innovative approaches to securing financing. It 
was surprising to learn that the Fund Council 
had not addressed this opportunity since 
several of the Fund Council members have led 
initiatives for innovative financing for health 
and other development sectors. It is also 
surprising considering the risks inherent in 
continuing to rely on direct grants given the 
current and projected reductions in ODA. 
Some Centers have been able to access 
funding other than grants, but this is small-
scale and certainly not system-wide. The 
discussion that the Panel has had with private 
sector stakeholders innovative financing 
experts, and the likelihood that research 
infrastructure and research investments 
needed to provide major biological advances 
could provide be investment opportunities for 
the financial sector currently exposed to 
systemic financial risk that resides in food 
system failures, leads us to conclude that 
there are opportunities for financial innovation 
that could significantly leverage the current 
grant financing provided to CGIAR. However, 
there are risks (reputational and financial) 
that need to be overcome to enable the 
donors to support such innovation. The Panel 
believes the risks should be manageable and 
the benefits far outweigh the risks. Some 
suggested approaches to innovative financing 
are presented in Section 6, 
Recommendations. 
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                6.   Recommendations  
 
6.1 Vision and Mission  
A common vision is required across the CGIAR 
system. A clear and focused vision should be 
developed to guide the decisions on priority 
research objectives, facilitate the 
development of strategic approaches to 
reaching those objectives, and provide 
adequately detailed expectations of results.  
 
The Panel recommends a task force, of senior 
representatives of Centers, Consortium, ISPC, 
IEA, and the Fund Council, be established 
immediately with a mandate to propose a 
CGIAR Vision that meets the above criteria. 
The task force should also review and identify 
priority areas of research, and advise ongoing 
work on the SRF so that it reflects this vision 
and its priorities.  
 
The Panel recommends that the focused 
vision for CGIAR be oriented towards 
agricultural research required to meet 
immediate and long-term nutrition needs and 
achieve equitable food security by 2030. 
Achieving such a vision will rely largely on 
current Center capacities but also require 
substantial scale-up of research partnerships 
for achieving climate-smart agriculture, 
sustainable intensification, improving and 
sustaining ecosystem services, and improving 
orphan crops.  
 
6.2 Prioritization 
The Panel, with Fund Office support, tasked 
two independent experts to organize a 
workshop of globally eminent scholars and 
practitioners to identify the highest priority 
researchable topics in the area of applied 
natural and social sciences related to 
interventions focused on improving the lives 
of the world's poorest people. The experts 
considered current frontier thinking about 
agricultural and food systems, nutritional 
security and dietary health, and the expected 
major drivers of change in the coming 
decades. A food systems approach was taken 
and the topics considered were not limited to 
those solely or chiefly concerned with 
agriculture or that traditionally have been part 
of the CGIAR remit. The result was the 
identification of 28 priority research areas.23 
Among these 28, the Panel identified five 
major research challenges with potential for 
very high payback. The list is by no means 
definitive- but this level of prioritization is 
needed to sharpen focus and impact. These 
include: 
 
1) Nutrition. All CGIAR food crop and 
livestock research should include 
nutritional improvement as an embedded 
objective, with a specific focus on 
reducing stunting and related impacts 
based on local conditions. 
2) Degraded lands. About 25 percent of the 
world’s agricultural land is severely 
degraded. Research should focus on 
increasing sustainable agricultural 
productivity or healthy agro-ecosystems 
for the world’s degraded arable land. 
3) Reduce Food systems waste. About 24 
percent of the caloric value of food 
intended for human consumption is 
wasted. In developing countries, about 66 
percent of the loss is during harvest, 
storage, and processing. Research should 
focus on reducing food system waste by 
considering the food value chain as well 
as opportunities to use waste for other co-
benefits related to sustainability and 
profitability – enhancing soil condition, 
energy generation, etc. 
4) Resilience. Recognizing that the poorest 
smallholder farmers are generally the 
most vulnerable and least resilient to 
shocks, agricultural research needs to be 
targeted to keep pace with the growing 
global, regional and local impacts of 
climate change, water shortages and 
other shocks. 
5) Big data. Investing in open data 
architectures, high performance 
computing and visualization facilities and 
big data analytics capabilities is of direct 
relevance to CGIAR’s outcomes and its 
                                                        
23 Priority Research Topics that Address Food 
System Knowledge Gaps to Improve the Lives of 
the World's Poor. 2014. Report by Charles Godfray 
and Molly Jahn, http://bit.ly/1t2QygH.  
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aspiration to be a global leader of 
networks. CGIAR is well positioned to 
develop a global agri-informatics network 
focused on “evidence based management 
of agro-ecosystems” by partnering with 
like-minded regional and global networks 
and organizations to leverage existing 
infrastructure and capabilities, improve 
the access and utility of agri-related data 
and save significant resources. 
 
There are certainly other priorities such as 
sustainable intensification and there are other 
ways to prioritize. The Panel recommends that 
the aforementioned task force should 
undertake a systematic process of 
prioritization. The objective should be to 
provide a menu of options for CGIAR and its 
partners to determine how they can maximize 
impacts with the least costs for both upstream 
and downstream research. The result might 
be a “food insecurity abatement curve” and a 
“nutritional value benefit curve”, each of 
which would estimate prospective benefits of 
targeted research streams against costs 
(including time) to achieve the results or 
reduce risks to targeted levels. Such curves 
would assist donors in identifying where they 
might achieve the largest benefits for the least 
costs in addressing the drivers of food 
insecurity, including productivity, water 
scarcity, and climate change; determining an 
appropriate balance of systems and breeding 
research, for example; and further 
strengthening gene bank management; as 
well as identifying potential high risk-high 
reward research areas. 
 
6.3 Strategy and Results Framework  
The Panel recommends that the Fund Council 
and Consortium Board should establish clear 
criteria by which they determine whether the 
SRF under preparation meets their needs. It 
must enable prioritization of research (CRPs) 
leading to confidence that the limited financial 
resources are being used for the greatest 
impact, and that those resources are 
sufficient for achieving the research goals. In 
this regard, it is timely to consider piloting, 
within the next round of CGIAR Research 
Program (CRP) proposals, a more open and 
competitive platform to allow a non-Center to 
lead on a proposal if it is uniquely qualified to 
do so, and piloting a performance-based 
financing mechanism. 
 
The research targets and indicators in the SRF 
should guide the individual CRPs and facilitate 
effective periodic review of research progress 
of the CRP portfolio to determine whether the 
portfolio of research is achieving the broad 
strategic objectives.  
 
The preparation of the SRF must have 
sufficient stakeholder participation to ensure 
joint ownership of the final product - the 
proposed task force can facilitate this. The 
process should take as much time as is 
required to get it right. The call for the second 
round of CRP proposals should only be issued 
after the Fund Council is fully satisfied with 
the SRF, including an assurance from CGIAR 
stakeholders that there is broad support. 
  
6.4 Governance structure 
The Panel strongly recommends that a single 
CGIAR Board be established replacing the 
Fund Council and the Consortium Board.  The 
Board should be supported by a CGIAR 
Administrative Unit, replacing the Fund Office 
and Consortium Office. The Panel considers 
that a properly designed and managed Board 
would eliminate the current governance 
ambiguities, strengthen the ability of CGIAR to 
deliver its mission of research and 
development impact, and to lead an effort for 
accelerated, scaled-up, solution-driven public-
private collaborative partnerships required to 
avoid food insecurity in the coming decades.  
 
We are not recommending that the CGIAR 
return to its old governance structure prior to 
the 2009 reforms. 24 The evaluation of the 
governance system leading up to the reform 
noted that the CGIAR’s governance systems 
                                                        
24 A summary of what had gone wrong with the 
multi-stakeholder Executive Committee approach 
of the CGIAR is in K.A. Bezanson and P. Isenman. 
“Governance of New Global Partnerships: 
Challenges, Weakness, and Lessons.” Center for 
Global Development Policy Paper 014. 2012 and 
the detailed assessment, “Independent Evaluation 
of the Partnership Committees of the CGIAR: Final 
Report” April 2004 is available at: 
http://bit.ly/1CV4ydy  
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and structures were largely dysfunctional, had 
not produced a strategy with results 
orientation, and lacked clarity on authority and 
decision-making. That evaluation 
recommended governance transformation to 
a rebalanced partnership with a shared 
strategy. 
 
The Panel is not in a position to design the 
overall governance structure; this requires 
careful, transparent, and consultative 
planning. The Panel notes that PwC came to a 
similar, though tentative conclusion in its 
report. After providing the Global Fund and 
GAVI as examples of the successful adoption 
of single structure, multi-stakeholder 
governing bodies, the PwC report notes that, 
“Most of other comparable organizations to 
the CGIAR in the development sector are 
working hard towards leaner governance 
structures and recently transitioned to 
multiple stakeholder representation in central 
board structures. These single boards are 
providing strong and visible leadership, 
attracting a lot of innovative funding, and new 
partnerships and are comprised of 
representative seats …”Appendix 5 
summarizes the structures and functions of 
the boards of a number of such organizations.  
 
Based on the positive experiences of other 
global partnerships, the Panel considers that 
the new CGIAR Board needs to adequately 
and effectively represent key stakeholders,25 
with clarity on the rationale for inclusion of 
stakeholders and the expectations of them. 
Consideration should be given to the size of 
the Board, limiting the number of members to 
ensure that it is manageable (see below). This 
will inevitably lead to a constituency-based 
board.   
                                                        
25 Bezanson and Isenman (2012) review of 
governance of global partnerships recommend 
avoiding constituency boards if possible, in part 
because they found that constituency boards tend 
to put the interests of the constituencies over 
those of the organization. They also caution on 
multi-stakeholder boards because they tend to be 
too large in order to be inclusive. However the 
Panel considers that a multi-stakeholder 
constituency-based board is feasible and 
necessary for the CGIAR. 
 
The governance design needs to specify the 
roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of 
Board members, its Chair, the head of the 
administrative unit, and the Centers. 
Particular attention should be given to clarity 
between the roles and responsibilities of the 
Board, its Chair and the head of the 
administrative unit. Similarly, the design 
should provide clarity on Board accountability 
for setting strategy, empowering Centers and 
CRPs to implement the strategy and the 
supporting role of the administrative unit. The 
design of the governance structure should 
also ensure transparency in decision-making 
as well as clear systems of accountability and 
performance reporting. 
 
The Board should focus on high-level, 
strategic issues, articulating accountabilities 
but allowing each Center and CRP to manage 
the on-the-ground work of CGIAR and the 
Board’s administrative unit to focus on day-to-
day management issues, such as 
administrative efficiencies, regulatory 
compliance, and reporting. Such high-level 
issues for the Board are likely to include 
establishing the overall strategy and principles 
that govern funding decisions; governance 
decisions, such as appointing the Board and 
Board Committee leadership; establishing 
policies for fiduciary and risk management, 
and other key policy elements of governance; 
management oversight; stakeholder 
participation; and review and approval of 
funding proposals.  
 
The Panel considers that, in order to avoid 
perceived or real conflicts of interest, the 
Board Chair should represent the mission of 
the CGIAR partnership and therefore should 
not represent a constituency.  Further, it 
considers that the Board Chair should have 
sufficient time to commit to that role to 
effectively lead the Board, which in addition to 
chairing Board meetings, could include 
serving as the principle spokesperson, 
advocate, and fundraiser for CGIAR and 
leading the Board’s inter-sessional work.  
 
Clear provisions to avoid perceived or real 
conflicts of interest from potential recipients 
of CGIAR funds (particularly Centers) and 
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beneficiaries of research results (particularly 
private sector) will be required.  
 
The Panel believes that the key stakeholders 
requiring representation on the CGIAR Board 
are the donors, CGIAR centers, NARs, 
agricultural private sector representatives, 
civil society development organizations (CSO), 
and recipient countries.  
 
Transparent procedures should be set out by 
the Fund Council to consider the member 
constitution and related Board matters. Based 
on legal advice provided to the Panel, it 
understands that the proposed Board could 
operate with or without its own legal identity. 
 
The Panel suggests that the size of the Board 
be limited to about 20 individuals, including 
the Chair. The design of the Board will need to 
identify the number of representatives from 
each constituency and breakdown the 
constituencies into sub-constituencies. For 
example, a 20-member Board might include 
six donor representatives, four CGIAR Center 
representatives (including at least one 
Director General), three NARs representatives, 
two private sector representatives, three 
recipient country representatives, and a 
development CSO. Self-selection of qualified 
board members would be made at the sub-
constituency level. Donor constituencies could 
be determined by size of contribution and/or 
geographic representation. CGIAR Center 
representation could be determined by size or 
thematic area of research (similar to the 
current breakdown of CRPs). Sub-
constituencies for NARs and recipient 
countries could be based on geographic 
considerations (for example, one each from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America). Private sector 
representation should include those from both 
developed and developing countries, with self-
selection by relevant industry associations. 
 
The ISPC Chair, who is essentially the chief 
scientist of CGIAR, should be an ex-officio 
member of the Board. 
 
The Panel recommends that the Board be 
charged with the responsibility (among others) 
of establishing a donor council, chaired by one 
of the donor members of the CGIAR Board. 
The donor council would advise the Board on 
the views of the broader CGIAR donor base 
regarding operations, fundraising, expanding 
the donor base and so on.  The donor council 
would meet prior to each board meeting.  It is 
also recommended that the CGIAR Centers 
establish an advisory committee, chaired by 
one of the Center members of the CGIAR 
Board, in order to advise the Board on new 
advances in research, and new or emerging 
challenges and risks for which urgent action 
by the CGIAR should be undertaken.  
 
In discussions with several stakeholders 
regarding the recommendation that a new 
CGIAR Board and Administrative Unit replace 
the current governance structure, a common 
question was “where should it be located?” 
The Panel is not in a position to advise on this 
issue. However, it does suggest that a 
competitive proposal approach be utilized, 
similar to that used by the UNFCCC for the 
selection of the location of the GCF. The 
Administrative Unit functions and related 
staffing should be limited to clearly delineated 
support functions required by the Board. Most 
of the functions of the Fund Office and many 
of the functions of the Consortium Office 
would need to be transferred to the 
administrative unit. But some functions need 
not be transferred, but rather should be taken 
on by the ISPC or the Centers. For example, 
some of the work by the Consortium Office to 
harmonize system-wide functions and services 
should be undertaken by the Centers, and the 
Centers should be held jointly accountable for 
the results with the Center members on the 
Board, providing periodic reports to the Board 
on progress and constraints.26 
 
Transition 
The Panel recommends that the design of the 
Board be undertaken in parallel with the 
                                                        
26 This type of arrangement should exemplify 
the spirit of a multi-stakeholder board - each 
stakeholder group has responsibilities to 
make the CGIAR successful, and the Board 
deliberations are transparent so that each 
stakeholder group is held accountable 
through its constituency representatives on 
the board. 
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completion of the SRF and the call for 
proposals of the next round of CRPs. The new 
governance structure should be in place in 
time to make the final decisions on the 
selection of the next round of CRPs. 
 
Transitional arrangements, including explicit 
change management planning and execution, 
will need to be made to facilitate the 
establishment of the new Board and convene 
an initial Board meeting and establish the 
Administrative Unit. The Board will need to 
make a number of policy decisions. A 
transition team will need to be established, 
presumably by the Fund Council, with 
expertise matching the needs for supporting 
the Board in making these initial, critical 
decisions.  
 
Examples of the key tasks of the Board will be 
to establish: 
 Development of a change management 
plan, including key sponsors and enablers 
of the changes 
 Fiduciary standards and assessment 
guidelines for CGIAR funded operations; 
 Criteria and guidelines for consideration of 
CRPs; 
 Criteria and guidelines for consideration of 
funding proposals for new collaborative 
research partnerships, particularly with 
regards to any special private sector 
considerations; 
 Audit arrangements; 
 Trustee arrangements; 
 Internal procurement, travel, etc. policies 
and regulations; and 
 Administrative unit design, staffing, 
employment policies and regulations. 
 
The key tasks of the transition team will be to 
(i) organize and support Board discussions 
and facilitate Board communications between 
Board meetings (i.e. serve as Secretary to the 
Board); and (ii) prepare draft proposals for the 
above listed items for deliberation by the 
Board and, based on guidance from the 
Board, prepare the initial management and 
operational policies, regulations, decision-
making criteria and related guidelines for 
Board approval.  
 
A number of comments received prior to the 
Consultation Draft and subsequent to it have 
raised concerns about the change process in 
transitioning from a two-pillar to a single board 
governance structure. There is concern about 
potential disruptions to ongoing work and the 
time it might take to make the transition and 
the risk that the next round of CRPs might be 
delayed. It is the view of the Panel that the 
finalization of the SRF, initial guidelines and 
the call for proposals for the next round of 
CRPs, and plans for strengthening ISPC can all 
be achieved in parallel with the transition 
planning process and that the new Board 
should be able to be in place in time for the 
CRP approval process. In order to 
demonstrate how this might be achieved, we 
have drafted possible transitional 
arrangements (see Appendix 6), not as a 
definitive piece, but simply to illustrate the 
sort of timetable that could be adopted. 
 
The staffing and expertise of the transition 
team will need to be sufficient to ensure that 
a change management plan is put in place, 
monitored and evaluated regularly, that tasks 
are carried out in a timely manner and with 
the highest quality. Several of the tasks could 
be outsourced but the transition team will 
need a core staff with adequate expertise to 
prepare the change management plan and 
the Board materials themselves or manage its 
preparation and assure quality of the 
products. 
 
6.5 Optimizing the strengths of partners  
CGIAR must use partnerships to achieve many 
of its objectives (once the objectives are 
clearly defined and embedded in an SRF). 
Prior to the reform, the Centers were criticized 
for being isolated, even insulated from each 
other, and not establishing collaborative 
partnerships on major challenges. Since the 
reforms, CGIAR Centers have made 
considerable progress in establishing and 
managing partnerships, with each other, with 
NARs, other public sector research 
institutions, and with private sector 
counterparts.  
 
Still, based on the Globe Scan survey adapted 
by the Panel, and the consultations the Panel 
has had with representatives of the 
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international food and beverage industry, 
there is considerable room for expanding 
existing and establishing new partnerships. 
But the Panel recognizes that establishing 
partnerships for the sake of partnering is not a 
good idea, and that partnerships may 
generate transaction costs, fiduciary and 
reputational risks, and other inefficiencies 
that can quickly outweigh the benefits. The 
challenge is how to engage potential partners 
as equal stakeholders so that joint decisions 
can be taken on when and how to partner.  
 
Many of the bilateral and multilateral donors 
on the Fund Council have developed 
institutional guidelines for identifying, 
establishing, managing and reviewing 
partnerships. In order to achieve consistency 
and avoid duplication among the Centers, the 
Panel recommends that the Fund Council 
seek the assistance of the donors (e.g. World 
Bank) and key organizations engaged in 
research with global reach (e.g. EMBRAPA, 
CSIRO, and private sector representing inputs 
and the food and beverage industry) to assist 
CGIAR establish such guidelines, working 
closely with the aforementioned CGIAR task 
force, so the guidelines are clearly tailored to 
meet the strategic objectives and results 
delineated in the SRF.   
 
6.6  Scaling up partnerships capable of 
tackling mega-challenges 
The Panel recommends that, once the SRF is 
adopted and the next round of CRP proposals 
are approved, CGIAR should organize a global 
reality check on the extent to which its own 
research programs and the agricultural 
research programs of other leading 
institutions and companies are sufficient to 
address the priority food security and nutrition 
challenges. The Panel expects that some 
significant gaps may be identified that require 
new global partnerships- special-purpose, 
internationally-coordinated, and long-term 
mega-programs designed to solve the 
problems, rather than put dents in them. 
CGIAR could play a key role in identifying what 
future partnerships to tackle the world’s food 
security mega-challenges might look like, what 
success regarding this challenge would look 
like, and propose a framework for action that 
is commensurate with the challenge.  
CGIAR Centers and other potential partner 
organizations need to be adaptive in how they 
work with partners so as to assure their long-
term relevance as coalition partners. To do 
this, they will need to be ready to engage in 
both leadership and non-leadership roles in 
new forms of partnerships that exhibit the 
vision, excellence, capacity, scale, resourcing, 
and durability required to match large and 
uncertain global challenges. The proposed 
model of global collaborative impact 
partnerships would have CGIAR in a dynamic 
role as a partner, taking on responsibilities 
that are best suited to its strengths, where it 
has a comparative advantage in a particular 
field, in conjunction with the resources of its 
partners. Focused, strategic and dynamic 
leadership is key to getting such initiatives 
under way. CGIAR can play that role by 
bringing top-level leaders together with a 
shared commitment and keeping their 
engagement active over time. Effective 
leadership will result in the partners 
identifying and tackling the challenges (that 
are beyond the reach of individual partners) in 
a collaborative manner and avoiding their 
pushing a particular agenda.  
 
6.7 Scaling up financing 
The Panel was asked to review the current 
challenges of rationalizing funding through the 
three Windows of the CGIAR Fund and the 
additional bilateral funding to individual 
Centers. The Fund Council has not been able 
to resolve issues related to such 
rationalization, probably because each 
contributor is “sovereign” and has its own 
priorities. There is no evidence for the Panel to 
consider that this situation is likely to change. 
The Panel considers that, while the balance 
between Windows 1 and 2 and the 
contributions channeled through Window 3 
and other bilateral funding may not be ideal 
for maximizing the focus on CRPs, the Fund 
Council and other CGIAR partners should be 
primarily focused on maximizing the total 
amount of funding available for high-quality, 
high-priority research. In this regard, CGIAR 
would benefit from an agreement on relatively 
tight criteria that define what counts, and 
what does not count, as CRP funding. The 
reality, however, is that the Fund Council and 
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other donors have doubled the total funding to 
CGIAR over the past five years.  
 
Several donors indicated to the Panel that 
continued funding is conditional on 
performance and highlighted the difficulty of 
securing long-term, predictable commitments 
to fund CGIAR Research Programs, as well as 
the uncertainties around maintaining, let 
alone significantly increasing, funding.  
 
The Fund Office engaged consultants to 
review and recommend improvements in 
resource mobilization. The Panel, in its first 
meeting, requested that additional work be 
undertaken to identify potentials for 
innovative financing. That work, together with 
the resource mobilization study is work-in-
progress. Nevertheless, some preliminary 
results of the innovative financing study lead 
the Panel to believe that there are options 
worth pursuing and recommends that the 
Fund Council organize a special session in 
early 2015 to discuss innovative financing 
options. CGIAR has historically focused on 
mobilizing resources through grants. This is 
particularly important given the difficulty of 
securing long-term, predictable commitments 
to funding for the CGIAR Research Programs, 
and the uncertainties around maintaining, let 
alone significantly increasing, current CGIAR 
funds.  
 
Examples of potential approaches to 
innovative financing identified by the 
consultants include: 
 Development impact bonds - a donor 
makes payments to repay upfront 
investment capital if certain key outcomes 
are achieved. Specialist investors provide 
the upfront capital to fund the research in 
the knowledge that successful programs 
will secure repayment of capital plus a 
financial return. 
 Capital formation investment fund - 
develop a mechanism that allows donors 
and/or investors to have an equity stake 
or loan for a pool of assets (e.g., he Global 
Health Investment Fund). 
 Green Bond concept - capital raised for a 
bond for specific activities. 
 Public-private strategies - Strengthen 
collaborative partnerships with 
corporations.  
 High risk-high reward impact investors. 
 
6.8 Optimizing political impact 
Many of the actions by CGIAR are significant 
at the regional and global political levels. 
CGIAR has tremendous knowledge and could 
contribute to and influence international and 
regional debates on a multitude of politically 
charges issues - climate change, food security, 
food safety, water management, fisheries 
management, sustainable development goals, 
and many more. Several of the Centers are 
engaged in some of the issues at the political 
level but the engagement of CGIAR is ad hoc 
at best and CGIAR’s objectives, strategy, and 
rules of engagement in global “politics” are 
not clear.  The Panel recommends that CGIAR 
(not just individual Centers) should establish 
specific objectives of and procedures for 
engaging in relevant global and regional 
political negotiations and actions. 
 
6.9 Optimizing knowledge impact 
Based on the information available, the Panel 
recommends that the responsibilities of the 
ISPC be elevated to empower it to be 
proactive in terms of providing strategic 
guidance, foresight analyses, and assessing 
and reporting on quality of research results 
across the system. The review and reporting 
functions should be at least as rigorous as 
was previously provided by the pre-reform 
Science Council. Currently, the ISPC does not 
have a role in monitoring research quality 
once the research is funded; this function is 
left to the Independent Evaluation 
Arrangement (IEA). It is critically important to 
ensure that high-quality research review and 
advice is consistently provided by qualified 
researchers. The Panel considers that the role 
the IEA is playing in reviewing the governance 
of CRPs is appropriate, but that the review of 
the quality of research should be under the 
oversight of the ISPC. 
 
At a minimum the Fund Council and 
Consortium Board (and later the CGIAR Board) 
should establish independent research panels 
comprising world-class scientific leaders to 
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advise on particular issues as required under 
the overall guidance of the ISPC Chair.  If for 
some reason the initial design framework of 
the ISPC cannot be readily adapted to meet 
the current needs, then a new structure may 
be required. A detailed proposal for the new 
functions of the ISPC or its replacement 
should be prepared immediately by a task 
force, established by the Fund Council, 
chaired by the Chief Scientist and comprising 
leading scientists from Centers and their 
Boards, the Consortium Office Chief Science 
Adviser, Council and Consortium Board, and 
two or three representatives from major 
research councils such as the US National 
Research Council. Further, regarding 
knowledge impact, the CGIAR should 
strengthen its structured knowledge sharing 
by replacing the Funders Forum (which would 
no longer be required if a single multi-
stakeholder Board is established) with a 
partnership forum that brings partners 
together to share lessons and knowledge. 
Numerous successful examples of such 
institutionalized fora have demonstrated 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
in knowledge sharing, as well as in facilitating 
dialogue among partners that might otherwise 
not have a periodic opportunity to compare 
lessons.
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Appendix 1. Brief Biographies of MTR Panel Members 
 
Sir John Beddington is the Chair of the MTR Panel. Sir Beddington was from 2008 until 2013 the UK 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser providing scientific advice to the Prime Minister during the 2009 
swine flu outbreak, the 2010 volcanic ash incident and the emergency at the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant in 2011. In 2008 Sir Beddington raised the concept of the “Perfect Storm” of food, 
energy and water security in the context of mitigating and adapting to climate change. During 2011 
he chaired an International Commission on Sustainable Agriculture and Climate Change and recently 
took on the Co-chairmanship of an International Commission on Agriculture and Nutrition. He 
is currently the Senior Adviser to the Oxford Martin School and Professor of Natural Resource 
Management at Oxford University.    
 
Dr. Akinwumi Adesina is Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. From 2008 until his 
appointment as Minister in 2011, he was Vice President of Policy & Partnerships for AGRA. Before 
joining AGRA, Dr. Adesina was associate director for Food Security at the Rockefeller Foundation for 
more than a decade. He has held senior leadership positions within the international agricultural 
research centers of the CGIAR. In 2007, Dr. Adesina was awarded the prestigious YARA Prize in Oslo, 
Norway for his leadership in pioneering innovative approaches to improve access of agricultural inputs 
for African farmers. Among several other distinguished awards, he was awarded the Borlaug CAST 
Award in 2010 by the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, USA;  the second highest 
National Honor, the Commander of the Order of Niger in 2012; and in 2013 the Forbes Africa Person of 
the Year for his bold reforms in Nigeria’s agriculture sector.  
 
Mr. Warren Evans is an independent adviser to international development organizations, 
governments and private sector on sustainable development, particularly on environment and 
climate change. He retired from the World Bank in July 2013 after serving as a Senior Adviser on 
Sustainable Development and Director of the Environment Department. During this time he led a 
team responsible for establishing several innovative environment and climate finance mechanisms 
including the Climate Investment Funds, and served as an advisor for the design of the Green 
Climate Fund. Before joining the World Bank in 2003, Mr. Evans spent 25 years working on 
environment and development issues across Asia including 15 years at the Asian Development 
Bank.  
Dr. Bronwyn Harch is Professor and Deputy Director – Research at the Institute for Future 
Environments at Queensland University of Technology. Dr. Harch was formerly the Chief of Division 
for CSIRO Computational Informatics (CCI) providing research leadership and oversight for the 
division, where staff are deployed to all of CSIRO’s 11 research flagships. Previously she was Deputy 
Director of the CSIRO Sustainable Agriculture Flagship (3 years). In this role she was responsible for 
developing the flagship’s strategy, ensuring capability from across CSIRO’s 11 research divisions was 
relevant and available for the flagship, relationship management with external partners co-investing 
in the research outcomes and managing and developing an impact evaluation strategy for research 
undertaken by the flagship. 
Mrs. Jane Karuku is the former President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a 
dynamic Africa based, African-led organization committed to fighting food insecurity in Africa and 
uplifting millions of smallholder farmers out of poverty through smallholder agriculture 
transformation. Mrs. Karuku's career spans over 20 years, most of which has been in the agriculture 
sector. She has held senior positions in a number of international corporate organizations including 
Farmers Choice and Cadbury Limited where she served as the Managing Director with responsibility 
for 14 countries in the East and Central African region. Mrs. Karuku joined AGRA in April 2012 from 
Telkom Kenya, where she was the Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary General from July 2010.  
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Dr. Bindu N. Lohani is Vice-President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for Knowledge 
Management and Sustainable Development. He is responsible for ADB’s Regional and Sustainable 
Development Department, Economics and Research Department, Office of Regional Economic 
Integration, and Office of Information Systems and Technology. Prior to assuming his current post, he 
was Vice-President Finance and Administration of ADB, and was involved in reforming the budget 
and administrative systems as well as the General Capital Increase and various fund 
replenishments. Dr. Lohani is a member of the National Academy of Engineering of United States 
and Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Council.  
Dr. Idah Sithole-Niang is Professor in the Department of Biochemistry at the University of Zimbabwe. 
Her primary research is in the area of cowpea crop improvement. Dr. Sithole-Niang is Chair of the 
Board of Trustees of the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and Chair of the African 
Women in Agricultural Research and Development (AWARD) Steering Committee and Vice 
Chairperson of the Research Council of Zimbabwe where she chairs the National Research Priorities 
and Strategic Planning Committee and was co-author of the 2nd Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy for Zimbabwe.  
 
Dr. Howard-Yana Shapiro is Chief Agricultural Officer, Mars, Incorporated, Mars Advanced Research 
Institute Fellow; Senior Fellow, Plant Sciences, College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, 
University of California, Davis; Distinguished Fellow, the World Agroforestry Centre.  He is a globally 
respected expert in plant science, plant breeding, genetics and molecular biology, he led the cacao 
genome project and is the founder of the African Orphan Crops Consortium and the African Plant 
Breeding Academy, which will sequence, assemble and annotate 101 pan-African food crops.  He 
has presented at TED, TEDMed, Google SolveforX and many other conferences. 
Dr. Izabella Monica Vieira Teixeira is Minister of Environment of Brazil. Minister Teixeira, a biologist 
with a Master's Degree in Energy Planning and a Ph.D. in Environmental Planning, served as a civil 
servant at the Brazilian Environmental Agency since 1984. From 2007 to 2008, Minister Teixeira 
was the Vice-Secretary of the Environment at the State Government of Rio de Janeiro, until she was 
nominated for the position of Vice-Minister of the Environment. In May 2010 she was appointed 
Minister of the Environment and reappointed to that position by the new President in January 2011. 
In 2013, following the Rio +20 Summit, she received the United Nations 2013 Champions of the 
Earth award. 
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Appendix 2. Submission from the 15 CGIAR Centers to the MTR Panel  
(Received August 16, 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The reform of the CGIAR that was initiated in 2008 was, by design, ambitious in its objectives and 
was carried out without a structured change management program; rather, the reform followed from 
an initial design template and then was adaptively managed while it was underway, primarily through 
consultative processes between the new governance and management entities and the CGIAR 
Centers.  Of course, the reform and its design elements were based on considerable diagnostic 
evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of the CGIAR.  Consequently, the adaptive processes that 
followed were guided by at least three main intentions of the reform:   
(a)  making the whole CGIAR system greater than the sum of its parts -- the creation of CRPs as a key 
instrument for achieving this,  
(b)  a more compelling global agenda for the CGIAR that ends the mandate creep of the Centers, 
inspire confidence among investors and help mobilize increased financial investments –a key 
element of this was the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) with four strategic objectives, and  
(c)  simplification of the CGIAR system which had become enormously complex –but for which no 
road map was created as implementation of the reform started. The adaptive process of the reform 
referred to above continues and brings together the lessons of the first five years of the reform.  
This note is a brief assessment, from a Center perspectives, of where the CGIAR is currently in the 
change process, and what has been learned --in short what has worked well and what has not 
worked so well. 
 
A. What has worked well 
This starts with the overall objective of the reform, namely to transform the CGIAR from 15 
autonomous international agricultural research centers into an integrated, highly responsive, and 
learning system focused on major global challenges related to food and nutritional security, reducing 
poverty and sustainable natural resource management. This overarching objective was intended to 
make the whole CGIAR greater than the sum of its parts. There were two elements to this (a) 
delivering greater synergy and impact from the combined research effort of the CGIAR and (b) 
gaining greater efficiency and effectiveness organizationally from shared infrastructure and services 
etc. The following are some examples of what has worked, identified by the Centers: 
 
1. The CRP mechanism: Development of CRPs was a key element of system architecture and 
contributed to both (a) and (b) above, and embodied four principal design elements, namely: 
 
a) The CRPs were the mechanism for achieving integration around a common research 
agenda defined at the CGIAR system level with the assumption that there would be 
progressive programmatic alignment within Centers themselves and supported by full 
W1/W2. However, there has a continuing reliance on an increasing share of bilateral 
funding. 
 
b) A framework for accountability for development impacts would be developed with a 
focus on monitoring outcomes rather than outputs and where effective partnerships 
were a necessary element in achieving these impacts. 
 
c) The CGIAR would continue to lead with high quality science but with the difficulty of 
balancing upstream research with the investment in innovation and delivery capacity 
needed to achieve downstream impact. 
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d) There would be an organizational separation of “funders” and “doers” but with an 
inherent tension in who lead resource prioritization, particularly given the continuing 
dependence on bilateral funding reflecting the preference of many of the "funders". 
In many ways this central CRP plank of the reform has been an extremely positive achievement. For 
example, the CGIAR system has consolidated new areas of work in all of the four strategic objectives 
of the SRF.  There has also been a tangible increase in scientific collaboration across Centers as 
evidenced by increased joint planning, implementation and publications. There has also been 
pooling of different strengths of participating Centers around the common research agenda of 
individual CRPs.  CRP development has been an ongoing learning process and some challenges 
relating to governance and transactions costs remain. One area of future work is to define areas 
where cross CRP collaboration will achieve even greater efficiencies. At the same time, the CRPs 
have led to improved conceptualization of how the CGIAR approaches delivery and impact, often 
through greatly improved geographic alignment, and significantly deepened CGIAR’s capacity and 
approaches to gender equity.   Ongoing and planned evaluations of CRPs will provide excellent 
opportunities to refine and improve the governance and efficiency of CRPs, and thereby Centers; the 
CRPs have already been shown to be highly responsive to various reviews. 
 
2. Creating the SRF: Although the first edition of the SRF was completed  later than was 
desirable and with some inadequacies, it has served to advance the second intention of the 
reform --a more compelling global agenda for the CGIAR that reduces the mandate creep of 
the Centers, inspires confidence among investors and helps mobilize increased financial 
investments. Here too, much has been achieved: 
 
a) The mandate creep: Mandate creep that plagued the CGIAR prior to the reform by 
dissipating efforts and violating principles of subsidiarity with partners has largely 
been arrested. The vast majority of CGIAR research efforts fit within the SRF and, 
more importantly, drive the current portfolio of CRP.  
 
b) Increased funding: Funding to the CGIAR has doubled since the reform started, 
although there is continuing debate about attribution. This relates to whether the 
increase in funding came about as a result of the reform, and/or by the global food 
price crisis which struck the same year (2008), with continuing ripples since then. 
Whatever the cause, the CGIAR with a new SRF and portfolio of CRPs, was well 
positioned to address the attending anxiety about how the world will sustainably feed 
itself to the time of population stabilization in the 2050s, while also addressing 
poverty and climate change on a planet that some argue is reaching its ecological 
limits. The appropriate positioning of the CGIAR at that time was undoubtedly the 
result of the reform process.    
  
c) The Windows: Importantly, the significant growth rate in the CGIAR’s aggregate 
budget since 2008 has provided more opportunity for achieving impact. The 
combined and complementary funding model (W1/W2 and W3/Bilateral) is 
fundamentally sound and provides for CRP stability, growth, evolution and innovation. 
W1/W2 donors get effective leverage as W3/bilateral funds are mobilized to 
enhance delivery of CRPs. Conversely, given the (theoretical) stability of W1/W2 
funding to CRPs, Centers are in a good position to mobilize additional and 
complementary funding for the CRPs. There is thus a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between W1/W2 and W3/bilateral funding. Although there has been 
some tension among the various parts of the system on the matter of W3/bilateral 
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funding, Centers are firmly of the view that resource mobilization from that source for 
the CRPs, and the SRF more broadly, should be encouraged.  However, Centers are 
also of the view that W1/W2 funding should represent a higher amount and 
proportion (growing to over 60%) of total funding, than is the case now, if system 
integrity is to be maintained into the future.  
 
3. Partnership and gender higher up the agenda: The CGIAR has always been noted for 
extensive up and down stream partnerships, particularly with NARES in the developing 
countries. The advent of the CRP and the enhanced funding base have facilitated significant 
strengthening of these partnerships and the creation of new ones, for example, with 
specialized development organizations that will facilitate scaling and greater impact. These 
conditions have also facilitated stronger efforts to mainstream gender and advance this area 
of work where it belongs -higher up the agenda of the CGIAR and partners. 
 
4. Prospect of more collective action: Although not yet paying many dividends to the reform, 
plans are being developed to capture organizational benefits in such areas as (a) shared 
services, (b) deliberate movement towards co-locating of staff across countries/regions, (c) 
managing security and related risks and building stronger communities of practice in 
capacity development, communications and knowledge management, among others. Of 
course, collective action of this sort is not new to the CGIAR; the Centers previously created 
CGNet and AIARC, among others, which have endured and served the CGIAR well. That track 
record has emboldened the Centers and created a commitment to doing more in this area in 
the future.  
 
B. What did not work so well 
The above benefits of the CGIAR reform, however, have come with some costs associated with 
differing interpretation of the Consortium Constitution and inadequate articulation of how the 
expanded number of organizational parts should work. These in turn are manifested in governance 
and operational difficulties and ever rising transactions costs.  Some examples of these challenges 
follow: 
1. The conceptual divide: There are differing interpretations of the Consortium’s Constitution 
which defines the relationship between the Consortium Board (CB)/Consortium Office (CO) 
and the Centers and guides operations. Centers believe that what they had signed up to was 
a sort of a ‘joint venture’ in which they were an integral part of the Consortium. However, 
legal opinion given to the CO provides an interpretation that the Consortium is a separate 
and independent entity and does not include the members Centers (see attached).   In this 
context then, the CGIAR Consortium of Agricultural Research Centers is a misnomer. 
Interestingly, however, the word consortium is derived from Latin and means “those with a 
shared fate”.  Under the interpretation above, while the Consortium consults its members 
and generally represents their views and interests, it need not do so as it has the liberty to 
act in its own right and to take positions that do not necessarily reflect that of the members.  
 
In operational terms this interpretation, adhered to by the CB-CO, has at least two important 
implications: 
a) The ambiguity about whether the Centers are part of the Consortium or not and the 
uncertainty concerning the obligations in both directions have severely impeded the 
building of trust and cohesion between the Centers and the CB/CO. 
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b) It was envisaged that the CO would be a convener, facilitator, and advocate, 
providing intellectual support in areas such as the quality of CRP submissions. 
However, as a result of (a) above, different expectations have emerged between the 
Centers and the CO over its role as facilitator or regulator. 
 
2.  The governance challenge: The reformed CGIAR consists of an enlarged number of system 
entities, namely the Fund Council (FC) and Fund office (FO), the Consortium CB and CO, the 
ISPC the IEA and the 15 Centers each with their own respective Boards.  Inadequate 
articulation of guidelines on interoperability and operating procedures that clearly defined 
the roles and responsibilities of each of the entities, led to adaptive management that was 
described in the introductory section of this paper. Furthermore, lack of definition of what 
success actually looks like, with baselines and metrics of reform progress, have led to 
divergent views. This has also led to less than seamless relationships between the CB and 
the FC, the FO and the CO and between the CO and the Centers. But perhaps the greatest 
tension has been between the CO and Centers, especially in the area of governance and 
management of the CRPs. Some of the implications of this atmosphere are: 
 
a) While lead Centers have been designated to lead the various CRPs, this role and 
particularly the lead Center Board governance responsibility, in relation to the CRP 
Advisory Committee/Panel/Board, is still uncertain terrain even after the 
dispensation of the recently concluded CRP Governance and Management review.  
 
b) Leading or not, if the Centers are not part of the Consortium, then the Centers 
relationship with the CRPs may be regarded as just contractees of the Consortium 
rather than the joint owners of the programs they perceive themselves to be. This 
characterization seems fair given that all but fiduciary responsibility lies outside the 
Centers. 
 
c) While the creation of the CRP mechanism must be regarded as a resounding success 
as explained at A.1 above, their operationalization, given the current architecture, 
has imposed very high transactions costs in both financial and senior scientist time. 
For example, each CRP has a program management committee with an average size 
of roughly 10 members thus engaging 150 people (15 CRP X 10 members) at the 
management level with statutory meeting roughly four times per year. In addition, 
each CRP has an advisory committee/panel/board of roughly 10 people each, thus 
engaging about another 150 people at the advisory/governance level, meeting on 
average twice per year. Furthermore, numerous science planning and coordination 
meetings at theme/flagship level are required within each CRP. This of course, is in 
addition to existing Center level boards and CO/CB processes in which Centers, CRP 
Directors and other science leaders are involved. While these operational modalities 
were required in the past, the question is, can we obtain similar benefits of an 
expanded research and development agenda, strengthened partnerships among 
Centers, expanded research and development partnerships beyond the CGIAR, etc. at 
a lower transaction cost?    
 
d) Simplification of the CGIAR system: As indicated in the introduction of this paper, 
simplification of the CGIAR system was a key objective of the reform. Leading up to 
the reform, it was realized that the system had become inordinately complex and 
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difficult to navigate by both those inside and outside the system. This of course 
militated against building research and development partnerships beyond the CGIAR, 
particularly the private sector, and bewildered potential new non-traditional donors. 
Most players in and outside the CGIAR will unfortunately agree that the system is 
every bit as complex, and perhaps even more so, than before the reform.  
 
3. Science management:  The CGIAR is about science for development and that is the basis on 
which its reputation was built. The reform then, included the search for more effective 
science leadership.  In this regard the reformed CGIAR system faces a number of science 
challenges. Only three will be listed here.  First is how to match the science aspirations of the 
CGIAR, namely being a leader in global agricultural and related  research, with the evolving 
and complicated structure of CRPs and Centers management and governance within a 
geographically distributed system.  There is an inherent rigidity to scientific research, given 
the human and infrastructural capacities needed in specific scientific areas and thus, 
evolving new science agendas require foresight tied to investment strategies, where such 
investments are often financially constrained under the budgetary systems put in place after 
the reform.  Second, is how to balance the need for science and innovation addressing long 
term challenges with those that addressed immediate or short term development needs.  
The reform has resulted in a greatly expanded research agenda for the CGIAR and how to 
balance more upstream aspirations with more downstream relevance is an ongoing issue 
within a complex system.  Third, and related to the previous point, is how to organize and 
manage science within an accountability framework focused on broad development 
objectives.  Does this shift scientific incentives and priorities and how does the CGIAR 
manage the scope of research together with the necessary partnerships needed to respond 
under such an accountability framework?  
 
Given the science challenges above, are the various CGIAR organs for science review 
providing the scientific leadership required, as well as direction on the institutional 
arrangements needed for innovative partnerships? The foresight studies, exploratory 
initiatives, novel discoveries are not now being sufficiently addressed.  Science oversight is 
essentially focused on the CRPs; and yet science quality, new research capacities, and 
design of research programs are essentially managed by the Centers.   Centers are of the 
view that some of the current modalities of executing the CGIAR’s agenda erode their 
capacity for global scientific leadership. 
 
C. Way Forward 
Centers believe that this is an opportune time to consolidate the gains of the CGIAR as indicated 
above, particularly by developing an even more compelling SRF that exploits our comparative 
advantage to address the most compelling global agricultural and related challenges of our time, 
and to leverage expanded research and development partnerships, including with the CGIAR. To do 
so the Centers perceive the following: 
 
a. Revision of the Consortium Constitution to reflect the centers as an integral part of the 
CGIAR Consortium; and development of operational modalities that create congruence 
and closer proximity among the various system entities. The modalities to this are not yet 
fully explored, but options suggested by various Centers include integration of the FC and 
CB and the FC and CO; full representation of Centers on the CB as opposed to observer 
status should entertained. 
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b. Integrate the functions of CB and FC and the FC and CO to avoid duplication and 
confusion and to ensure clear accountability and inclusiveness.  The integration should 
include Center representation in addition to that of donors, NARS, etc.  The integrated 
entity(s) should support resource mobilization at much increased levels and consistent 
with the level of effort that is required for the CGIAR to make the global difference that is 
required.  In the absence of this integration, systematic performance reviews should not 
only focus on the CRPs and Centers but on all system entities, including the CO and FO 
and the FC and CB.  
 
c. Greater awareness and recognition by all actors that the reform is not about CRP versus 
Centers but rather the complementarity of the two. CRPs capitalize on the scientific 
expertise, infrastructure and global modalities of the Centers. We contend that the 
debate about CRPs versus Centers is injurious to the mission of the CGIAR. 
 
d. Create modalities for the Centers to assert global scientific leadership to address the SRF 
through development and execution of a compelling portfolio of CRPs and related 
activities, with enough room for risk taking and high-end scientific discoveries. 
 
e. Revise modalities for executing the CRPs that facilitate greater efficiencies and 
effectiveness with lower transactions costs. 
 
f. Enable the balancing of the short and long-term research for development portfolio and 
up and down stream engagement, based on the comparative advantage of the CGIAR 
and subsidiary principles that define the requisite partnerships. 
 
g. Ensure long-term multiyear commitment of funding to the system, both to the Centers 
and the CRPs. This is consistent with RBM, which assumes that methodology is designed 
to achieve short, medium and long-term objectives. We would like to emphasize the fact 
that Centers have funding requirements to cover very critical business needs, including 
capital development, and requirements for equipment and infrastructure.  Centers also 
feel the pressing need for adequate financial reserves to cover uncertainty and risk, 
including security risks that attend many of the locations in which Centers are located or 
CRPs are implemented.   
  
Approved by the following on behalf of the Centers and their respective Board Chairs: 
 
Bird, Jeremy (IWMI) 
Fan, Shenggen (IFPRI) 
Tutwiler, Ann (Bioversity) 
Sanginga, Nteranya (IITA) 
Lumpkin, Thomas Adam (CIMMYT) 
Wells, Barbara (CIP) 
Echeverria, Ruben (CIAT) 
Simons, Tony (ICRAF) 
Holmgren, Peter (CIFOR) 
Hall, Stephen (WorldFish) 
Dar, William (ICRISAT-IN) 
Solh, Mahmoud (ICARDA) 
Zeigler, Robert (IRRI)  
Traore, Adama (AfricaRice) 
Jimmy Smith (ILRI) –Chair  
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Appendix 3.  CGIAR Consortium Submission to the MTR Panel (August 28, 2014) 
 
Introduction 
The Consortium submitted a briefing note to the MTR Panel at its meeting in January. The 
Consortium Board Chair, Board members, CEO and a number of Consortium staff members have 
subsequently also engaged in conversations with the Panel Chair, some of its members and 
particularly the Member-Secretary – most recently around the Panel’s meeting in London in July. 
Now that the Panel has shared its draft initial conclusions, and the 15 Centers have shared their 
views, the Consortium would like to submit this additional note for the Panel’s consideration. 
 
What has worked well and not so well? 
The Consortium agrees with the Panel that the challenge of food security and nutrition, exacerbated 
by climate change, requires a rapid scale-up of carefully targeted agricultural research that can be 
effectively translated into development – and that the reform has placed the CGIAR well to lead and 
coordinate scaled-up efforts, but not alone. The Consortium agrees with the Centers that the CRPs 
have been a very positive achievement that have led to much improved collaboration among the 
centers, stronger partnerships, and consolidated work in transversal and essential areas of work 
such as climate change and nutrition. While many of the CRPs were initially still collections of legacy 
activities, ongoing change within the CRPs is resulting in much improved coherence within the CRPs, 
improved collaboration among them, improved theories of change and impact pathways at program 
level, and a much improved sense of the intermediate development outcomes the CGIAR can deliver. 
 
The Consortium agrees with the Centers that the first SRF was successful to help focus the 15 
centers on a more compelling shared agenda – even though it also agrees with funders that a more 
quantitative results framework and targets that enable priority setting, resource allocation and 
results based management were lacking and are needed. The Consortium is confident that the 
ongoing work to produce a new SRF, with strong engagement of the investors as well as the centers 
and a consultation of partners and stakeholders, will indeed position the CGIAR well for the next 
round of investments. 
While there are strong partners that share responsibility for some CRPs, the Consortium agrees with 
the Panel that stronger partnerships with the private sector present opportunities for the CGIAR that 
are still largely untapped (with some very positive exceptions). Partnership with national research 
and development organizations could be improved as well. 
 
The increased funding for the CGIAR is clearly a key achievement, due in part to the increased 
priority among investors for food security, but also because the reform positioned the CGIAR well. 
Further growth in funding, required if research is to be scaled up rapidly, will not be easy in the 
current climate and will require a strong and concerted resource mobilization effort from all 
stakeholders, centers, the Consortium and the Fund. The Consortium agrees with the Centers that 
the current combined and complementary funding model (the Windows 1, 2 and 3) is basically 
sound and that combined W1-2 funding should indeed grow to a higher percentage of the total. The 
Consortium has supported a target of 50-60% W1-2 funding and notes that the Centers also support 
a proportion of W1-2 growing to over 60%. The Consortium believes that a new, revitalized SRF and a 
new round of strong, coherent CRP investments that jointly form a high-performing, value-for-money 
portfolio are critical to the further growth of the W1-2 share of CGIAR funding. 
 
The Consortium notes, and shares, the Panel’s concern that the CRP portfolio will need to meet two 
– potentially competing – challenges, that is: (1) there will need to be sufficient investment in 
upstream, transformative, discovery type research; while on the other hand (2) ensuring that there is 
sufficient investment into integrated delivery of innovations proven to work, at a scale of millions of 
farmers and consumers. 
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Governance 
The Consortium noted in its January briefing note to the MTR Panel that governance and 
management of the CRPs was a key concern for the Consortium. In our opinion the IEA External 
Review of CRP Governance and Management has provided an excellent analysis of the issues and a 
helpful set of recommendations to address them. We are pleased that the Centers and the 
Consortium agreed on a management response to the IEA review that has provided a solid basis for 
adjusting the governance and management of the CRPs; it will provide greater authority for CRP 
directors to manage for results; a stronger position of partners in the steering committees; and 
reduce transaction costs by reducing the number of governance and management committees. 
 
With respect to the system-level governance structure the Consortium agrees with the Panel that the 
reform has led to ambiguities between and among the CB/CO, FC/FO and Centers. The Consortium 
believes that to some considerable extent the resulting conflicts and tensions are a normal –even 
unavoidable – consequence of a major reorganization of a 40-year old system. Resistance to change 
is part of every major change process. The CGIAR could certainly have done better in managing the 
change process in a more structured manner, and can still learn from this experience going forward. 
The Consortium also agrees that the design of the reform placed the Consortium in a difficult and 
ambiguous position. It has, on the one hand, clear programmatic oversight over the CRPs as a whole 
and fiduciary responsibility for W1-2 funds. It has to approve the CRP proposals of the centers, to 
monitor CRP performance, and allocate funding to the CRPs within the CRP contracts approved by 
the investors. The primary accountability of the Consortium for the CRPs is to the Fund Council, not 
to the Centers. That establishes the “regulator” role, which the Consortium has been given in the 
CGIAR reform, for good reasons, and that the Centers do not always appreciate. On the other hand 
the Consortium also has a role supporting and facilitating Centers’ collective actions, the 
development of joint policies and guidelines, and the implementation of some crosscutting actions, 
for which the Consortium accountability is wholly, or at least partly, to its members, the CGIAR 
Centers. This dual role, both as regulator and as facilitator, is indeed causing ambiguities – and 
leads to levels of tension, and lack of trust that is unproductive and should be addressed. 
 
The MTR Panel has indicated it supports a single Board, in place of the current dual structure with a 
Fund Council and Consortium Board, and the Centers have indicated their support for such a 
solution in their submission to the panel as well. The Consortium is definitely interested to explore 
how the Fund Council and Consortium could work together more productively, but is concerned that 
the Panel’s recommendation would have huge transaction costs. It has taken considerable time and 
effort to establish the Consortium as an international organization and a do-over at this stage could 
derail the critical business of putting in place a strong SRF and second phase of the CRP portfolio. 
 
One question the Consortium has for the Panel is how it proposes to resolve the inherent conflict of 
interest of the members of the proposed single board. The idea that donors will share decision 
making on the CGIAR funding to CRPS with the Centers (recipients of those funds), industry (which 
may or not contribute funding), NARS (that would be partners contributing in kind in most cases), 
and scientists (which do not fund anything) is not realistic. The practical challenges associated with 
such a single board should receive more attention. Maybe, in the longer term one can develop a 
single Board, but then the decision making on funding would likely shift to a finance committee with 
donor members of one form or another.  
The current design, where the Consortium does not implement research, and has an arm’s length 
relationship with the Centers, allows the Consortium Board to take decisions regarding the CRP 
portfolio and individual CRPs without a conflict of interest. This degree of independence of the 
Consortium from the Centers is a key feature of the new CGIAR – built into its design deliberately - 
that is causing the dissatisfaction noted by the Centers’ Directors General in their submission to the 
MTR Panel. It also enables the Consortium to be impartial and have its allegiance first and foremost 
to the SRF. 
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The Consortium represents the interests of the CGIAR system as a whole and has its primary 
allegiance to the implementation of the SRF and the health and performance of the entire CRP 
portfolio; not the interests of individual centers or CRPs. This is a critical difference in the way the 
Consortium addresses its work and determines its positions. The Centers will need to clarify what 
they really mean when they ask for a change in the Constitution to become part of the Consortium. 
While the Centers clearly already are a component of the Consortium – as was stated in the updated 
legal opinion* – the fact that they cannot currently dictate what decisions they would like the 
Consortium Board to take is indeed a critical feature of the current design and should not change 
without endangering the impartial role of the Consortium in the new CGIAR. It is clear that this is a 
significant difference with many other membership-type organizations where the members do indeed 
determine the positions. 
Functioning of the Consortium 
While the Consortium is ready to engage in discussions that may lead to a reform of the system-wide 
governance structure over time, it also believes there are some issues in the current structure that 
should be resolved at short notice. These emerged in 2013 out of discussions between the FC and 
CB and were addressed in part in the PwC review of CGIAR governance, specifically: 
 The FC decision in April 2013 that the Consortium can only be funded through W1 of the
Fund, and that its budget is capped, are in direct contradiction to the Joint Agreement and
Constitution of the Consortium. The FC is not a board for the Consortium, and it does not
consider the funding requirements required to fulfill the Consortium mission. The Consortium
accepts that the FC is not obliged to make available more than the subsidy it is willing to
allocate the Consortium, but then the Consortium Board should be free – indeed has the
fiduciary responsibility - to raise the resources it deems necessary fulfill the Consortium’s
mission to the best of its abilities.
 The Consortium Office is an entity of the Consortium, reporting to the Consortium Board (not
a system entity reporting to the FC). It is the Consortium, not the Consortium Office, which is
accountable to the Fund Council and reports to the Fund Council.
Opportunities for collective action and for increased efficiency and effectiveness 
The Consortium agrees with the Centers that another of the things that have worked well in the 
reform is the prospect of more collective action. The Consortium believes there are opportunities to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system, and reduce its transaction costs, if the 
system is able to think like a Billion $ organization (while maintaining the advantages of a 
decentralized networked “consortium”, not a single centralized organization). It has indeed taken 
quite a long time for 9 Centers and the Consortium to implement a single ERP, the Once Corporate 
System (OCS), and there are clearly lessons to be learned on how this could have been done more 
effectively. The Consortium agrees, though, with the two reviews of CGIAR governance carried out in 
2013 that a shared ERP such as OCS is a key enabler of more collective action, as well as a 
requirement for better and faster CRP management – and reporting and information across centers. 
The Consortium and a group of center corporate service directors are developing a business plan for 
increased collective action along at least three main axes, i.e. shared systems and services, shared 
country offices, and shared management of security risks and stronger communities of practice. We 
note the Centers commit to do more in this area in the future in their submission to the MTR.  
* The version of the note “What is the CGIAR Consortium” appended to the Centers’ submission to the MTR
Panel was an old version, revised after consultation with the centers and re-issued in June. It recognizes the 
Centers as one of the three components of the Consortium, members of, but separate from, the Consortium. 
52 
In addition, the Consortium believes that continued action (as already taken by some Centers) to 
reduce the very large number of small grants in the system would reduce transaction costs 
significantly, and make the overall portfolio more strategic. This was a key objective of the reform, 
that is, reducing the over 3,500 bilateral grants on Center books pre-reform, to a small portfolio of 
large coherent programs. While it is recognized that some small grants may well have a strategic 
nature, generally speaking, a small number of larger bilateral grants (e.g., reducing the number to 
500 larger bilateral grants, plus some small grants, from over 2,000), complementing a system of 
CRPs with a solid share (50-60%) of pooled W1-2 funding and single reporting was a core idea 
behind the reform that still has to be fully realized. 
Jointly, the opportunity for large-scale efficiencies in the system from increased collective action, 
shared country offices and a reduced number of small grants has the potential to increase 
efficiencies and reduce transaction costs very significantly more than reducing the number of board 
members, merging centers or reducing center overheads would. Realizing this potential will require 
investments first, however. 
The way forward 
The Consortium agrees with the Centers that there are many things that have gone well in the reform 
and that this is a time to capitalize on the investments made in the reform over the last five years, 
particularly by developing a strong, compelling SRF and implementing an excellent process for the 
CRP 2nd Call that delivers a compelling investment portfolio, enables much improved joint resource 
mobilization and has clear development outcomes. 
The Consortium also agrees that it is wise to develop operational modalities that create congruence 
and closer proximity among the various system entities. While this may over time lead to a single 
Board, the Consortium Board is not, at this time, convinced that a system with a single large Board 
would be practical or solve the issues the system currently experiences. Any new system of 
governance should help decrease the ambiguities and simplify the overall system, but would have to 
maintain a separation of tasks and responsibilities that maintains investor confidence that funds are 
managed without conflicts of interest. In general, the Consortium would like to see the MTR 
recommendations further developed, to help our ongoing work in the context of current realities. The 
Consortium would appreciate orientation on how to adjust current work, with more guidance on what 
ought to be done how, when and by whom. 
In the shorter term, the Consortium Board thinks that a number of actions could be taken as follows: 
1. Confirm, resource and ensure a firm focus on the core business of the CGIAR through
development and approval of a new SRF and commissioning of a new portfolio of CRPs by
December 31, 2016.
2. Change the funding model of the Consortium to a levy (fixed % of CSP for a number of years)
set by the FC on the proposal of the Consortium Board, as a contribution to its operating
costs – with full responsibility of the Consortium Board for revenue and expenditure to meet
its mission, as well as accountability for spending this levy to the FC.
3. FC support in 2015 for the development of a business case to scale up collective action and
shared services across the CGIAR system, in order to achieve large scale efficiencies across
the system, through a W1 allocation of about $1 million to the Consortium.
4. Ensure longer-term multi-year stable financing for CRPs through innovative financing that,
among others, helps to turn multi-year commitments from CGIAR investors into upfront cash
and could enable the CGIAR system to access soft loans (e.g. for scaling out or delivery).
5. Develop and implement a CGIAR-wide strategy to engage and partner more effectively with
the private sector to scale up and out strategic public-private partnerships with key seed
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companies, food companies, and large retailers, as well as the small to medium enterprises 
such as Asian and African seed companies over the next 3-5 years. 
6. Intensify the partnership with key NARES in medium income countries (including but not
limited to EMBRAPA, CAAS and ICAR) to take advantage of their sizeable national
investments in agricultural research that have the potential to be leveraged to a much
greater extent internationally.
7. Support a crosscutting program (or platform) for investments in gene banks (e.g. cryo-
preservation), common tools, such as related to bio-informatics and “big data”, high thru-put
phenotyping sites and state of the art infrastructure, managed on a system-wide basis.
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Appendix 4.  Summary of responses to Panel TOR questions 
Research 
 Does the research commissioning process and incentives comply with best practices globally?
We are not aware of “best practices.” There are a number of different guidelines used by research 
organizations. CGIAR appears to be using guidance developed in 2007, criteria which are consistent 
with the guidelines used by others. Based on a review of the first round of CRPs, it appears that the 
current process leads to reasonably well-defined research priorities at the CRP level. Selection 
criteria are appropriate. The pre-proposal and proposal quality is highly variable, and the ISPC has 
done a good job in reviewing the proposals. However, that does not necessarily impact decision-
making by the Fund Council. There is no performance index which makes clear deliverables and 
accountabilities, and the reporting is highly variable. 
 What should CGIAR be doing to improve the way research is managed and integrated across its
Centers?
The lack of a suitable SRF makes it difficult to define program boundaries, potential synergies, and 
the need for cross-cutting support and research linkages.  Without a suitable results framework it is 
not clear how the Consortium Board can manage the system towards greater coherence, efficiency 
and effectiveness. Currently the responsibility for linking activities to pathways is pushed down to the 
CRP level. It appears that there should be opportunities to build on clusters of expertise in Centers to 
facilitate synergy and collective impact. For example, would it be sensible for breeders or those 
working on big data across all of the Centers to engage more frequently and deeply to share lessons 
and knowledge? If yes, then a structural arrangement would be required to facilitate this.  
 Is CGIAR effectively building diversity, including gender, into its research programs?
There have been a number of reviews of this issue (e.g., ISPC in 2011, SPIA in 2011, and 
Consortium reports in 2012 and 2014, including a Diversity and Inclusion Strategy). There is greater 
inclusion of gender issues in CRPs. Recognition of gender as a cross-cutting issue in the new SRF 
should further strengthen this. However, the data show a lack of gender balance across the CGIAR. 
The issue is certainly being given the attention it is due at the strategic level. The question that 
remains is the extent to which action and progress will be monitored and acted upon.  
 Does CGIAR have the appropriate balance of research for development, and a focus on delivery
for end-users?
The focus on delivery through the CRPs has reportedly improved in several of the CRP extension 
proposals. The next round of CRP proposals needs to clarify how the proposals will serve end-users’ 
needs and the impact pathways necessary to deliver results. Finding the right balance is a matter of 
understanding the research required to enable the impact.  
 How can CGIAR better deliver its research to the field and what model(s) should it employ to do
so?
The 2014 Dalberg report provides a number of recommendations regarding “delivery.” The Panel 
recognizes that there have been mixed views on the accuracy of this report and is not in a position to 
judge one way or the other. The Panel considers that the important question which should be 
addressed in each CRP, after impact pathways are well understood, is the extent to which delivery is 
embedded in a CRP, as opposed to simply providing mechanisms to facilitate delivery by another 
entity. This does not mean that CGIAR is the delivery agent, but that a roadmap is designed at the 
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outset, and redesigned as necessary, to ensure that the research is readily translated into action at a 
scale required to achieve the desired impact. 
Partners 
 Does CGIAR engage with the appropriate partners to deliver high-quality research and impact?
A major benefit of the reform and the resulting CGIAR Research Programs is increased collaboration 
among Centers and with other partners. The Elsevier studies, the IEA’s review of CRPs, and other 
evaluations confirm this progress. Some Centers have substantial partnerships with the private 
sector (in both developed and developing countries). Stakeholder surveys by GlobeScan and by some 
Panel members show mixed views on accessibility to partner with Centers. The question that should 
be asked is whether current partnerships adequately tap key players to scale-up and accelerate 
research and roll-out appropriately targeted and budgeted research to address 2030 issues. There is 
clearly room to grow in this area. 
 What CGIAR incentives weaken or strengthen partnerships?
It was reported, but not verified by the Panel, that almost all W1/W2 funding goes to Centers, not to 
external CRP partners. If this is the case, then some potential partners may be reluctant to join a 
CRP.  There is also the issue of high transaction costs, as reported by the Centers and CRP directors. 
But overall, it appears the incentives far outweigh the disincentives (which should nonetheless be 
addressed). The main incentive is the opportunity to join a CRP or other research programs 
undertaken by Centers. As evidenced by progress-to-date, the CGIAR Centers have the capacity to 
scale-up partnerships where and when it makes sense.  
 How can CGIAR enhance its accessibility to and collaboration with partners?
Guidance for partnering should be established and monitored across the CGIAR. The use of 
GlobeScan-type surveys should be continued to solicit feedback from existing and potential partners. 
A special effort should be undertaken to reach out to the international food and beverage industry, 
and similar industries, to engage in a dialogue on collaborative partnerships. 
 How can CGIAR best engage with national agricultural research systems?
Several of the respondents to the GlobeScan survey (including the responses to the Panel) 
expressed the need for CGIAR to more effectively work with and build the capacity of the NARs. 
Others expressed that this is not the role of CGIAR; it should focus on producing international public 
goods. In discussions with Center and CRP staff, the general view, supported by the Panel, was that 
CGIAR should work with and build the capacity of the NARs as and when needed to successfully carry 
out the work of the CRPs and to set the stage for delivery of research results to achieve impact on 
the ground. The Panel considers that a concerted effort by bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies is required to elevate the recognition by recipient country governments of the need to 
invest in building strong NARs. The Panel also considers that aid programs should support capacity 
development by establishing strong linkages to CGIAR and other international research programs.  
Funding 
 Is the structure of CGIAR’s entire funding system appropriate for the purpose, or does it create
perverse incentives for free-riding or other sub-optimal practices?
Overall investment in CGIAR has doubled in five years to $1 billion in 2013, with $342 million in 
Windows 1 and 2; $140 million in Window 3; and $524 million in other bilateral contributions and 
Center earnings. Window 3 and other bilateral funding, which represents about 65% of total CGIAR 
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funding, comes from approximately 3,000 grants that are restricted and often support very small 
projects. The expected shift of funding to Windows 1 and 2 has not met expectations. Some reviews 
have suggested that the focus should be on making W1/2 attractive and not worrying about W3. A 
review of the last two Fund Council meetings shows no discussion on innovative financing. A major 
concern of many Centers is that current funding does not cover core costs, such as Center 
infrastructure needs. 
 What are the implications of misalignment among all funding sources (i.e., contributions to the
Fund and other support to CGIAR) for the governance and management of the system?
At the present time, following a period of rapid growth in funding, the misalignment does not seem to 
have had an adverse impact. The flexibility shown up to now in allowing Window 3 contributions to be 
assigned to CRPs has probably been a factor in funding growth, but at the same time has 
contributed to the misalignment. 
 Is the concept of fully pooled funding a realizable goal, or will Window 3 and bilateral funding
increasingly dominate?
It does not appear to be a realizable goal. 
 What mechanisms can enhance donor participation in pooled funding?
Efforts should be made to strengthen donors’ confidence that W1/W2 contributions will achieve 
greater value for money. 
 Does CGIAR have a clear understanding of the total funding needed to meet its goals?
No, it is unlikely that anyone does. The report of the Commission on the Economy and the Climate 
(2014) recommends that funding for agricultural research be doubled by 2030. 
Structure and governance 
 Has the separation between funders and researchers led to a more efficient and effective
CGIAR?
No. 
 Are the roles of the various CGIAR entities (e.g., the Fund Council, IEA, ISPC, and the Consortium)
distinct, clear, and well aligned to ensure accountability?
No. 
 Are the current governance arrangements consistent with best practices?
We are reluctant to assess best practices. The current arrangements are inconsistent with the 
governance structures adopted by most international partnership organizations over the last several 
years. 
 Have the reforms increased overall costs and, if so, is that increase justified by better, more
relevant research resulting in greater impact?
  
The actual increase in costs is unclear, and the impact of such investments on the outcome of 
research is even less clear.
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Appendix 5.  Governance Structure: Review of Global Partnerships 
In considering possible means of addressing CGIAR governance ambiguities, the MTR Panel 
considered responses by other organizations and funds that have faced similar challenges. It is 
worth noting that CGIAR was one of the first global partnerships designed to take collective action to 
help developing countries reduce poverty and grow their economies. Since CGIAR was established 
more than 40 years ago, many multi-stakeholder partnerships and multi-donor funds have emerged 
to address challenges and issues, such as climate finance, vaccinations, major infectious diseases, 
and education. Bezanson and Isenman (2012)27 attribute the growth in targeted, multi-partner funds 
to (i) recognition of the size and complexity of challenges for which single actors are not adequately 
equipped, (ii) the decline in confidence of existing aid structures and business models, (iii) the rapid 
spread of new technologies, (iv) successful advocacy of NGOs, and (v) their political appeal in donor 
countries. Many of the newer partnerships have been instrumental in developing and testing a new 
kind of governance that is based on the concept of stakeholder constituencies as opposed to 
shareholders.  
For the purpose of MTR Panel deliberations, the governance structures of several partnership 
organizations were reviewed. The results are summarized in the table below.  All of the partnership 
organizations or funds reviewed are governed by single boards that have varying structures, but all 
include both donors and recipients. Several boards include stakeholders other than donors and 
recipients as active members or observers. Some of these stakeholders also have active voting 
rights. In contrast, the current CGIAR governance structure is rather unique in its two-pillared 
structure, comprised of the Fund Council and Consortium Board, each supported by an 
administrative office.28   
The PwC report on CGIAR governance suggested that CGIAR should consider a single board. The 
report suggested that a “leaner governance structure” could (i) reduce duplication, (ii) achieve greater 
efficiency, and (iii) improve accountability. The PwC report also noted that “other organizations with 
prior dual structures have often opted for a single board, which comprises representatives of key 
stakeholders and partners balanced with independent individuals who are appointed on the basis of 
their skills and networks. A single secretariat with a strong CEO oversees program and performance 
management, providing internal and external visibility for the organization, while innovative and 
effective partnerships are seen as key ingredients for success.” 
In discussing the challenges of governance for organizations and partnerships, Bezanson and 
Isenman note that there is no agreed definition of “good” governance. However, they do outline 
the main (generic) strategic and fiduciary responsibilities for governing boards.29 These include 
the following. 
Structure and Composition: Ensuring that Board size is conducive to efficient and effective 
decision-making and that its membership reflects the mix of skills, abilities, experiences and 
competencies required to meet the needs of the organization. 
Strategy and Plan: Ensuring that the organization has a clear direction, knows where it is trying 
to go, has set reasonable goals, objectives and targets and has aligned these to the 
27 K.A. Bezanson and P. Isenman. “Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges, Weakness, and 
Lessons.” Center for Global Development Policy Paper 014. 2012. 
28 The fact that the Center partners have their own Boards adds to the complexity, but is not considered by the 
Panel to be unique. Most major partnerships comprising legal entities have a similar situation in that each 
partner is directly governed by a Board or similar entity accountable for that entity’s strategic and fiduciary 
performance. 
29 K.A. Bezanson and P. Isenman. 2012. 
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appropriate means for their attainment, including the required human and financial resources 
and the internal incentive system. 
Roles and Responsibilities: Ensuring that the principal roles and responsibilities of directors are 
stipulated and communicated, including the effective delegation of authorities and clear 
differentiation of the respective roles of management and board members. 
Performance Oversight and Assessment: Ensuring that the organization has in place information 
systems that track performance against established objectives and that timely reviews are 
conducted and adjustments/adaptations made as required. 
Financial Oversight and Management: Ensuring that the organization is well managed 
financially, that its accounting systems are designed and applied with professionalism and that 
there is independent audit and certification of accounts. 
Risks and Opportunities Oversight: Ensuring that corporate and other risk assessments are 
regularly conducted and that risks are monitored and opportunities for risk mitigation are 
pursued. 
Communications: Ensuring that the organization and its management have in place the means 
to communicate effectively the organization’s key messages and that this is applied with 
consistency. 
Succession Planning: Ensuring that there are succession plans for board membership and for 
the Chief Executive. 
Legal and Ethical Conduct: Ensuring that there are written conflict of interest and code of ethics 
policies and codified governance guidelines for boards and their committees. 
Even though it has existed for many more years than most similar partnerships, CGIAR can learn 
from the governance lessons of some of the newer partnerships. For example, the governance 
experience of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), initially established in 2002 as the 
Fast Track Initiative (FTI), is worth reviewing. The FTI governance went through a series of 
reforms made necessary because the partnership was launched before its structures, functions, 
lines of accountability, and basic objectives had been fully worked out. Following reviews in 
2005 and 2008, the FTI consolidated its various governing committees into a Board of 
Directors. The constituency-based Board currently has 19 members, senior-level 
representatives of various constituencies, and a full-time independent chair. Initially, the 
chairing arrangement was for Board members to select two co-chairs on a rotating basis. A 
comprehensive review in 2010 noted considerable improvements in the GPE governance 
following the reforms, but found the co-chairing arrangements to be sub-optimal. The GPE has 
since replaced the rotating co-chair arrangement with a full-time, independent and non-voting 
chair.30 
30 “Mid –Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Final Synthesis Report. February 2010. 
http://bit.ly/1vP1c7J. The 2013 DFID Multilateral Aid Review Update gave GPE the highest rating for financial 
resources management and noted that GPE had increased transparency and predictability of allocations since 
its reform. 
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Fund Board Composition and Selection Chair Selection and Term 
Adaptation 
Fund 
16 members and 16 alternates representing Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. 69% of members represent developing 
countries. Member governments determine representation 
by constituency. 
Elected by members of 
the board. 
Africa Water 
Facility (AWF) 
Governing Council made up of 13 members appointed as 
follows: it is made up of 13 members comprising 5 appointed 
by African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) on sub-
regional basis, 1 by AfDB, 1 by the African Union under the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 1 by 
U.N.–Water Africa, 5 by donors to the Water Fund and the 
Director of the Water Fund as ex-officio member. 
Membership of the Governing Council should reflect regional 
and geographical groupings, and due weight to funding 
efforts of all donors. 
The Chairperson is 
appointed by the 
Governing Council and 
serves a one-year term. 
African 
Development 
Fund (ADF) 
The Board of Directors of the ADF consists of 14 members, 7 
appointed by the Bank and 7 appointed by State 
participants. The governors and alternates of the African 
Development Bank are ex-officio governors and alternates of 
the Fund. 
The Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the 
Fund is the President of 
the Bank, who is ex-officio 
President of the Fund. He 
cannot vote. 
CARE 
International 
The CARE International Board is the main governing body of 
CARE International. The CI Board is comprised of an 
independent Chairperson plus the national director and a 
board representative (usually the chair) of each national CI 
Member.  
The Governance and 
Nominations Committee 
is responsible for 
identifying and 
nominating candidates for 
officer positions within the 
CI Board (i.e., 
Chairperson, Vice-
Chairperson, and the 
Treasurer). Decisions are 
taken by a vote by the CI 
Board. 
Clean 
Technology 
Fund 
Governed by a Trust Fund Committee, and supported by the 
multilateral development bank (MDB) Committee, the CIF 
Administrative Unit and the Trustee. The Trust Fund 
Committee is composed of 8 representatives of contributor 
countries, 8 representatives of recipient countries, and 
includes as “active observers” (non-voting) representatives of 
the World Bank, the MDB Committee, the private sector, 
NGOs, UNDP, UNEP and UNFCCC. Representatives from 
contributor and recipient countries are identified through a 
consultation among their constituencies. 
Two co-chairs are elected 
from among the members 
of the Trust Fund 
Committee to serve an 
18-month term. One co-
chair will be a 
representative of a 
contributor country and 
one represents a recipient 
country. 
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GAVI, The 
Vaccine 
Alliance 
The Board is comprised of 27 members consisting of 18 
Representative Board Members and 9 Unaffiliated Board 
Members. In addition, the CEO (head of the secretariat) is an 
ex-officio non-voting Board Member. Voting members include 
5 from developing country governments, 5 from donor 
country governments, and one each from WHO, UNICEF, 
World Bank, BMGF, a vaccine industry representative from a 
developed country, a vaccine industry representative from 
developing countries, a representative of civil society, and a 
representative of technical health/research institutes. 
Elected by the Board for a 
term of 2 years. 
Global Crop 
Diversity 
Trust 
The Executive Board consists of: 4 members, at least 2 of 
which are from developing countries and appointed by treaty; 
4 members, at least one of which is from a developing 
country, appointed by the Donors’ Council; 1 member 
appointed by the Director General of FAO who shall operate 
in a technical capacity only and shall not have the right to 
vote; 1 member appointed by the Chair of CGIAR who shall 
operate in a technical capacity only and shall not have the 
right to vote; and the Executive Secretary of the Trust as a 
member ex officio. The Executive Board may appoint two 
additional members to ensure overall balance among its 
membership, in particular with regard to diversity in 
disciplinary backgrounds, geographical representation, 
gender, and competence in fundraising and financial 
management.  
The Executive Board shall make every effort to reach 
agreement by consensus on all matters on which a decision 
of the Board is required. If all efforts to reach a consensus on 
a particular matter have been exhausted and no agreement 
has been reached, a decision on the matter shall, as a last 
resort, be taken by a vote in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedures of the Executive Board. The Executive Board 
establishes a Donor Council, comprised of public and private 
sector donors to advise on fundraising and other financial 
matters and to provide a forum for the expression of the 
views of donors that make significant contributions to the 
Trust. The Executive Board determines the criteria for 
eligibility to serve on the Donor Council. 
The Executive Board 
appoints an Executive 
Secretary. 
Global 
Environment 
Facility (GEF) 
The Assembly is the governing body of the GEF in which 
representatives of all member countries participate. The 
Council is the GEF’s governing board of directors, responsible 
for developing, adopting, and evaluating policies and 
programs for GEF-financed activities. Council members 
represent 32 GEF constituencies, 16 from developing 
countries, 14 from developed countries, and two from 
countries with economies in transition. A Member and 
The Assembly elects its 
Chairperson from among 
the Representatives. At 
each Council meeting, a 
Chairperson is elected 
from among its Members 
for the duration of that 
meeting. The position of 
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Alternate representing a constituency are appointed by the 
Participants in each constituency. 
elected Chairperson 
alternates from one 
meeting to another 
between recipient and 
non-recipient Council 
Members. 
Global Fund The Global Fund's Board includes representatives of donor 
and recipient governments, non-governmental organizations, 
the private sector (including businesses and foundations) 
and affected communities. 20 are voting members and 8 are 
non-voting. Each group represented in the Board determines 
its process for selecting Board representation. 
Chair and Vice Chair 
elected by the Board for a 
term of 2 years, and the 
two positions alternate 
between the voting 
groups. 
Global 
Horticulture 
Initiative 
The Board consists of 10 voting members, four 
representatives from international institutions and agencies 
conducting horticultural research for development, and one 
representative from each of the following: international 
society for horticultural science, farmers, health sector, 
private horti-business sector, donors, and United Nations 
organization. The Executive Secretary of the Consortium is 
ex-officio member. 
The Chair of the Board of 
Directors is selected by a 
two-thirds majority vote of 
the Board from among its 
members for a 3-year 
term. 
Global 
Partnership 
for Education 
Board has 19 members, senior-level representatives of 
various constituencies as follows: 6 recipient countries 
including 3 from Africa; 1 each from Asia and Pacific, Eastern 
Europe/Middle East/Central Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean; 6 from donor constituencies; 3 from civil society 
organizations including 1 each from international/northern, 
developing country, and teachers profession; 1 from private 
sector/foundations; 3 from multilateral organizations; and a 
full-time independent chair. 
The Chair of the Board of 
Directors is selected by 
the Board and represents 
the Board and the 
Partnership. 
Green 
Climate Fund 
24 members composed of an equal number of members 
from developing and developed country Parties. Members 
are selected by their respective constituency or regional 
group within a constituency. 
Two co-chairs of the 
Board (one a member of a 
developed country Party 
and one a member of a 
developing country Party) 
are elected by the Board 
members to serve for one 
year. 
International 
Finance 
Facility for 
Immunisation 
(IFFIm) 
Managed by a board of 5-6 directors. The GAVI Board does 
not have oversight of IFFIm but there is a regular flow of 
information to the GAVI Board about IFFIm’s performance 
and activities. The IFFIm Board briefs the senior executives of 
the GAVI Alliance who, in turn, brief GAVI Board members. 
The IFFIm Board requires a skill mix that includes the health 
sector and systems, multilateral development institutions, 
capital markets, accounting/audit and legal capability.  
The first chair was 
recruited and appointed 
by the GAVI Alliance, and 
thereafter the Chair is to 
lead the recruitment and 
selection process. 
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Oxfam 
International 
The Oxfam International Board is made up of the Chair and 
Executive Director of each of its 17 affiliates and an 
independent Chair and Treasurer. Each affiliate uses its own 
method of selection. 
The Chair is elected by the 
affiliates through a secret 
preferential ballot. The 
Chair may be the Chair of 
an Affiliate or may be an 
additional person from an 
affiliate Board. 
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Appendix 6: Outline of Possible Transitional Arrangements 
 
A number of comments received prior to the Consultation Draft and subsequent to it have raised 
concerns about the change process in transitioning from a two-pillar to a single board governance 
structure. There is concern about potential disruptions to ongoing work and the time it might take to 
make the transition and the risk that the next round of CRPs might be delayed. It is the view of the 
Panel that the finalization of the SRF, the initial guidelines and the call for proposals for the next 
round of CRPs, and planning required to strengthen ISPC can all be achieved in parallel with the 
transition planning process, and that the new Board should be able to be in place in time for the CRP 
approval process. In order to demonstrate how this might be achieved, we have outlined below 
possible transitional arrangements, not as a definitive piece, but simply to illustrate the sort of 
timetable that could be adopted. 
 
November 2014 – December 2015 – Action Plan Implementation  
By the end of November, the FC Chair appoints a Transition Team Leader (TTL), who would manage a 
transition team and be the focal point for engagement with stakeholders for consultation on the 
various elements of the shift from the two-pillar to a single board governance structure. 
By the end of December, (i) the TTL with support from the Fund Office (FO), identifies expertise 
requirements for TT, detailed TOR for each, and candidates to be recruited, and (ii) the Fund Council, 
Consortium Board, and Centers designate a cross-CGIAR advisory team, with four members from 
each of the three  
 
January 2015 – April 2015 
By January 15, 2015, the TT is in place, with an office at the FO. This is likely to be two senior 
experts, in addition to the TTL, all capable of interacting one-on-one with stakeholders and 
representatives of “peer agencies,” such as GAVI, GPE, etc., plus three more junior professionals to 
assist in research and drafting. In addition, the World Bank would be requested to second an 
individual from the Trustee’s Office and another from the Legal department on a part-time basis to 
support the work of the Transition Team.  
 
By mid-February 2015, circulate a detailed TOR for Board Chair and process for his/her recruitment, 
for eventual approval by the Fund Council on a no-objections basis by the end of February. 
 
By mid-March 2015, the consultation draft options paper on Board size, membership, constituency 
breakdown, and self-selection process discussed at a workshop with the cross-CGIAR advisory team. 
Other interested parties and potential key stakeholder group representatives could also be invited). 
 
By mid-April 2015, professional head hunters establish a short-list of candidates for the Board Chair. 
 
Late April 2015 – Fund Council Meeting 
TT proposes for approval (i) a short-list of candidates for the Board Chair, along with proposed 
selection process, (ii) Board structure, constituencies and process for self-selecting representatives 
to the Board, and (iii) the procedure and selection criteria for locating the Administrative Unit. 
 
TT also submits for information progress on the (i) design of the Administrative Unit functions, 
accountabilities and composition, (ii) delineation of joint responsibilities of Centers (i.e., the selected 
functions of the Consortium Office that would transferred to Centers for joint responsibility), and (iii) 
a detailed work plan up to the November FC meeting. 
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May - September 2015 
By the end of May 2015, TT recommendations revised in accordance with guidance from FC. 
Detailed options on Board roles and responsibilities and accountabilities, as well as the 
Administrative Unit’s design, functions, and responsibilities, prepared and discussed in a second 
workshop with the cross-CGIAR advisory team. 
 
TT assists/facilitates constituencies as required to agree on initial Board membership. 
 
By mid- September 2015,  circulate for virtual discussion, the change management plan; initial 
policies and procedures necessary to hold the first Board meeting; assessment of  proposals for 
location of the Administrative Unit; and proposed compensation, rights, and privileges, etc. for Board 
members and Administrative Unit staff. 
 
By the end of September, the change management plan etc. (see above) discussed at third cross-
CGIAR Advisory Team workshop. External stakeholders likely to be on Board would be invited.  
 
October 2015 
Circulate for the November Fund Council meeting the (i) selection of Board Chair, (ii) Board 
composition, (iii) first Board meeting agenda, and (iv) draft agreement on the establishment of the 
Administrative Unit,  
 
November 2015 Fund Council Meeting 
The Fund Council would approve the appointment of the Chair, and the establishment of the Board 
and the Administrative Unit, and would dissolve itself. 
 
The new Board Chair would convene the first Board meeting and consider for approval the proposed 
Board responsibilities, rules, and procedures; the Board’s and Administrative Unit’s workplans and 
budgets; and policies and procedures required to maintain operational momentum on preparation of 
the second round of CRP proposals.  
 
November 2015 – December 2016 – Initial Board Priorities 
November 2015 and April 2016: First two Board meetings would appoint the Chair; adopt the basic 
policy framework, including changes in ISPC, etc.; agree on Board operating guidelines; establish 
Donor Council; establish priority Board committees, such as an Audit Committee, etc.; approve 
Administrative Unit structure, staffing and initial budget and appoint the head of the Unit; receive 
reviews of current CRPs; and confirm endorsement of the new SRF and new CRP selection criteria. 
 
November 2016: Third Board meeting would, among other business, review and approve the second 
round of CRPs. 
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Supplementary Appendix:  
Comments from CGIAR Stakeholders on Consultation Draft of the MTR Report 
 
 
Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions (APAARI) 
 
The Association of Agriculture Research Institutions in the Near East & North Africa 
(AARINENA) fully endorses the comments below submitted by APAARI 
 
The need for greater clarity in the CGIAR Vision and Mission is fully supported, but it is not clear as to 
how a more elaborate mission statement as suggested in the report will link to the new Strategic 
Results Framework (SRF) to avoid duplication or potential confusion. The SRF and CRPs should be 
the key vehicles for elaborating and delivering the Vision and Mission statements. Unfortunately, so 
far there is no clarity on SRF and the process has invariably taken long time. Hence, urgency for 
putting in place SRF must be highlighted with a defined time frame and the process should be 
transparent and consultative, involving the developing NARS and all stakeholders. 
 
·  A CGIAR Task Force to identify priorities and least cost options on a systematic basis is useful 
recognising that the links and timing of such a prioritisation process will likely have a strong 
bearing on the development of the new SRF and its implementation. This needs further 
explanation in our view, given that the new SRF is still being developed. The open data facilities 
are required and such a network will need to be developed in consort with existing regional and 
global research data networks to be effective and to avoid wasteful duplication.  
 
· We fully agree that the preparation of the SRF must have sufficient stakeholder participation to 
ensure ownership of the final product. With regards to the NARS and regional forums the two way 
interaction will need proactive action by all parties. To date many NARS feel somewhat sidelined 
in the deliberative mechanisms. APAARI and other regional forums can be important focal points 
for progressing this process further, especially through effective stakeholder involvement. The 
GCARD Road Map had been an outcome of this process and hence we must take advantage of 
such initiatives while finalising SRF and needed CRPs 
 
· The proposed single CGIAR Board to replace the Fund Council and Consortium Board is indeed 
the most radical proposition, which should be taken up as a priority. In doing so the current 
ambiguities and confusions for the overlapping roles and responsibilities should be resolved, 
since the lack of clarity on roles has potential implications for cost and managerial efficiency. A 
unified and more streamlined governance structure would improve the system's efficiency, 
coordination and convergence. Further, a suggestion to form a donor council (like the Finance 
Committee chaired by World Bank in the past) to advise the CGIAR Board is most appropriate. In 
addition, it is our considered view that there could also be an Independent Advisory Committee 
(IAC) for the single Board having representation of eminent persons representing different NARS 
/regional organisations to provide matured advice on national/regional perspectives and 
developments. The role of regional forums and NARS in greater adoption of research results and 
their role in capacity building can be substantially enhanced to out scale innovations for greater 
impact on small holder farmers. 
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· The CGIAR partnerships will require much more serious efforts in strengthening to avoid slippage 
and to ensure greater partnerships in future. This is the considered view of regional forums 
based on feedback of various NARS members and stakeholders. Stronger partnership will help 
immensely in scaling up research, adoption and improved financing for the future. We also 
support the important role of both public and private partnerships, as emphasised by the review 
panel. APAARI stands ready to be an active regional contributor to these endeavours. It has 
suitable networks involving emerging Asian economies to make a positive contribution in 
meeting the CGIAR Goal and Mission. 
 
· Similarly, APAARI and other regional forums can be active partners with the CGIAR and its 
constituent centers in research policy advocacy, including political level representations and 
deliberations, knowledge sharing, capacity building and research partnerships. Suitable 
mechanisms for making such partnerships feasible in practice require further consideration. 
 
· The proposed extension and elaboration of the ISPC role and leadership in providing guidance, 
analyses and quality assurance (like the role of TEC in the past) is fully supported. Its role and 
authority for partnerships requires further clarity and action since in our view this has remained a 
weak link despite existing reforms.  
 
· An additional comment relates to GCARD. The regional forums consider this an important event 
to bring all stakeholders on a common platform to deliberate periodically the research 
outcomes/outputs of CGIAR system, and to provide periodic strategy for their faster adoption 
through greater involvement of stakeholders. We consider this to be an important requirement 
for which allocation of resources will be more productive in the long run. Interface among 
stakeholders at frequent intervals is considered to be a useful investment. No doubt, required 
reforms for the GCARD process will be put in place alongside the implementation of the MTR 
Panel Review report.  
 
Further, while resource mobilisation has been considered in the review findings and 
recommendations, the role of window 3/bilateral funding sources has not been fully addressed. 
Given the ongoing importance of these funding options in the overall financial position of the CGIAR, 
it is considered that member centers of the CGIAR should be able to raise contributions from the 
donors though these channels and other sources in the future without any restriction. Also the 
importance of window 1 and 2 funds and also the importance of autonomy of each of the institutions 
should also be emphasised. 
 
 
Australia 
 
The Panel has addressed well the six Focus Areas of the review. Brief comments on each are 
provided below. The comments are initial reactions, not informed by deep reflection. More fully-
developed responses will be presented at FC12.  
1. The appropriateness of the current CGIAR’s goals and strategies in supporting the fundamental 
purpose of agricultural research to deliver development solutions needed to create a world free 
of hunger. 
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We concur with the Panel’s observations about the deficiencies – including broadness – of the 
CGIAR’s vision, mission and associated strategies and results. The Panel recommends that a 
taskforce be established to propose a CGIAR Vision. Given the stature and diverse but 
complementary expertise of the Panel members, it would be particularly instructive for the Panel 
to propose such a vision, as a starting point for the taskforce, if constituted.  
 
The Panel has identified five ‘big challenges’ for the CGIAR and proposed five major research 
challenges with potential for greatest impact and payback. While these priorities may not be 
definitive, they are helpful for sharpening the focus of the CGIAR system. We support the 
recommendation for a systematic process of prioritisation but observe that what’s easy in theory 
can be devilishly difficult in practice.  
 
The Panel proposes that development of the new Strategy and Results Framework ‘should take 
as much time as is required to get it right’. This should not be interpreted literally, or in absence 
of consideration of the consequences – the system does not have a particularly good track 
record of delivering in the absence of a deadline.  
 
2. CGIAR’s effectiveness in generating and delivering solutions for reducing rural poverty, 
improving food security and advancing the livelihoods of users of its research. 
 
The Panel acknowledged the difficulties in finding a common truth among the variety of 
stakeholders interviewed (“where you stand often depends on where you sit”) and have been 
realistic in what they conclude. However, only a fairly ‘light’ treatment was given to the 
assessment of whether the reforms had helped or hindered the generation and delivery of 
solutions.  
 
The Report usefully distilled the complex range of issues and characteristics surrounding the 
CGIAR system, including the four pre-reform principles (donor sovereignty, independent scientific 
advice, center autonomy and consensus decision-making) that have been retained and the three 
new principles introduced through the reform (separating the funders from the doers, 
harmonisation and managing for results).  
 
3. The efficiency and effectiveness of CGIAR’s architecture/structure, operations, and mechanisms 
for managing and funding research programs and building capacity, including its internal 
systems, risk management, governance and accountability. 
 
The Panel has made insightful observations about the CGIAR architecture and structure, and 
particularly the associated ambiguities. We welcome the Panel’s bold recommendation in 
relation to a single CGIAR Board. We do harbour some doubts about the ability of the system to 
implement the recommendation, if accepted, ahead of the second CRP round.  
 
While a single CGIAR Board, if adopted, can be expected to reduce ambiguities between the 
‘funders’ and the ‘doers’, it is unlikely in and of itself to remove all ambiguities, including those 
between the new Board and the Centre Boards. More critical thinking will be required. In 
addition, CRP leadership and management considerations will need far greater clarity.  
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The Report’s consideration of capacity building and risk management are relatively limited and 
could be usefully strengthened.  
 
4. The extent and quality of partnerships within the CGIAR network and with external collaborators 
and stakeholders.  
 
We support the Panel findings that the increase in collaboration among the Centers (mostly as a 
result of the cross-cutting CRPs) with a sharper focus on delivering development impact, and 
increased donor funding have been among the major successes resulting from the reform. On 
the flip side (and highlighting the complexity of these issues) factors associated with 
collaboration, such as knowledge exchange and greater efficiencies, have not achieved their full 
potential.  
 
While the Panel made a range of observations about CGIAR partnerships, the Panel’s key (and 
rather underwhelming) recommendation in this respect appears to be to develop guidelines. 
Further elaboration, and more incisive guidance, would be welcomed.  
 
5. The structure of the Fund, the challenges of increasing the proportion of commitments to pooled 
funding (Windows 1 and 2), the prospects for firm multi-year pledges, and the roles of Window 3 
and bilateral funding.  
 
The review appears to take as a self-evident truth that pooled (Window 1 and 2) funding is the 
ideal, without adequately exploring the pros and cons of Window 3 and bilateral funding.  
 
FC10 Agenda Item 13 notes that, ‘it was also decided that the review of Window 3 be made part 
of the MTR’. While resource mobilisation was featured in the review findings and 
recommendations, it was a shame that the use, value and future of Window 3/bilateral funding 
wasn’t pursued in greater detail, with perhaps a recommendation provided. We would have liked 
to have seen further emphasis on this aspect to resolve the W3 uncertainty.  
 
6. Measures needed for the CGIAR to continue playing its critical role in global public goods 
research and national capacity building, and maintain its relevance in a rapidly changing global 
environment of ODA, more complex and crowded global research architecture, changing roles of 
public and private research investment, and ever competing demands on donor funding. 
 
The document sets an ambitious yet optimistic tone in relation to tackling the global mega-
challenges; with a clear aim to not only make a contribution but to solve the challenges. This 
approach engenders donor confidence, especially when the document calls for rigorous and 
accurate budgets to be developed for delivering the final SRF.  
Concluding comments 
In some respects, key determinations (vision, prioritisation, etc.) have been deferred, and referred to 
a (proposed) taskforce, while the complexity of the design of the Board is acknowledged, but no path 
forward is proposed (notwithstanding the transitional secretariat, which would provide a support 
function). These are points amongst several points of vulnerability in the execution of the 
recommendations. The system needs to be able to make tough choices and hard decisions; its 
record to date in this respect is rather patchy. 
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Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) 
 
As representatives of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation on the Fund Council, we strongly support 
all nine MTR recommendations and want to publicly acknowledge the tremendous contribution of 
the MTR panel. Recommendations that we want to call out as high priority for the future success of 
the CGIAR reform include: governance (one board), innovative financing, and taking time to develop 
a strong SRF to frame the next round of CRPs. All three of these issues are interrelated. 
 
We are quite aware that implementation of these recommendations will require grappling with as-yet 
unanswered questions, especially the governance structure and the wording of new governance 
documents.  Outcomes of the proposed changes should include: 
 simplified governance structure, including advisory bodies 
 appropriate allocation of responsibility and risk among a unified board and the Center 
Boards 
 clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all parties of the CGIAR (CGIAR Board, CGIAR 
Board Chair, advisory bodies, Center Board Chairs, Center DGs, CRP Directors, etc.) – this is 
one of the key issues that has adversely impacted the CGIAR reform implementation during 
the past four years and the recommended changes create an opportunity to institute clear 
responsibility and accountability for all parties of the CGIAR. 
 
A few additional comments that may help shape the conversation at FC12 include:  
 
(1) Transition – the CGIAR is at a fragile point in the change management process (too many have 
been at this for too long).  We should be thoughtful of how to implement the MTR recommendations 
to achieve the original goals of increased efficiency and effectiveness of the CGIAR.   But at the same 
time we should put ourselves on an assertive time line – so that this process does not drag out.  
 
(2) Center Boards – a particular attention is warranted in deciding the scope of authority of the new 
CGIAR Board with respect to the Centers’ individual governance. As in any consortium or group 
governance, there is real value in the individual organizations’ Boards to manage their institutional 
risks. The CGIAR Board of Governors does not want to be managing a Mexican labor dispute, 
approving a land deal in Nigeria, or negotiating with a local host government of a Center. If they are 
run well, the Center Boards play critical governing roles, because they have their feet on the ground, 
so to speak. Weakening the Center Boards would actually weaken the practical accountability overall 
of the system. Instead, there should be progress made to delineate roles and responsibilities that 
are clearly articulated in a new constitution as well as mechanisms to govern, such as voting for 
approval by the CGIAR Board, Centers, and decisions that are straight out delegated (with 
concomitant accountability) to the Center Boards. The current constitution does not offer the 
required clarity to cover practical guidance of the division of responsibilities. 
 
(3) Accountability for CRPs – this should be the central responsibility of the new CGIAR Board. 
Governance at the level of the CRPs and Center programs needs to be clarified to reduce duplication 
and inefficiencies that supports collaboration cross-centers and partnerships. Accountability follows 
the flow of funding from donors under suitable performance agreements. Currently, CRP Lead 
Centers (and Center Boards) are accountable. However, this is separated from the most 
management decisions of each CRP Director. Here too we need greater clarity on governance 
structure, roles and responsibilities of all parties. Under the one board model, does the Lead Center 
Board take on direct governance accountability, given that sub-grants to partners are managed by 
the Lead Center? We need to drive towards simplicity, clarity and accountability as governance 
structures are designed and learn from the experience of the past four years. 
70  
Canada 
 
Canada appreciates the work of the Mid-Term Review Panel and welcomes its findings gathered from 
consultations across stakeholders.  We are particularly supportive of the recommendations to 
develop a focused and outcome-oriented Strategy and Results Framework that is at once allied to a 
clear compelling vision of the mission of the CGIAR, and that identifies opportunities for innovative 
finance, optimizes developmental impact, and improves thought leadership by the CGIAR with a 
stronger role for the Independent Science and Partnership Council.  
 
In Canada’s view, the CGIAR needs to push forward three priorities in order to reinforce its value-
proposition to donors: 
 
Strategy: First, the CGIAR’s Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) needs to clearly articulate 
expected development outcomes in the long term. The SRF also needs to describe how 
outcomes from the CGIAR’s research programmes (irrespective from which of the three 
Windows they receive funding) will be tracked in the short to medium term. Donors need to 
be able to gauge performance more easily.  
 
Effectiveness: CGIAR should continue to improve the effectiveness of its collaborative 
research programs, including more systematic implementation of its commitments on gender 
equality and engagement with a broader array of partners, including the private sector.  
 
Efficiency:  While reform efforts to date have reduced multiple costs to donors involved in 
oversight of 15 CGIAR Centers, there is scope for more ambition.  Further improvements in 
system-wide coherence, be it policy, operational or governance-related, would spur the CGIAR 
towards greater efficiency, as well as reassure donors that the CGIAR system is focused on 
reaping the maximum dividend from each dollar it receives. 
 
Following are our preliminary comments and questions respecting the consultation draft of the MTR 
report: 
 
Prioritization of Research: The priority areas defined in the report are important to for global food 
security research.  Further dialogue through the process of consultation and development of the 
Strategy and Results Framework in 2014-2015 would provide a constructive mechanism for further 
consideration.  In particular: 
 Canada strongly supports a focus on nutrition integrated into agricultural research 
moving forward, and appreciates the focus on stunting, however we recognize that 
nutrition research may have broader impact that could integrate other measures to 
demonstrate progress. 
 Recognizing the role of agriculture in the context of both climate change adaptation 
and mitigation, accelerating progress on climate-smart agriculture is welcome.  
 The focus on degraded arable lands should consider research on marginal lands 
rather than solely degraded lands, reflecting agricultural research on marginal areas 
that may, for example, be naturally less fertile, subject to desertification, or highly 
saline.  
 Disparities remain among CRPs and Centers in their dedicated capacity for 
integrating gender in research agendas.  This is reflected in the limited progress by 
some research programs on these commitments; while others have more fully 
embraced gender equality as a central component of their research. In parallel with 
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the need for improved performance management systems, gender should be more 
fully integrated into results and accountability frameworks.  
 
Scaling-Up Partnerships:   
The ‘science of delivery’ challenge remains undefined at the system level in so far that the CGIAR 
has not articulated its approach to engaging various external partners.  Canada supports the 
recommendation to further define how CGIAR can more effectively engage partners outside the 
system, and how it makes decisions about linking with various types of delivery agents to achieve 
development outcomes. 
 
Scaling Up Finance:   
Canada supports the recommendations to pursue opportunities to scale up finance for the CGIAR 
system with new and existing donors in the context of a changing funding landscape.  CGIAR can 
seize opportunities to improve messaging based on a shared vision and strategy, coordinate 
communications, engage partners and leadership, and the explore innovative finance mechanisms.  
 
Governance Structure:   
Canada recognized the opportunities for simplifying the governance structure and improving the 
effectiveness of decision-making and accountability within the CGIAR system.  A stronger role for the 
Independent Science and Partnership Council is a welcome recommendation to improve the rigour of 
decision-making.  
In principle, we support the merger of the Fund Council and Consortium Board subject to additional 
clarity on the issue of representation and management support functions to be put in place to 
advance decision-making by the single Board. The establishment of a single Board should be 
contingent upon: 
o adequate donor representation, reflecting the role of funders in supporting the CGIAR 
system; 
o a clear conflict of interest policy to maintain the integrity of funding and strategic 
decisions, with due consideration to the range of stakeholders proposed for 
membership including the private sector and management of CGIAR research; 
o maintaining the continued role of the World Bank as Trustee of the CGIAR Fund, 
providing essential technical and administrative capacities to support the Fund. 
 
The final decision regarding the governance structure should be contingent upon further clarification 
of a number of considerations: 
 definition of the key roles, authorities, and accountabilities of Board membership, 
with a focus on enhanced accountability and strategic decision-making; 
 the proposed role of the private sector on the Board; 
 the role of the proposed Donor’s Council and CGIAR Centre Advisory Committee, 
including the relationships with the Board;  
 the proposed mechanism for establishing the Board’s membership and 
constituencies; 
 the legal and administrative implications of moving the Fund Council and Fund Office 
from the World Bank to an independent Board with a support secretariat possibly 
housed in another country; and 
 equally, the legal and administrative implications of moving the Consortium Board 
and Consortium Office from its current status in France. 
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CGIAR Consortium and Centers – Joint Response to the Consultation Draft from the Mid-
Term Review Panel of the CGIAR Reform Recommendations (October 19, 2014) 
 
 
Recommendations Draft Joint Response 
1. Develop a clear CGIAR Vision and Mission – A clear and 
focused vision and mission should be developed to guide 
the decisions on priority research objectives, facilitate the 
development of strategic approaches to reaching those 
objectives, and provide adequately detailed expectations of 
results. The Panel recommends that the vision for CGIAR 
be oriented towards agricultural research required to meet 
immediate and long-term nutrition needs and achieve 
equitable food security by 2030. Likewise, the Panel 
recommends that the CGIAR mission should include how it 
will achieve these short and long term societal challenges 
through its mission statement – through its strengths as a 
global network; a network that harnesses other relevant 
capabilities from organizations. 
Agree.  The updated SRF (to be 
finalized by April 2015) must include a 
compelling clear vision and mission for 
CGIAR. 
2. Prioritize to achieve maximum impact with the least 
cost – A CGIAR task force should undertake a systematic 
process of prioritization, with the objective of providing a 
menu of options for CGIAR and its partners to determine 
how they can maximize impacts with the least costs. This 
would assist donors in identifying where they might 
achieve the largest benefits for the least costs as well as 
identify potential high risk-high reward research areas. 
The Panel identified five major research challenges with 
potential for very high payback. The list is by no means 
definitive- but this level of prioritization is needed to 
sharpen focus and impact. 
Agree.  The updated SRF should take 
into consideration the research 
challenges identified by the MTR team 
as part of inputs (together with inputs 
from NARS, national policymakers, 
centers and donors, and other 
stakeholders) when identifying priority 
objectives, themes, IDOs, portfolios 
and priorities. 
3. Strategy and Results Framework – The Fund Council and 
Consortium Board should establish clear criteria by which 
they determine whether the SRF under preparation meets 
their needs. It must primarily enable prioritization of 
outcomes being sought and consequently the research and 
partnerships required to deliver against these.  This will 
enhance stakeholder confidence in that the limited 
financial resources are being used for the greatest impact, 
and that those resources are sufficient for achieving the 
research goals. The preparation of the SRF must have 
sufficient stakeholder participation to ensure joint 
ownership of the final product. The process should take as 
much time as is required to get it right. The call for the 
second round of CGIAR Research Program proposals 
should only be issued after the Fund Council is fully 
satisfied with the SRF, including an assurance from CGIAR 
stakeholders that there is broad support. 
Agree.  One of the critical gaps in the 
current process of SRF development is 
a lack of consultation with key 
stakeholders including NARS, national 
policymakers, the private sector and 
NGOs.   
 
Stakeholder consultation for the SRF is 
important and it is foreseen in the 
process for development of the SRF 
between November 2014 and April 
2015. 
 
In addition, the development of the 
future portfolio of CRPs should take 
into consideration a smooth transition 
for any change from the existing 
portfolio 
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4. Governance structure – The Panel strongly recommends 
that a single CGIAR Board be established to replace the 
Fund Council and the Consortium Board and be supported 
by one Administrative Unit, replacing the Fund Office and 
Consortium Office, with the aim of eliminating current 
governance ambiguities, strengthening the ability of CGIAR 
to deliver its mission of research and development impact, 
and accelerating and scaling up solution-driven public-
private collaborative partnerships. The Board would 
establish fiduciary standards and assessment guidelines 
for CGIAR funded operations; criteria and guidelines for 
consideration of CRPs and funding proposals for new 
collaborative research partnerships; audit and Trustee 
arrangements; CGIAR internal policies and regulations; and 
the design and operation of the Administrative Unit. 
 
The proposed Board would need to adequately and 
effectively represent key stakeholders, with clarity on the 
rationale for inclusion of stakeholders and the expectations 
of them. Consideration should be given to the size of the 
Board - limiting the number of members to ensure that it is 
manageable. This will inevitably lead to a constituency-
based board.  The Panel believes that the key stakeholders 
requiring representation on the CGIAR Board are the 
donors, CGIAR centers, NARs, agricultural private sector 
representatives, chief scientists, and recipient countries. 
 
The Panel considers that, in order to avoid conflict of 
interest, the Board Chair should represent the mission of 
the CGIAR partnership and therefore should not represent 
a constituency. 
 
The Board should establish a donor council, which would 
advise the Board on the views of the broader CGIAR donor 
base (e.g., regarding operations, fundraising, etc.).  The 
CGIAR Centers should establish an advisory committee to 
advise the Board on new advances in research, and new or 
emerging challenges and risks requiring urgent action by 
CGIAR.  The design of the Board should be undertaken in 
parallel with the completion of the SRF and the new 
governance structure should be in place prior to final 
selection of the next round of CRPs. 
We agree that in principle one single 
board could be an effective way to 
integrate functions of the Fund Council 
and the Consortium Board.  The key 
question is how this could be achieved 
practically. We also agree that such a 
new board should be supported by one 
office.   
 
Retaining the independent role of the 
new single Board is imperative and the 
board should be effective and 
accountable. 
 
The transition process and 
composition of a new board has to be 
well thought through to reflect 
perspectives from donors, experts, 
centers and high level individuals who 
can serve as champions of the CGIAR.  
A clear mutual accountability 
mechanism should be developed 
between the board, centers and 
donors.  Strong leadership of the board 
and supporting office must be 
ensured.  
 
It is important that governance 
structure changes do not disrupt 
continuity of funding and operations in 
existing CRPs.  
 
We also believe it will be premature to 
respond to specific comments made 
by the MTR Panel about setting a 
donor council and other committees. 
Centers and the Consortium need to 
be involved in the design of the 
organization and processes. 
 
5. Optimize the strengths of partners – There is 
considerable room for expanding existing and establishing 
new partnerships globally. To avoid transaction costs, risks, 
and other inefficiencies and engage partners as equal 
stakeholders so that joint decisions can be taken on when 
and how to partner, the Panel recommends that the Fund 
Council seek the assistance of donors (e.g. World Bank) 
and key organizations engaged in research with global 
reach (e.g. EMBRAPA, CSIRO, and private sector 
representing inputs and the food and beverage industry) to 
Agree. Partner identification and 
management needs to be for both 
research (including national, sub 
regional and regional entities and think 
tanks) and development organizations 
(NGOs, multilateral agencies). 
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assist CGIAR in developing guidelines for identifying, 
establishing, managing and reviewing partnerships. The 
guidelines should be clearly tailored to meet the strategic 
objectives and results delineated in the SRF. 
6. Scale up partnerships capable of tackling mega-
challenges – Once the new SRF is adopted (outcomes as 
the focus) and the next round of CRP proposals (multi-
disciplinary research required as a focus) are approved, 
CGIAR should assess the extent to which its own research 
programs and those of other leading institutions and 
companies are sufficient to address priority food security 
and nutrition challenges, with a view to identifying major 
gaps that require new global partnerships, special-
purpose, internationally-coordinated, and long-term mega-
programs designed to solve the problems, rather than put 
dents in them. CGIAR is likely to play a key role in 
identifying what future partnerships are needed to tackle 
the world’s food security mega-challenges and propose a 
commensurate framework for action. 
 
CGIAR Centers and other potential partner organizations 
need to be adaptive in how they work with partners so as to 
assure their long-term relevance as coalition partners. They 
will need to engage in both leadership and non-leadership 
(or supporting) roles, taking on responsibilities that are 
best suited to CGIAR’s strengths and comparative 
advantages. CGIAR can play a leadership role by bringing 
top-level global leaders together to tackle challenges 
(beyond the reach of individual partners) in a collaborative 
manner. 
Agree.  The new SRF and the second 
round of CRPs should also allow 
flexibility for the system to take these 
emerging mega challenges together 
with key partners.    
7. Scaling up financing – The Fund Council should organize 
a special session in early 2015 to discuss innovative 
financing options, recognizing the difficulty of securing 
long-term, predictable commitments to fund  CGIAR 
Research Programs, and the uncertainties around 
maintaining, let alone significantly increasing, funding. 
Some potential approaches include development impact 
bonds, a capital formation investment fund, the Green 
Bond concept, public-private strategies, and pursuing high 
risk-high reward impact investors. 
Agree.  Identifying key champions for 
CGIAR is critical, and will be an 
important part of a Resource 
Mobilization Strategy.  We believe that 
a strategic role of the proposed new 
Board will be to scale up fund raising 
at higher levels than Centers and CRPs 
are able to reach currently. 
8. Optimize political impact – CGIAR (not just individual 
Centers) should establish specific objectives of and 
procedures for engaging in relevant global and regional 
policy formulations, negotiations and actions. CGIAR has 
tremendous knowledge and could contribute to and 
influence international and regional policy debates on 
many highly emotive issues, such as climate change, food 
security, food safety, water management, fisheries 
management, and the Sustainable Development Goals, 
among many others. 
Agree.  Centers can also play a large 
role in global dialogues, setting 
development agenda and formulating 
global policies and strategies. 
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9. Optimize knowledge impact – The responsibilities of the 
ISPC should be elevated to empower it to be proactive in 
terms of providing strategic guidance, foresight analyses, 
and assessing and reporting on quality of research results 
across the system. The review and reporting functions 
should be at least as rigorous as was previously provided 
by the pre-reform Science Council.  It is critically important 
to ensure that high-quality research review and advice is 
consistently provided. At a minimum the Fund Council and 
Consortium Board (and later the CGIAR Board) should 
establish independent research panels comprising world-
class research leaders to advise on particular issues, as 
required.  A detailed proposal for the new functions of the 
ISPC or its replacement should be prepared immediately by 
a task force established by the Fund Council.  
Agree. Yet the periodic external advice 
and evaluation (ISPC & IEA) should be 
complemented by a continuous 
monitoring and management support 
function. 
 
 
China 
 
China values very much the MTR Panel’s work on conducting such a productive Final Report 
(Consultation Draft). The report findings well summarized the achievements CGIAR have made since 
its reform as well as the challenges CGIAR is facing at the current stage.  
 
China agrees that the conception of SRF and CRPs are the most important outcomes from the 
reforms and have largely improved the consistency and coordination of overall research work across 
different centers.  
 
As a Fund Council member, China also expects to see further improvement in operational and 
administrative efficiency of the system, especially for the new SRF formulation and CRPs 
implementation. 
 
China believes that most recommendations put forward by the Final Report are appropriate and 
pertinent aiming at promoting CGIAR long-term development, in particular, the finalization of SRF, 
the research priorities and the partnership optimization are the most concerns from China. 
 
However, China thinks it’s still need to be carefully considered and discussed regarding the 
suggestion to change the governance structure, e. g. to establish a single Board replacing Fund 
Council and Consortium. The current structure is resulted from a common decision made by the 
majority of all related stakeholders at the beginning of CGIAR reform, and the centers and donors 
have adapted gradually to this system. To establish a new governing body will not only involve the 
cost of energy, human resources and expenses to form new rules, but also will probably bring 
confusions to the on-going research work, which is not helpful for efficiency improvement. We believe 
that strengthening the coordination and communication between Fund Council and Consortium 
should be ideal way to improve the governance of CGIAR in spite of the fact that .it’s not always easy 
to do it perfectly.  
 
In addition, we have some other suggestions in terms of recommendations: 
 
1) For the research prioritization, we think technology transfer and delivery should also be included 
since the aim of the research and its outputs should be efficiently delivered to the end users. This 
also aligns in large part with existing AR4D frameworks.  
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2) We think it’s also important to enhance awareness and visibility of CGIAR initiatives as well as 
publicize and highlight its achievements. Indeed CGIAR has circulated every year a large number of 
very detailed documentations, including annual reports; however partners at different levels 
(governments, research institutions, farmers) would expect more clear, concise and attention-
drawing messages for better understanding and time saving. Such kind of publication and 
communication methods should help strengthen impacts to larger audiences.  
3) China is willing and prepared to get more involved in large-scale research cooperation such as 
CRPs and expect to make more contributions to improve global food security with CGIAR. We 
welcome the idea to scale up the partnerships and upgrade the cooperation with strategic partners 
with great potential in order to address global agriculture challenges. 
 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
 
Introduction 
 FAO thanks the Panel for the report it provided, acknowledging the extensive interviews and 
the collective wisdom of the review panel, which is composed of a well-balanced, 
distinguished group of leading experts.  
 FAO agrees in general with the panel’s assessment on the achievements and the key 
problems of the 2009 CGIAR reform. We are in concurrence with the Panel, the Center 
Directors-General, and the Consortium on the key areas that have worked well, and those 
areas that have not. 
 FAO considers that the MTR proposes a substantial modification on the existing governance 
structure, but fails to provide a strong analysis of potential operational difficulties and 
political consequences of such a proposal. We therefore feel that the recommended “new 
wave of reform” especially on the governance needs further assessment and discussion. 
 Furthermore,  FAO finds that some key recommendations of the panel report, such as the 
five new areas of research priorities, the principles and the possible composition for the new 
governance mechanism, the partnerships, and the restructured ISPC, lack  a robust 
evidence-based analyses, more empirical than analytical, and hence are not sufficiently 
convincing. 
 
FAO’s specific comments: 
 
1. What has worked well and not worked so well: 
 We agree with the Panel’s assessment of the important achievements, e.g. the formulation of 
a results oriented Strategy and Results Framework, the progress of the CRPs, significantly 
increased funding, much increased collaboration of the Centers, a strong programmatic 
alignment and the shared services. 
 We also agree strongly with the Panel’s conclusion on the problems of the reform so far, 
especially those associated with the ambiguities between the FC and CB, the FO and CO, 
reflected perhaps in the cumbersome relationship between the Centers and the Consortium. 
The high transactions costs of the system as a whole is another area of discontent from the 
Centers and some stakeholders.  
 The inability of the Consortium and the Fund Council to enact necessary operational 
guidelines and a code of conduct recognized by all partners as a “must have” for 
operationalizing a dual structure was a key problem. 
 
2. SRF and research priorities: 
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 FAO agrees that the current SRF, together with the SRF Action Plan, served its purpose at the 
time. FAO also agrees with the Review panel that a renewed SRF needs to be developed 
before the second call for CRPs.  
 FAO appreciates the intention of the Review Panel in pointing out five potential areas of new 
research priorities. However, we are of the view that the research priorities will need to be set 
under the framework of the renewed SRF. The SRF should be formulated based on a solid 
analysis of the challenges that agricultural research will face, the comparative advantage of 
the CGIAR Centers, and the documented needs of the stakeholders.  
 FAO would urge that research priorities are not defined in isolation from the international 
policy framework and the sustainable development agenda. The priority setting on food and 
agriculture as it takes place in appropriate fora, such as FAO and IFAD, should be carefully 
considered in any research prioritization exercise. 
 
3. Governance:  
 FAO is in concurrence with the Review Panel on the problems in the current governance 
structure, and agrees that the problem needs to be addressed in order to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the system. We would like to advise that in deliberating on a 
“new” governance mechanism and structure, it should not be underestimated the processes, 
the cost and the legal implications associated with drastically changing the Consortium which 
is legally established as an International Organization under international law.  
 In the meantime, FAO does not find the Panel’s specific recommendation about the 
governance sufficiently convincing at this stage, without a thorough and evidence-based 
analysis of the potential gains and risks of the recommended new structure. We are 
nonetheless open to further discussions about the optimal solutions to the problems 
identified by the MTR Panel.  
 In particular, FAO would like to emphasize the importance of involving the multilateral system 
(such as FAO, the World Bank, IFAD) mandated on food security and rural poverty reduction 
in the CGIAR governance. The presence of UN specialized agencies establishes a vital linkage 
and consistency between CGIAR and the international policy and normative framework on 
food and agriculture. 
 FAO believes that the leadership role of the World Bank, perhaps one of the most important 
global development institutions that has provided the CGIAR with consistent and pivotal 
support since its inception, in the new CGIAR governance is crucial, especially at this juncture 
of CGIAR transition.  
 It is not clear the expected role of the “Chief Scientist” in the new board as recommended in 
the MTR report. What would be the role and responsibility of the Chief Scientist in the Board 
vis-à-vis that of the Science Council?  
 
4. Partnerships: 
 FAO finds the Panel’s analyses and the recommendations on partnerships weak and 
disappointing.  
 The importance of novel and effective partnerships is indisputable. One of the key elements 
of the 2009 CGIAR reform was to remove the CGIAR annual meeting and established the 
GCARD. A close engagement of multilateral development partners such as FAO and IFAD in 
the CGIAR system is expected to contribute to bridging research with extension, policy and 
application by farmers so as to scaling up impact. FAO finds it odd that neither FAO, GFAR nor 
GCARD are mentioned in the Panel report.  
 FAO believes that CGIAR needs the full participation of Development Agencies and non-
funders represented by GFAR into the Fund Council.  This implies that its governance needs 
to be inclusive, not exclusive, and to provide accountability vis-a-vis both the Funders and the 
partners/beneficiaries.  This was the rationale for merging the former Annual Meeting of the 
CGIAR and GFAR triennial Assembly into a single new process leading to a conference, the 
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GCARD, while providing accountability to the CGIAR with all sectors, 
research/extension/education/Private sector and other stakeholders.  It is disappointing that 
the MTR report does not present an analyses nor recommendation on this critically important 
aspect of the CGIAR reform. 
 
5.  Scaling up funding: 
 FAO would like echo the reminder in the Consortium’s submission to the Panel that further 
scaling up funding will likely be challenging. The idea of a “bond” is interesting, but lacks 
support by thorough analysis of the financing market, investors’ expectations, the suitability 
of the CGIAR core business with such financial tools, and the potential political risks and 
transaction costs of CGIAR pursuing such directions.  
 
6. Role and future direction of the ISPC: 
 Not clear about the new direction and roles of the ISPC as recommended by the Panel. 
 Recall the 2008 CGIAR system review report that recommended changing the role of the 
Science Council from “policing” to advising and helping on the research direction and 
science quality.  
Conclusions/recommendations: 
FAO feels that it may be too early to draw conclusive decisions on the CGIAR reform especially on its 
governance, since some of the key reform elements are still being put in place.  FAO believes that 
caution may be appropriate at this stage before embarking on a new, all-encompassing reform.  
However, challenges of governance should be addressed based on a careful analysis to increase the 
efficiency and functioning of the CGIAR system. 
 
 
Fiji 
 
Pages: 7, 13, 24, 27, 28, 33, 45, 49: "Innovative Financing Options/ Approaches for Agricultural 
Research." This is an important area and we feel that more discussions are needed on the various 
mechanisms needed for fund generation, what are the opportunities, and how to identify them. This 
is of special interest to us as we are also looking at ways to generate funds to implement the "Fiji 
2020 Agriculture Sector Policy Agenda" that was launched by the Hon. Prime Minister of Fiji in 
August this year to modernize Fiji's Agriculture Sector.  
 
Pages: 6, 7, 17, 20, 29, 30, 44, 49, 50: "Governance Structure." We agree to the suggestion of the 
Panel that a single CGIAR Board (CB) and Administration Unit be established replacing the Fund 
Council (FC) and Consortium Board (CB), to reduce duplication, improve efficiency and accountability. 
The panel has proposed number of representatives from various constituencies and to break down 
constituencies into sub-constituencies, representing the CGIAR Board. The 3 NARS representatives 
from geographic areas: Africa, Asia and Latin America are mentioned. We feel at least one NARS 
representative should be included/added from the Pacific Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs). 
This is because there are unique and wide range of challenges and opportunities in the PICTs.  
 
Pages: 5 (Executive Summary), 10 & Page:6: "To Create a World Free of Hunger." & "Specific focus 
on reducing stunting." No mention is made for Pacific Islands Countries and Territories, where 
hidden hunger (nutritional hunger) and Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) are of serious concern. 
In PICTs populations, we should look at other more sensitive and measurable indicators of nutritional 
hunger rather just than stunting alone.  
 
General Comments on the CGIAR/IARCs: We are of the opinion that there should be one exclusive 
dedicated IARC under the CGIAR umbrella that would address the food security, poverty reduction, 
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sustainable management of natural resources, and improve human health and nutrition in Pacific 
Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs). This would also address cross-cutting issues: gender 
issues, strengthen the R&D capacity of the NARSs, and integrate climate change, biodiversity, etc. 
We propose it as "International Institute of Island Agriculture" for your kind consideration. 
 
 
The Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) 
 
Review Process 
These comments are framed by the comments of GFAR Steering Committee members provided in an 
open dialogue with the CGIAR Consortium Office during the GFAR SC meeting in April 2014.  The full 
Minutes of this meeting are publicly available at: 
http://www.egfar.org/sites/default/files/draft_minutes_29th_gfar_steering_committee_montpellier.
pdf and these form part of the Global Forum’s formal response to the MTR Review report, together 
with the notes below.  
 
We are concerned that insufficient time was allowed for real consultation on this document with 
GFAR stakeholders and that it was unclear whether this was a public consultation or restricted 
circulation. The views of partners who were unable previously to provide direct comments will be 
captured in the GFAR Chair’s inputs to the Brussels Fund Council meeting. GFAR is also broadly 
aligned with the comments made by FAO in their separate report. 
 
The Panel’s emphasis 
While unquestionably eminent, the Panel’s composition was still primarily that of leading scientists 
rather than other stakeholders – farmers, women, civil society organizations etc. and did not draw on 
many existing stakeholder networks for inputs.  The criteria for evaluation discussed still rest heavily 
on traditional scientific measures such as peer reviewed publications. There is a clear message in 
the review that prime partners are considered by the review to be mainly other research 
organizations, including universities and large national agricultural research institutions. The report 
therefore places the emphasis more on research than development, with a rather linear perspective 
in its approach, which does not serve well the complex realities of development and putting research 
into use for development impacts. 
 
The 9 recommendations of the Panel 
The recommendations are many but it is not clear how general recommendations focusing on clear 
vision, partnerships and innovative financing can alone achieve impact on the ground. These three 
axes have long been part of the CGIAR’s approach to research, but have not been well linked to 
effective decision making choices toward greater impact. The panel has not reviewed or suggested 
measures to develop impact pathways or to measure progress towards impact, which are crucial at 
this stage of the CGIAR’s work. The report actually pays little attention to the importance of pathways 
to impact, i.e. the key institutional relations that need to take place for outcomes of the CGIAR to 
become knowledge that is used and valued in the landscapes which farmers inhabit - and which 
becomes taken up into impacts. Stakeholders in the report are mentioned as “a survey of associated 
stakeholders (e.g. donors, research partners, industry)” reinforcing that downstream partnerships 
are not in the mindset of the panelists. Similarly the report does not describe farmers as key clients 
and partners, but views them only as recipients of technologies – something that the GCARD process 
actively challenges.  
 
The members of the panel still use the concept of ‘NARS’ (without defining what they refer to by this 
acronym, that can itself mean several things), rather than national and local innovation systems, 
reinforcing the issue that the focus is research alone and not research for development and impact.  
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The CGIAR sits in a very complex system where there are many innovators, including farmers who do 
not get a mention as such here, and in a world of very diverse agricultural systems where achieving 
big-scale wins is dependent as much on improving farmers social circumstances as the value of the 
technology. It is surprising that the recommendations refer only to food and nutrition security as 
targets. What of development reducing (largely rural) poverty? Poverty and nutrition/food security are 
directly linked. 
 
The fundamental divides inherent in the CGIAR come through strongly in the document. Is its 
purpose to sustain leading edge research institutions through investments in science and using a 
value system of science alone, or to contribute to development impacts by adding value to national 
systems? If the latter, then capacity development must be seen as an integral development outcome 
and necessary channel to achieve adoption and impact on the ground. The Panel recommendations 
seem to take us back to a pre-reform stage where the focus was on research only. The vision put 
forward by the Panel of orienting research towards food and nutrition security alone is surpassed in 
scope and vision by the current vision of the reformed CGIAR. 
 
Priority setting 
Optimizing impact is of course essential, but a note of caution is that this also depends on the 
metrics and purpose desired. Productivity measures are relatively easy, but skew the focus of work 
compared with other areas. Similarly with the foresight projections cited, no differentiation is made 
on the form of food consumed, which is a poor omission when considering the future of food.  
 
The GFAR Steering Committee has made very explicit that GFAR, as the multi-stakeholder global 
mechanism, is particularly well placed to advocate and bring these issues to the forefront at global 
level. The Forum has the global reach to support processes of prioritization, mobilize support through 
international mechanisms such as the G8 and G20, and connect to heads of government and other 
decision makers through initiatives such as the African Agricultural Science Agenda and the 
European agenda on agriculture. It was noted that these processes reap substantial benefit in public 
awareness, resource allocation and establishing policy 
 
The claim that the GCARD process provides weak representation of partners is totally unfounded. 
Over 2,000 participants from around the world and from all sectors took part in the regional and 
global dialogues of GCARD 1 and the GCARD2 directly engaged over 200 relevant partnership 
programmes and held major sessions on foresight – actions through the Global Foresight Hub that 
are also supported by the G20 Chief Scientists. This also requires finding ways to reach and engage 
the poorest farmers, which is itself challenging. The GCARD2 - foresight exercise gave strong 
emphasis on farmer voices and local level actions and this should be built upon through planned 
grassroots foresight exercises and focus on multi-stakeholder actions, with provisions of funding for 
further farmer involvement in such dialogues. 
 
GCARD1 was ground-breaking in taking innovation systems on board, a real shift from the previous 
CGIAR AGM, at which there was felt to be little attention paid to partners. GCARD1 empowered 
partnerships beyond research, while GCARD2 explored links between the newly established CRPs 
and other stakeholder networks and partnerships for action. GCARD3 will explore demands from 
focus countries and regions for collective AR4D actions in the next phase of CRPs.  
 
Governance structure        
GFAR supports the representation of the global and multilateral ARD system (e.g. The World Bank, 
FAO and IFAD) in the Fund Council or whatever new structure could be decided, and expects GFAR 
stakeholders to be reflected in any new governance system. It is surprising that the report 
recommends a return to a number of flawed structures that gave rise to the reform in the first 
instance.  
 
81  
The real problem is how to ensure genuine leadership to the overall system. This point had been 
identified during the preparation of the Reform and discussed by the Working Groups on Governance 
and Partnerships, which came up with the common sense view that the SRF has to be jointly owned 
by the Consortium and the Fund and that the Chair of the Fund Council and the Consortium Chair 
should be clearly on the same page when it comes to strategic decisions, representation of the 
CGIAR, as well as the Fund Office and Consortium Board in constant interaction and coming to clear 
consensus or expressing joint decisions.  
 
The above considerations, the reform principles and the recent GFAR-CGIAR discussions imply that 
governance needs to be accountable, transparent and open, yet the measures provide seem to run 
counter to these principles and could create what seems to be an exclusive Board, without reference 
or accountability to any wider constituencies. Perhaps more than ever, the CGIAR needs the full 
participation of Development Agencies and non-funders represented by GFAR into the Fund Council 
to link with the Post 2015 Agenda and SDGs, and be responsive to needs of the ultimate 
stakeholders of IAR4D – the farmers, who are not mentioned once as partners in the review.  
 
The report makes very little back-reference to the rationale and strong demand for the original 
reform. Nowhere is it mentioned that a major driver for the reform was the conflict of interest 
perceived by funders in being asked to also directly govern programme implementation. GFAR 
agrees with the Price Waterhouse Coopers report that it is not the best moment to engage the CGIAR 
into a further new Reform of this magnitude. The recommendation for this major further reform 
comes without in-depth analysis of the problems that have to be corrected which are partly of 
institutional nature (Operational rules and definition of responsibilities between the Fund and the 
Consortium, as decided in the Constitution signed by the Centers and the Consortium with the Fund) 
and partly those of behaviour (code of conduct). For example, despite the clear attribution of 
responsibility for the Fund Raising strategy to joint initiatives by the Consortium and the Fund 
Council, the centers –and also the CRPs continue to pursue funding for individual direct investments 
and projects…..However, here the funders themselves are part of the governance issue by not 
adopting coordinated positions and providing consolidated funding through Window 1 & 2 to better 
align their own individual strategies and investments in a collaborative way. The implication should 
have been the eventual phasing out of Window 3, but the opposite has happened in practice. Nor, in 
practice, has the transaction cost for individual scientists in making individual grant applications 
been reduced.  
 
There are a number of operational difficulties and political consequences that would emerge from 
the adoption of the single Board proposal - the CGIAR cannot come back to such a single governance 
overnight without considering the legal and political implications of eliminating the Consortium, 
which is now a fully-fledged International Institution established by international agreement. 
Governance comparators based on other organizations are notably flawed in that they do not reflect 
a basis derived from required function of the institution concerned. There is a risk of bringing the 
flaws of other bodies into the system unless form follows function. 
The suggestion that the TAC should be revived is surprising, given that the Canters clearly did not see 
a role for a strengthened expert scientific body at the time of the reform.  
 
Optimizing the strengths of Partners 
GFAR does not accept the statement under 5.3 that “Other key stakeholders, such as NARs and 
private sector partners, are not adequately represented, except through weak voice in the biennial 
GCARD process”. There is no evidence basis offered for this statement.  To the contrary, the Global 
Forum routinely solicits perspectives from a very wide range of stakeholders on key documents and 
programmes and makes these known to the Fund Office and in full public transparency. Whether the 
system entities choose to listen and respond to their partners is a different question. 
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GFAR now directly engages large scale networks across all sectors of the AR4D continuum to impact, 
including the private sector as the input sector, SMEs and food industries, advisory services, youth 
and the world’s agricultural universities. It is a pity that the Panel did not refer to the Partnerships 
Working Group report from the initial reform, the regional priority setting processes of GCARD1, the 
Global analysis undertaken by Uma Lele, Eugene Terry, Eduardo Trigo and Jules Pretty, nor the 
GCARD Roadmap for change which was accepted in full by all stakeholder networks in GFAR, 
including the Consortium Board. Over 80% of stakeholders consulted in an external survey at the 
end of 2013 considered that participation in collective actions were enhanced by being involved in 
GFAR and 88% considered that the AR4D system needs to be transformed and strengthened.  
Through these processes and the discussions between the CO and GFAR Steering Committee this 
year, GFAR has been consolidated as a dynamic and permanent forum with direct commitment from 
the CGIAR as the main tool to consult and publicly validate strategic processes such as the SRF, 
CRPs, etc. 
 
As the review did not include GFAR in its governance comparators, we inform the Panel here that 
GFAR’s governance comprises representatives directly identified by the following sectoral networks, 
fora and international institutions themselves. GFAR has evolved over recent years to be truly 
inclusive, with an innovation systems approach and outcome-based thinking and the Forum’s 
governance is to be still further strengthened in the months ahead. 
 
 FAO and IFAD (the facilitating UN organizations for GFAR) 
 CGIAR Consortium and AIRCA – all the international agricultural research centers  
 International and regional Farmers Organizations: 285 linked, >200 M farmers 
 Regional Fora of National agricultural research and extension systems from nearly all 
countries of the world: AARINENA, APAARI, CACAARI, EFARD, FARA, FORAGRO 
 Private sector: SAI Platform of 55 international food companies; PanAAC -  SME networks in 
35 countries 
 CSOs/NGOs: CSO-GARD >200 member institutions  
 Advanced research: G20 MACS & BRICS now directly linked: 70% of global ARD investment 
 Advisory Services – GFRAS, regional networks of advisory service providers around the world 
 Higher Education – GCHERA, >600 agricultural universities, >1 million students p.a. 
 Youth  - YPARD >8,000 youth members 
 
Financing 
The Centers clearly still see the new system as one of a number of avenues they have to meet their 
individual goals. There is a governance failure in relation to the reform intention, whereby most of 
the center’s budgets are still W3 and bilateral. Resources (management, physical and human) are 
still allocated to initiatives that are not strictly related to the new system (CRP embedded or directly 
related) and there are no penalties for this behavior. There is a Window 4 (bilateral not entering 
through the Fund) that may itself run counter to the reform intention. Funders are by nature of the 
issue deeply involved in continuing this divide. 
 
It is noted also that while there has been a very welcome increases in the scale of CGIAR funds and 
of the total funding going to partner institutions within this, the intention of the reform in bringing 
shared responsibility for outcomes has not been reflected in a greater proportion of these funds 
going to partners:  
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Year % of CGIAR funds to partners 
2004 14 
2005 16 
2006 14 
2007 15 
2008 16 
2011 16 
2012 17 
The first CGIAR SRF (based on IFPRI models) considered that a tripling of national investments was 
required by 2025 alongside the increased investment in the CGIAR, if development impacts were to 
be realized. Donor funding behavior and national commitments to investment in their own 
capabilities have so far fallen well short of this need. The EIARD report showed that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, CGIAR funding amounts to 12% of the total ARD public investment, but receives 2/3 of all 
donor support to AR4D. Overall funding to partners through the CGIAR has greatly increased due to 
the reform and this is to be welcomed. 5-25% of the total CGIAR investment now goes to partners, 
yet for the Challenge programs 35% went to partners in 2007 & 2008. 
Enabling environment for the reform 
Change brings many challenges and it is natural that a few years into such a major change many 
questions will be asked as new relationships become apparent. To some extent the system has been 
left to find its way through the complexities involved. Irrespective of the future governance 
structures, to support the changes underway there would be value in further capacity development 
to address the required changes at many levels, inside and outside the system. Individual capacity 
development would help enable research and non-research staff to adapt to the systems approach, 
innovation platforms, theories of change and impact pathways and approaches entailed. 
Organizational and institutional development will better enable CGIAR to successfully manage and 
implement the reform and required strategic planning, review of organizational structures, levels of 
authorities and work flow, aligning governance arrangements with the goals of the reform, 
developing performance incentives and M & E approaches, use of ICT in documentation and 
communication, establishing partnership and resource mobilization mechanisms, and measuring 
impact on the ground.  
National capacity development is mentioned, but without clear recommendations on the long term 
vision of the CGIAR and its purpose in relation to national systems, nor on the need for the CGIAR to 
clearly add value to national actors. Externally, partners and beneficiaries of CGIAR reform would 
benefit from individual and organizational capacity development to be able to take part in the 
formulation and implementation of reform plans, technology development and adoption, and 
realizing and measuring impact on the ground. CGIAR, Centers and CRPs’ capacity development 
strategies and action plans need to be developed to reflect the above. 
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Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) 
 
The ISPC has reviewed the consultation draft of the final report from the Mid Term review (MTR) 
Panel of the CGIAR reform dated October 8, 2014. In general, the ISPC welcomes the proposals 
for discussion but believes that decision making will have to wait further elaboration of the 
Panel’s thinking and intent in some areas. The ISPC appreciates the early, clear emphasis on 
international/global public goods as fundamental to the C G I A R  mission. (Since there is 
confusion about meaning of that/those terms, it would be good if the final report could include a 
definition of what the MTR mean by using the term.) 
 
Subsequent comments follow the headings of the recommendations outlined in the Executive 
Summary of the MTR, followed by more specific consideration on the role and relationships of 
the ISPC, and, finally some clarifications on aspects of the text. 
 
1. Vision and mission are appropriate. 
 
2. Priorities. The CGIAR has had many attempts at priority setting. ISPC published a White Paper 
reviewing these in 2012. It quoted the Science Council of 2004 as concluding that “setting 
research priorities for as vast and complex an institution as the CGIAR is a daunting task. No 
approach, however complex and multidimensional, can be fully satisfactory.” From discussion 
with Centers, in 2012 the ISPC found that: ‘many saw the lack of high quality data as a 
bottleneck to priority setting in general, and particularly for economic assessments and 
modeling’. The ISPC agrees. It is tempting to think that prioritization is feasible and worthwhile 
but a Task Force would not have time to report before the 2nd call for CRPs will have had to be 
published. Further thinking on processes for prioritisation at different levels within the system 
might, however, be useful. The report acknowledges that the list of research challenges given (p 
27) is not definitive and while accepting that food waste is a priority, the ISPC is not convinced 
that the CGIAR has a research advantage in that area. A focus on Big Data and informatics within 
the CGIAR is, on the other hand important for the CGIAR, but it is a research approach and not an 
outcome. In addition it is not clear whether it is the Panel’s intent to steer the CGIAR away from 
poverty alleviation as a practical target and towards resilience  since  the  rationale  for  this  set  
of  priorities  is  not  given.  Thus apart from encouraging the CGIAR to make choices and focus 
on the solution of big issues, it is not very clear what the MTR is trying to convey in this section. 
 
3. SRF. The ISPC concurs with the Panel that the SRF should be adequately developed to meet 
the needs of the CGIAR and that criteria should be set as to what this entails. The MTR does not 
stress impact, but importantly, the investors in the CGIAR System do want development 
impact, which means that they need to fund both upstream and downstream research and 
funding should be allocated on the basis of the strength of the proposal in terms of both 
science quality and relevance. The SRF therefore needs to give clear guidance on what is 
expected of systems research at one end of the continuum and of, for example, genomics 
research at the other and of the expectations as to how the potential impact from all research 
will be delivered. 
 
4.a. Governance structure. While the consolidation of the CO and FO to a single “CGIAR 
board/administrative unit” has some superficial attraction, the various implications of this are 
only superficially discussed in the report. The System has recently undergone major 
governance reforms (e.g. the creation of the Consortium Office) and the establishment of the 
CRPs has also taken considerable time away from research. Large sums of money have also 
been invested in the research to date, and if investors are to see returns on their money (some 
of the research is still at an early stage), then the CRPs which are judged to be on the road to 
delivery need to be given time and a supportive environment to enable them to deliver. 
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Justification for further disruption would, therefore, need to be robust. It is surprising, given the 
attention to “governance ambiguities” starting on p. 20, that the MTR has so little to say (and 
no recommendations) about the number of Centers, the governance of Centers, and the 
relationships between Centers and Center Boards to the CO and FO. Whilst the document 
raises a number of issues concerning governance structure - e.g., “the authority of the 
Consortium CEO vis-a-vis the Center DGs is not clear” - the report is not bold enough to say 
where the Panel thinks authority should reside? Similarly it points to the outcomes of the 
CGIAR governance report in relation to responsibility for CRP direction, but does not discuss this. 
Establishing clarity of this sort might help eliminate the tension and power struggles that 
currently exist. 
 
4.b. Governance composition. The suggestions (paragraph, top p7) regarding composition of the 
proposed “CGIAR board” are (to the ISPC at least) confusing and the remit of the Board is not 
clear. For the ISPC, what is needed is improvement in governance and decision- making. 
But if that is the case, how could representatives of a limited number of CGIAR Centers 
acting as Board members provide disinterested decision-making over programs on which they 
are dependent for funding? Who would decide on future calls for CRP proposals? How do we 
avoid the advocacy of the doers with a mix of decision making? Secondly, who do the ‘Chief 
Scientists’ represent, since the recommendation is that the new CGIAR Board can call on ad-
hoc scientific advice and a strengthened ISPC? And if “private sector representatives” are 
included (which ISPC would support), then why is civil society (the voices of environmental 
organizations and social justice advocates) not represented? Yet the proposed size of the Board 
is already rather large for effective decision-making. Moreover, in the second single-sentence 
paragraph (p7), what does it mean that the chair of this board would “represent the mission 
of the CGIAR” and not a constituency? 
 
4.c. Governance: proliferation of advisory bodies. The report (third paragraph, p7) makes the 
recommendation that “The CGIAR Centers should establish an advisory committee to advise 
the Board on new advances in research.”  Again, this does not seem to be adequately thought 
out as a recommendation in the Executive Summary, nor does the ISPC find arguments 
supporting this idea in the body of the draft report. We would suggest that further explanation 
will be required from the Panel to illustrate and justify the intent. 
 
5 and 6 Partnerships: it is appropriate that the CGIAR and its programs consider the best forms of 
partnership to maximize their global investment programs and to provide influence in agriculture- 
related policy fora. However, the formulation of “guidelines” would seem to be a fairly modest 
response to this requirement. In general the report is almost silent on 'impact'. Delivery of impact 
is very important to the donors and hence is a major issue for the CGIAR and has a strong bearing 
on how partners should be selected. 
 
Importantly, under 6, why would the CGIAR endorse its own programs and only then seek to form 
mega-consortium partnership for other globally-important aspects to which it might 
contribute? Surely a genuine SRF would advocate for the areas in which the CGIAR could play 
to its comparative advantage amongst global actors and the programs should be designed to help 
formulate solutions to the major challenges, not leaving this as an add-on. 
 
7. “Scale up financing” The jargon is not evident to all readers – e.g. what do a “capital 
formation investment fund” or “the Green Bond concept” mean in this context? Nor is it clear 
how these ideas would address the fundamental challenge of funding science in the broad 
(global or international) public interest. It is harder to translate these concepts into some 
practical implications for CGIAR research. Who would provide the expertise to explore this 
recommendation and how would it be vetted? 
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8. Optimize political support. This recommendation may address some concerns ISPC raised 
with respect to the Extension proposals, recently reviewed, such as CRPs moving too far into 
global “policy space”. But similarly it raises the question of staffing and budgets for some 
central body (CO or CGIAR board) to take this on. Why not see this as part of the CGIAR’s 
collaboration with the multilateral agencies or specialized advocacy organizations and focus 
CGIAR effort (collectively or at the CRP level, as we have suggested) on providing credible, policy-
relevant research for evidence-based decision making by the global agricultural sector? A 
clear principle for the CGIAR should be to adopt the role of honest broker between science 
and decision-making communities, including the provision of objective scientific evidence. 
 
9. Optimize knowledge impact. We interpret the Panel’s remarks on the role of the ISPC positively. 
The ISPC also interprets calls for “strategic guidance” and “foresight” as including more “ex ante” 
impact assessment – but it is not yet clear whether that capacity (and those budgets) should 
reside in some executive unit (CO or CGIAR Board/unified administrative unit), within a specific 
Center or program, or within ISPC as an ex ante complement to the suite of ex post activities 
carried out by SPIA (the Standing Panel on Impact Assessment) for the system. Also as the MTR 
report seems to be describing a potentially revised role for ISPC in strategic guidance and 
foresight analysis, at the same time the CGIAR Board is also given a role in the development of 
ad hoc scientific advice. It would be helpful if the Panel’s intent here could be clarified. 
(Additional comments on the ISPC role and relationships are expanded below.) 
 
References to the role and relationships of the ISPC (text section 6.9, p33): 
 
The first sentence of the section says that the ISPC should be enabled “to be proactive in 
terms of providing strategic guidance, foresight analysis, and assessing and reporting on 
quality of research results across the system.” The ISPC already is proactive with 
respect to the first two of these issues, working with components of foresight and not 
as a commissioned body on behalf of the Consortium or the funders. Both the proposed 
'Advisory Committee' and the ISPC would appear to have foresight roles. The former 
seems to be internal and the ISPC is independent, but what are the delivery points for 
(potentially differing) advice? Who would the ISPC report to? At present the ISPC 
reports to the FC. Further clarification on the Panel’s vision here would be helpful. 
 
The remainder of the sentence talks about assessing and reporting on quality of research results. 
This is an interesting brief. SPIA (Standing Panel on Impact Assessment) covers impact, but 
the ISPC does not evaluate the quality of the science within programs once programs are 
initiated nor does it evaluate the research results. This change could be interpreted to mean that 
the ISPC would be assessing the quality of research well upstream of where SPIA takes up the 
challenge. 
 
The paragraph also talks about the need for “high-quality research review and advice.” The ISPC is at 
present quite distantly removed from the details of the science being done in the CGIAR (design, 
methods and analysis) and operates more at a strategic level, rather than carrying out 
detailed scientific review. A question for the panel is whether the IEA currently evaluates the 
science? If so, then this function might more naturally fall under the IEA. 
 
If the ISPC is meant to provide this kind of scientific review, then it probably does make sense to 
have “independent research panels comprising world-class research leaders,” because the 
ISPC is too small to provide this kind of detailed expertise across the range of CGIAR research 
activities, but who should they report to ensure objectivity? 
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The ISPC is concerned that scientific quality across the CGIAR is uneven and in need of 
enhancement, but currently these concerns are probably secondary to the challenges of research 
prioritization, direction, and management. Scientific review will not easily address this latter 
category of challenges. And it would seem that the logical place to situate the evaluation of 
science would be in the IEA’s periodic assessments of the CRPs. Whether the IEA should be 
under the aegis of the ISPC is a different question which is not addressed. In sum, the current 
proposals leave the ISPC unclear on how this suggested realignment of the ISPC would really 
improve the overall effectiveness of the system. 
 
Specific comments on the text: 
 
Under 4.2.4 Effective oversight, it is not clear what the panel is referring to in its equivocal 
statement on the oversight of system-wide performance. 
 
4.3.2 Governance ambiguities, the Panel’s report expresses stakeholders views on the effects that 
the reform has had on Centers with rather less information on the effects on the developing CRPs 
other than noting the recent CGIAR governance report. The Panel’s view on programs, program 
ambition and program quality are not clear and the respective role of Centers and CRPs is not 
seriously addressed in the Panel’s report. 
 
Under 5.1, the text (p24) raises a number of questions, such as the CGIAR’s ability to articulate 
a clear value proposition, prioritise the use of limited funds, avoiding Centers self- interest…. but 
the report does not propose how these faults will be improved. 
 
Similarly, the items under 5.3 Systems architecture and governance are descriptors of the current 
situation which are not adequately resolved (at least as described) by the adoption of a single 
Board. The Panel’s report is insufficient on CRP governance to see the way ahead. 
 
Under 5.5 “the Panel considers that the current approach leads to incremental and essentially 
marginal impacts in consideration of the complexity of food security and nutrition challenges” but 
presents no analysis to support this view. 
 
Recommendation 6.4 on Governance structure, (p30): The ISPC concurs with the need for an 
improvement in the setting of strategic direction and decision-making over financial resources to 
back up priorities. However, the draft recommendation for a single Board throws up a 
number of queries: details such as who would appoint the Board Chair? And, if there is a 
donor Council as well as a Board (which seems an amplification of bodies rather than a 
simplification) is there still a 'Funders' Forum'? The only significant change appears to be the 
transfer of decision-making power to a Board with an independent Chair? As noted above, it is 
not clear in the proposed formulation of a new Board how CGIAR Centers will make 
disinterested decisions over programs as part of a multi-constituency board. 
 
The report refers to Chief Scientists from time to time (e.g. p32, a Task Force to be chaired by the Chief 
Scientist) and, in particular, to 'a Chief Scientist' on the Board - what constituency does this post 
refer to? 
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International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
 
22 October 2014 
 
Dear Ms Kyte, 
 
On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for giving the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) the opportunity to comment on the Consultation Draft of the CGIAR Mid-term 
Review, led by Professor John Beddington and a panel of distinguished international experts. We 
appreciate the hard work that has gone into the Review and we are encouraged by the Review's 
willingness to confront many of the difficult issues for the future of the international agricultural 
system. We believe that the Panel's findings can, with suitable modification, be used to strengthen 
the governance and performance of the global system. 
 
Our initial comments focus on three issues raised in the Review: (a) the recommendation that the 
governance structure of the system be changed, as indicated at the breakfast meeting on Saturday 
11 October 2014, by merging the Fund Council and the Consortium  Board and  by creating  a single 
Administrative  Unit  in place  of  the  current separate Fund Office and Consortium Office; (b) the 
problem of sustainable financing for the system, especially given the uncertainties about future 
funding from the World Bank; and (c) the Review's treatment of climate finance. 
 
A. Governance Structure 
 
With respect to the recommendation about the governance structure the Review states:   
 
"The Panel strongly recommends that a single CGIAR Board be established to replace the Fund 
Council and the Consortium Board and be supported by one Administrative Unit, replacing the Fund 
Office and Consortium Office... " 
 
IFAD supports the recommendation to establish a single CGIAR Board with one Administrative Unit. 
We believe this change will make the system more efficient and will allow greater operational focus 
by the single Administrative Unit. In our comments on the Review (attached as Annex 1) we outline 
an IFAD proposal for a single Board and a single Administrative Unit. 
 
We fully understand that the submissions of the Center Directors and the Consortium Office differ 
sharply about the Single Board and the single Administrative Unit. We nonetheless agree with the 
Center Directors that the strategic vision of the system will develop best with a Single Board and that 
the development results focus of the system, in its many components, will be sharpened with one 
Administrative Unit. We hope that this important recommendation can be agreed and implemented 
quickly, given its importance to system performance. 
 
B. Sustainable financing 
 
We are delighted that the Review raises a sense of urgency about the future of the CGIAR funding 
because IFAD, as do many respondents to the Panel's TOR questions, does not believe that the 
current  model  is  sustainable  or  innovative  enough  to  meet  the challenges of the near future. 
 
IFAD therefore endorses the Review's plea for a special meeting to be convened by the Fund Council: 
 
"The Fund Council should organize a special session in early 2015 to discuss innovative financing 
options, recognizing the difficulty of securing long-term, predictable commitments to fund CGIAR 
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Research Programs, and the uncertainties around maintaining, let alone significantly increasing, 
funding ." 
 
With respect to the interaction between the governance structure of the system and the needed 
growth of sustainable financing, we agree with the Panel's view that the current management 
structure of the CGIAR does not promote innovative or sustainable financing: 
 
"It is the Panel's view that CGIAR has the potential to play this global leadership role {in finding 
innovate mechanisms to double funding for agricultural research}, but not as it is currently 
structured and managed." 
 
We agree fully with the Panel's conclusion that "there are opportunities for financial innovation that 
could significantly leverage the current grant financing provided to CGIAR." 
 
Therefore, we strongly urge the Fund Council to accept the Panel's recommendation to organize a 
special session, as soon as possible in 2015, to discuss new CGIAR financing options. Those options 
should be presented in detail by qualified individuals with experience in development financing and 
should be reviewed thoroughly by donors and other partners. 
 
On the basis of those reviews, the Fund council should urgently consider how to apply new funding 
mechanisms - such as the use of IDA Credits, other concessional loans, venture capital options, and 
the issuance of international bonds - in the second half of 2015. 
 
C. Climate Finance is Development Finance 
 
IFAD appreciates the Panel's deep understanding of climate change, of how it affects agricultural 
productivity in the tropics and of the need for the international agricultural research system to 
respond to the challenge of climate change in innovative ways. Yet we believe that the Panel's report 
misses a vita l issue. This issue is that finance to mitigate or to adapt to climate change is not 
distinct from development finance. At IFAD, we believe that climate finance is development finance. 
The problems of agricultural development, and more broadly economic growth, in the tropics can 
only be resolved by a concentrated development effort, with appropriate scaling, on the core 
problems of agricultural productivity, better nutrition, the empowerment of women and marginalized 
groups, access to land and productive inputs, and access to markets and other opportunities for 
greater welfare of the world's poor rural people. We therefore strongly urge that the Fund Council, in 
its organization of a special funding session, directly link the problems of research funding, 
development finance and climate finance. 
 
We thank you again for requesting IFAD's comments on the Panel's Report. The Report has made a 
good start in defining the next phase of the reform of the CGIAR. It will nonetheless be vita l for the 
success of the reform, and for the impact of international agricultural 'research system on the 
welfare of poor farmers, for the reform to be more forceful and creative in addressing the issues of 
institutional efficiency, sustainable financing and the necessary mainstreaming of climate finance as 
development finance. 
 
Sincerely, 
John Murray McIntire 
Associate Vice-President 
Programme Management Department 
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IFAD, Investing in Rural People:  Annex 1 
 
IFAD Comments on the Consultation Draft of the Mid-Term Review of the CGIAR 
 
1. IFAD staff and management have reviewed the MTR Report and have the 
following comments. 
 
General comments 
 
2. The Report of the Panel has made a good beginning. The next version should 
be more specific about: 
• a clearer and factual inventory of the successes and failures of the CGIAR reform; 
• accountability for successes or failures of the reform; 
• Specific recommendations and a calendar of implementation about the 
five research areas - nutrition, degraded lands, food waste, resilience, big 
data - advocated in the Report; 
• the development of innovative funding mechanisms; 
• the links between climate finance and development finance; 
• the  implications  of  a  single  governance  structure  and  administrative  
unit for  the system; and 
• potential sources of financial efficiencies in the system. 
 
Specific comments 
 
Did the MTR meet its objectives? 
 
System structure and governance. 
 
The Report arrives at a useful recommendation about system structure and 
governance - a single Board and a single Administrative Unit -- though it should 
have been edited more closely to avoid ambiguity in this recommendation. 
 
3. The Report successfully highlights the risks to the sustainable financing of the 
CGIAR and stresses the need for innovative thinking about finance. The call for 
a special financing session, to be convened early in 2015 by the FC, is 
particularly welcome 
 
4. The Report is very superficial on system priorities, as we discuss below in 
our comments on the Report's individual recommendations. 
 
Recommendation # 1  - Vision 
 
5. The  CGIAR  surely  needs  a  vision  but the  Panel ought  to  be  more specific  
about  what new vision  is needed to meet today's challenges. 
 
Recommendation # 2  -  Priorities 
 
6. The problem with the Panel's broad recommendations is that it implies that 
all - nutrition, degraded lands, food waste, resilience, big data - should be a 
priority in each Centre program. This is neither possible nor desirable. We 
understand that the Report does not quantify its recommendations, or even 
rank them, but it is not enough for a paper of this importance to simply state its 
preferences without explaining the rationale or the implications of its 
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recommendations. 
 
7. Nutrition focus is important, of course, but including a nutrition focus in all 
CGIAR research projects will cause higher transactions costs (i.e., repeated 
evaluations of the nutrition content of each proposal). The nutrition focus of _the 
CGIAR program can only be defined as a function of other efforts, mainly those 
in the countries where malnutrition is still acute. The system response to the 
MTR should therefore be to survey the nutrition content of the Center programs 
including the CRPs, and to propose changes in the existing nutrition work, not to 
follow a blanket recommendation. 
 
8. The utility of the degraded lands recommendation can only be evaluated with 
respect to the opportunity costs of research on other themes. Should Centers 
working on high yielding crops in good areas switch to work on low payoff themes 
in bad areas? 
 
9. Food waste is not an appropriate CGIAR research theme because it is nothing 
like a global public good. If the international community wants more work on 
food waste, it should invest in FAO and in national extension programs. It is not 
really a CGIAR issue and we would be interested what the Panel proposes that 
the CGIAR could do that is not already done by partner international 
organizations and by the national programs. 
 
10. Resilience is another major topic where the Panel ought to have stated its 
views more specifically on what the Centers could do to improve resiliency that 
they are not already doing. For example, plant improvement programs universally 
seek higher yields and usually seek lower variability - how would a greater 
system focus on resilience change these facts or add to what the Centers are now 
doing? 
 
Recommendation #3  - SRF 
 
11. The MTR correctly concludes that "... the lack of a high-quality Strategy and 
Results Framework (SRF) - focused on outcomes - is a key reason for many of 
the challenges facing the CGIAR partnership." It recommends that the system 
should improve the SRF, but says nothing about how this will be done. It 
further says nothing about the lengthy delays in developing an SRF despite major 
efforts among Center and CO staff to prepare an SRF, and the associated 
quantitative indicators, over the past 5 years. 
 
12. The MTR evidently understands the weakness of the current quality review 
processes but makes no recommendations about them. 
 
Recommendation #4  - Governance structure 
 
13. The MTR correctly notes: "The two-pillar model leads to much duplication, 
inefficiency and unease, between the Consortium Board and Fund Council and 
their respective secretariats (Consortium Office and Fund Office)." It then 
recommends that the creation of a single Board by the merger of the Consortium 
Board and the Fund Council. IFAD strongly supports this recommendation. We 
outline below what a new governance structure would be. 
 
Recommendation #5  -  Optimize strengths of partners  
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Recommendation #6  -  Scale up partnerships 
 
14. The Panel makes somewhat vague recommendations about partnerships. It 
concludes that, "in addition to the current effort to improve the strategic focus and 
results of the CGIAR system, new partnership models will be required, designed to 
optimize the capabilities and strengths of a broader range of partners." 
 
15. Most observers understand that new partnership models were necessary long ago, 
but the Panel ought to have surveyed the hundreds of existing partnerships to 
assess their performance and to have made recommendations based on such a 
survey. 
 
Recommendation #7 -  Scale up financing 
 
16. . The Review raises a sense of urgency about the future of the CGIAR funding.   
IFAD, along with many respondents to the Panel's TOR questions, does not believe 
that the current model is sustainable. We therefore endorse the Review's plea for a 
special meeting to be convened by the Fund Council. 
 
17. A second issue related to this Recommendation is the interaction between the 
governance structure of the system and the needed growth of sustainable financing, 
we agree with the Panel's view that the current management structure of the CGIAR 
does not promote innovative or sustainable financing. 
 
18. We agree fully with the Panel's conclusion that "there are opportunities for 
financial innovation that could significantly leverage the current grant financing 
provided to CGIAR." 
 
19. Therefore, we strongly urge the Fund Council to accept the Panel's recommendation 
to organize a special session, as soon as possible in 2015, to discuss new CGIAR 
financing options. Those options should be presented in detail by qualified 
individuals with experience in development financing and should be reviewed 
thoroughly by donors and other partners. On the basis of those reviews, the Fund 
council should urgently consider how to apply new funding mechanisms - such as 
the use of IDA Credits, other concessional loans, venture capital options, and the 
issuance of international bonds - in the second half of 2015. 
 
Recommendation #8  -  Optimize political impact 
 
20. . We agree that the system could and should have greater political impact. This 
could be achieved by creating a dual structure - one pillar for policy impact and one 
for scientific impact - in the single CO. For example, the CO could appoint a Chief 
Policy Economist, would be charged with synthesizing Centre knowledge on global   
advocacy issues (climate change, food security, nutrition, degraded lands, 
agricultural trade, the use of GMOs). At the same time, the Chief Science Officer 
of the Consortium Office would focus on the quality of science in the Centers, in 
close collaboration with the ISPC. 
 
Impact of the reform 
 
Has the reform developed an  SRF ? 
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The MTR concludes that there is no "suitable SRF" (page 47).  I t  i s  impossible to 
disagree with this and this must be seen as a major failure of the reform. 
 
Has the reform reduced transactions costs? 
 
21. Clearly, the reform has not reduced transactions costs. The Panel cites evidence 
showing that transactions costs have actually increased. 
 
22. With respect to new ways of recuing transactions costs, the CO contends: 
"Jointly, the opportunity for large-scale efficiencies in the system from increased 
collective action, shared country offices and a reduced number of small grants 
has the potential to increase efficiencies and reduce transaction costs very 
significantly more than reducing the number of board members, merging Centers 
or reducing Center overheads would. Realizing this potential will require 
investments first, however." (page 45) The MTR presents no evidence in support of 
these claims from the CO, however. 
 
23. IFAD suggests that the small grant problem can be solved, partly, by having the 
donors agree not to make grants less than US$0.5 million and by having Centers 
agree not to bid on grants less than US$0.5 million. 
 
24. IFAD has a query about the One Corporate System (OCS). The co submission 
states that the OCS is working at 9 Centers and in the CO, when it appears 
that the OCS is not yet working in the 10 system entities cited. The next version 
of the Panel's Report might discuss this at greater length. 
 
Has the reform consolidated sources of funding to the Centers? 
 
25. It has not. In its submission to the Panel, the Consortium states that: 
 
"... continued action (as already taken by some Centers) to reduce the very large number 
of small grants in the system would reduce transaction costs significantly, and make the 
overall portfolio more strategic. This was a key objective of the reform, that is, reducing 
the over 3,500 bilateral grants on Center books pre-reform, to a small portfolio of large 
coherent programs. While it is recognized that some small grants may well have a strategic 
nature, generally speaking, a small number of larger bilateral grants (e.g., reducing the 
number to 500 larger bilateral grants, plus some small grants, from over 2,000), 
complementing a system of CRPs with a solid share (50-60%) of pooled W1-2 funding and 
single reporting was a core idea behind the reform that still has to be fully realized." 
(page 45). 
 
Appropriateness of the CGIAR's goals 
 
26. The first recommendation, by focussing on some low priorities for international 
research (notably food waste), shows that the MTR might consider strengthening 
its advocacy of the five new goals in light of the comparative advantage of the 
CGIAR. 
 
CGIAR effectiveness and efficiency 
 
27. The Panel does not make enough effort to evaluate effectiveness. I t  correctly 
says that: "One of the objectives of the reform process was to reduce transaction 
costs and improve effectiveness and efficiency by simplifying the overall 
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governance. This has not happened." 
 
28. . The  MTR  concludes:  "The  current  system-wide  reporting  on  the  results  of   
CGIAR research  -  from  Centres  and from the CRP partnerships  - does  not 
provide  a clear answer as to whether CGIAR  is capable of taking such a  
leadership role."  The next version of the Report ought to suggest how the CGIAR 
could take this leadership role. 
 
29. The MTR notes that "Many stakeholders consider that the burden of the 
bureaucracy, efficiency and transactions costs have considerably worsened since the 
reforms." The MTR continues to say "The reforms were expected to improve 
efficiency but by all counts there has been uneven progress on efficiency." It would 
be valuable for the next version of the MTR to cite examples of improvements in 
efficiency to give external stakeholders greater confidence in the reform process. 
 
Panel findings on accelerating agricultural research 
 
30. This Chapter repeats familiar material and we have no comment. 
 
Panel findings on gender commitments 
 
31. The MTR concludes that: "Discussion with senior HR staff of one Centre revealed data 
that gender balance remains a critical challenge in terms of Centre employment."  It is 
true that "gender balance remains a critical challenge" across Centres, but quoting one 
person from one Centre is a small sample and the MTR ought to have made more of 
an effort to substantiate this point.  Moreover, the report's focus on gender balance 
among Centre staff is to sharp and ought to have been stronger on gender equality 
and empowerment of rural women with respect of the impact of CGIAR research outputs 
on its users and beneficiaries. 
 
IFAD proposed outline for a revised governance system for further discussion 
 
32. IFAD supports the Panel's recommendation for a revised governance system and 
structure for the CGIAR. As a basis for discussion, we suggest that the outline of such 
a system might be as follows. 
 
• A CG Assembly would be the governing body composed of representatives of all 
member countries and institutions. 
 
• There would be one Board, called the Fund Board (FB). That FB should have 6 
"permanent" members (WB, DFID, and BMGF, for example plus 3 next largest donors) 
each serving 6 years. The 6 permanent members should be reviewed after 6 years 
to verify that they have maintained their shares of system contributions and any not 
having maintained their shares would be relegated to associate status or dropped. 
(Major changes in shares from any permanent member during a six year term 
could lead to a change in their permanent status). 
 
• There should be 13 "associate" members each serving 3 years; the 13 
associates would be changed after 3 years, so there would be two sets of 
associates for each 6 year term of the permanent members. The 13 associates would 
represent large national programs (Brazil, China, and India); two private sector 
members (one from Part 1and one from Part 2); 2 Center Directors (each to serve 
not more than one 3 year term); 2 Center Board chairs; and 4 significant donors 
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beyond the five permanents (each to serve not more than one 3 year term). 
 
• The Fund Board would have a small Secretariat, whose role would not overlap 
with that of the single Administrative unit. 
 
• FB meetings would be webcast live in the interests of transparency to all members 
of the CG Assembly and other global stakeholders. 
 
• The FB would appoint the CO to one six-year term, not renewable. The CO 
would report to the Fund Board. The CO would prepare a six year staffing plan 
and the FB would approve the staffing plan, including resources for consultancies 
to be commissioned by the CO as required beyond core staff of the CO. 
 
• The CB and the FO would disappear. 
 
• The system entities- the single Board and the single Administrative Unit -- would 
be funded by a 2% levy on W 1 and W2 contributions. A t a real steady state 
budget of US$1 billion, and a target W1/W2 share of 50 percent, the system 
entities would have a budget of US$10 million. This is roughly equivalent to 40 FTE 
staff members. 
 
• The costs of the participation of FB members would be borne by their 
employers, as would the costs of the CG Assembly. The sources and 
applications of system funds would be published monthly on the SAU and FB 
websites. 
 
 
Japan 
 
1. To clarify the role of each governing body is quite important, and the recommendation from the 
Panel to establish a single Board is noted. To establish an effective governance structure, legal 
authority, TOR, member constitution, relation for each organization (structure) etc. should be 
discussed with various stakeholders including Japan. 
 
2. We think donor constituencies (exemplified as 6 constituencies) should be considered the 
geographic representation and cumulative contribution including that before the CGIAR reform, 
etc. to broaden its global partnership and to provide important leadership, securing the 
coherence and continuity of the activities of the CGIAR. 
 
3. To maintain ear-marked funding for the CGIAR projects is needed to secure the accountability to 
our contribution to the CGIAR. CRP is one of the most important improvements in the CGIAR to 
avoid research duplication, and each project are evaluated in an equal manner as far as 
possible regardless of the source of funding through the Windows 1, 2, 3 or bilateral. 
 
4. To promote the collaboration and partnership with related organizations, such as JICA, private 
sector and other development partners. In order to disseminate and scale up the important 
achievement of the CGIAR projects, enhancing the collaboration with other partners, and 
pursuing synergy is indispensable, which would contribute to establishing the food value chain, 
and public private partnership. 
 
5. The management of genetic resources and gene banks is obviously an important item of the 
MTR. Japan committed to the construction of various gene banks in CGIAR research centers 
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before the CGIAR reform process started. In this context, Japan notes that Consortium board 
also thinks that the investments in gene banks is important, as described in appendix 3(pp.46), 
and would like to note the discussion between FC and CB about the new SRF(pp.29) because 
we have a strong stake in the future direction of the management of genetic resources. 
 
Proposal for modification based on the above comments 
 
Modification corresponding to comment 1, 2 
 
6.4 
p.30 paragraph 4 
 
The Panel believes that…..the recipient countries. The details of the legal status, authority, member 
constitution and related matters of the board should be discussed among stakeholders in an 
appropriate forum with transparent procedure. 
 
Donor constituencies could be determined by size of contribution and/or geographic representation, 
with consideration of the coherence of CGIAR activities.  
 
Modification corresponding to comment 5 
 
6.2 paragraph 2 
 
p.29 There are certainly other priorities such as sustainable intensification, efficient and transparent 
investments in gene banks which mentioned in appendix.3 (p.46) and there are other ways to 
prioritize. The Panel recommends that ………. 
 
 
Sweden 
 
We consider that the recommendation for a single board has merit, although we would have liked a 
more in-depth analysis of where exactly the current two board model has failed.  We also have some 
concerns regarding the suggested composition of the single board. For example, the Panel suggests 
at least 4 centre representatives (including at least one DG) on the single board. Whilst we are 
sympathetic to the need for greater Centre involvement in governance (ref. the submission to the 
Panel by the 15 centres), our concerns are that these representatives would all too often find 
themselves in positions of conflict of interest e.g. in matters regarding acceptance of CRP proposals 
and/or financing of these, or indeed other centre related questions such as infrastructure 
replenishment. The panel suggested a ‘Donor Council’ that feeds into the single Board via (6) donor 
representatives which we find quite acceptable. Would not an equivalent ‘Centre Council’ (viz. 
‘advisory committee’) feeding to a single DG (?) representative on the new board suffice? 
 
We completely agree with the Panel on the necessity of a ‘well thought-through’ SRF, and that 
sufficient time is given in order to achieve this. This is essential in order to prioritise research areas 
for the 2Gen CRP’s. However, we would not like to see this process drag on too long and would 
expect a complete and robust SRF by, at latest, the first FC of 2015 i.e. c. May 2015. 
 
One of our major concerns is the absence of any comment on the future roll of the World Bank (the 
term ‘World Bank’ only appears three times in the main text). The Bank has been the back bone of 
the CGIAR for at least the last 20 years, not only in the quantity and quality of its un-restricted core 
funding, but also in its role as ‘honest broker’ i.e. Chair of the FC, Trustee of the Fund etc.. Should 
this omission in the report be interpreted as the Panel has acquiesced to the Banks’ CGIAR funding 
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exit strategy?  The Banks’ presence and its role in the system gave us the confidence to make a 
multi-year commitment to Window 1 of the Fund; this fact should not be underestimated. We 
therefore feel that some comment from the Panel in this regard is essential. 
The above are just a few preliminary comments to the report. In conclusion, we broadly endorse the 
recommendations although we have some serious concerns, particularly about some of those 
regarding governance.  Given the paucity of time from receipt of the report to the 20th October 
deadline we reserve the right to discuss the recommendations further within suitable donor fora (e.g. 
EIARD, FF and FC) and return with further comments. 
 
 
Turkey 
 
Only two points seem to be very important: 
1. The establishment of the Single Board. I agree with the idea, but the composition of the new 
Board will be very crucial, it should not exclude the functions and roles of the Fund Council. 
2. The ambiguity of the governance. Yes, there are some uncertainities, thus it should be very 
carefully desined. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The panel has done an excellent job in reviewing the performance of the CGIAR. We concur with the 
broad direction of the recommendations, the analysis is sound and the conclusions that the MTR 
panel have drawn are consistent with this.  
  
Governance: The overall model of governance is not functioning well, this is the inescapable 
conclusion of the review and it is consistent with the analysis of the earlier PWC Governance review. 
We agree that in order to deliver more effective and efficient use of resources across the system, 
governance needs to be reformed to increase accountability, simplify decision-making and reduce 
transaction costs. However in considering the current governance weaknesses and what changes 
could be made, form should follow function. There are examples of organisations which have a single 
Board but which do not operate effectively and do not deliver efficient decision-making or 
accountability. Simply restructuring the Consortium and Fund Council structure will not in of itself 
deliver improved decision-making.   
  
We agree that current system is inefficient and to some extent this is a feature of the two pillar 
structure. However before making recommending wholesale change there is scope for deeper 
analysis. We suggest that greater consideration should be given to the functions of a single Board, 
how it would make decisions more effectively, who it would be accountable to and how would it be 
held to account, and how in particular it would address the weaknesses in the current structure. The 
risk is that we restructure only to find we are facing the same problems. Recommending, as the 
report does, a Board made up of representatives of broader groups of stakeholders, each of whom is 
primarily accountable back to that group, is a model which does not always guarantee effective 
decision making.  
  
The report recommends that the restructuring takes place over the next few months. We can see the 
appeal of pushing ahead with change and of ensuring ownership of the SRF and CRPs by the new 
Board – if that is what is decided. However it’s worth reflecting that the previous round of reform 
took several years to complete and tied up considerable resources. There are a large number of 
changes underway – the development of the SRF, the next round of CRPs commissioning, the 
development of the resource mobilisation strategy, which are stretching the capacity of the system to 
the limit. Rapid governance change risks overwhelming the system and delivering further only 
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partially successful restructuring. In proposing these changes, careful consideration to the timing 
and the sequencing of this and other changes underway. Pace is good, but not at the expense of the 
quality of the outcome. 
  
Science Oversight: We concur that overall science oversight should be strengthened across the 
system. Only by identifying and commissioning the best research can the CGIAR deliver on its 
mandate, and this requires the best scientific expertise. However the recommendations in the 
report, which would set up an new CGIAR Board advisory committee, restructure or replace the ISPC 
and set up independent research panels to advise on specific issues, seems complex and confusing. 
Different bodies would be advising on different issues at differing times. We were not entirely clear 
what “empowering” the ISPC means in this context, since it already able to operate independently.  
  
Prioritisation: The SRF is the basis for the prioritisation of research and we agree with the emphasis 
placed in the report on getting the priorities right. Enough time should be made available to ensure 
that a high quality results framework is in place to guide the prioritisation of research. Aligning the 
delivery of CGIAR with a set of global priorities identified by a task force has some merit, but how 
does this fit with the work currently underway to complete the results framework? The report 
mentions “sharpened focus and impact”, but it was not clear how the high level priorities established 
by the task force and the on-going donor led development of the results framework are linked. How 
do these priorities relate to the “mega-challenges”?  
  
Competition is, in our view, the best way to drive up research standards. The report addresses what 
the priorities are, but is more or less silent on the process by which research will be commissioned, 
with high quality research being supported and less high quality research not being funded. We think 
this is a significant gap in the report. It’s unrealistic to assume that all the research undertaken 
across the CGIAR will be of the same excellent quality. 
  
Niche and Partnerships: We agree with the elements of the report which stress the importance of 
global partnerships, defining the niche of the CGIAR in terms of global research capability in the 
public and private sector. As part of this we welcome the proposals to establish guidelines for 
working more closely with the private sector.  
  
Innovative Finance: We fully support the recommendation to develop a new approach to finance 
which looks at a range of innovate approaches. Grant financing will continue to be important to the 
CGIAR, but these new approaches have the potential to deliver greater results by linking finance to 
outcomes or impact. As such we agree that they have the potential to tap into new sources of 
financing.  
 
  
United States 
 
We greatly appreciate the work of the Mid-Term Review panel and welcome their insights intended to 
help the CGIAR move forward.  As we consider the recommendations and our eventual pathway 
ahead, we would like to start with a few considerations that are important to the effective functioning 
of the system’s researchers and the constituent centers.  
  
Time-limited: The last reform process was arduous and absorbed enormous amounts of time and 
caused substantial disruption to the work of research leaders and researchers across the system; 
any changes we make must be done within a limited time frame (we would suggest no more than 
one year).  USAID legal counsel notes, however, that based on recent experience with similar 
changes for global organizations in Annex 5, the proposed governance modifications could 
reasonably take two to three years to complete from the date of a decision to proceed, and changes 
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from the only recently settled reform structures could be difficult.  We are concerned that the review 
may have underestimated the policy, management and legal work involved in restructuring the 
reforms.  Thus we believe that we should explore efficiency through management changes that more 
directly and quickly achieve the desired outcome of the reforms before the next set of CRPs are in 
place.    
 
Decision-making: It is not clear that a single, constituency-based board would result in enhanced 
ability to make difficult decisions.  One of the rationales for the reform was that ExCo (stakeholder-
based) was not able to make difficult decisions.  The key in our view rests in the recommendation of 
the MTR that the Science Council be greatly strengthened.  Independent science advice, not linked 
to either program implementation or program funding remains a critical need for the CGIAR.  Going 
forward, the Science Council needs to be empowered to make recommendations around priorities 
and strategies for CGIAR programs. Independent science advice and analysis, set out in a clear and 
executable strategy, should underpin the relationship between the “funders and the doers.” 
 
Modify: Recognizing that there may be no perfect structure, but that substantial negotiation was 
required to come to the current structure, we encourage the Panel to consider how to shape the 
current system to achieve the goals of the Reform without a shift back to pre-reform structures that 
were also imperfect.  The current FC has functioned well (e.g., open, frank exchanges, effective 
chairing) and contains key elements of the proposed governance structure, especially if the SRF/CRP 
structure were to be carried forward more effectively.  
 
Furthermore, the creation of the Consortium and Consortium Office provides a structure for 
attributing standardized accountability for execution of the CRPs, and core management, fiduciary 
and other requirements for the Centers.  If a decision is made to move towards a single board, it 
should build on this solid base.  In addition, the current Fund Council composition allows for every 
fund donor to either have a seat or be represented by another donor and thus addresses the issue of 
donor sovereignty. Further, for some donors, the current structure governing the CGIAR Fund (the 
Fund Council) may be a legal or policy requirement for contribution.   
 
World Bank role: The recommendations in the document leave many questions about the future role 
of the World Bank in the CGIAR if they are implemented. We strongly believe that the World Bank is 
uniquely positioned to continue as chair of the CGIAR.  No other relevant organization has the 
convening power of the World Bank, in which most of the major funders are shareholders.  Moreover, 
the Bank has provided exemplary, dispassionate chairing in ways that strongly connect the CGIAR to 
the larger international development agenda.  Any diminution of the World Bank’s role would send a 
strong negative signal across the development community. Further, the Bank’s continued funding of 
the system is an important signal as well. We agree with the report that new innovative sources of 
funding should be pursued, but not as a substitute for traditional grant funding, and not before these 
ideas have been developed beyond mere ideas.   Traditional funding has provided the flexibility in 
the system to pursue long-term objectives that could not have otherwise been achieved.  
 
Programmatic vs Governance Emphasis: While the MTR seems to have focused on governance 
solutions, we feel the review offered little on programmatic reforms – specifically in response to the 
questions in the terms of reference related to CGIAR effectiveness and efficiency. For example, the 
relationship between Windows 1/2 and Window 3/Bilateral is a critical and fundamental 
programmatic tension that requires attention. As we looked to the Reform to more effectively and 
efficiently deliver programmatic outputs from the System, greater attention to these programmatic 
questions is critical in the lead-up to commissioning the 2nd call for proposals.  
 
Clarified roles for Consortium, Centers and CRPs:  Our sense is that the MTR judges that some of the 
challenges facing the reform will be addressed by a new, single board. However, it is clear that there 
are major tensions between the Consortium and the centers.  If the Fund Council were to form the 
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foundation of a single board, could centers similarly develop closer ties to and greater ownership of 
the Consortium Office?   Or would these tensions then simply move into a unitary Board? 
 
Research Priorities: We agree with the Panel’s attention to prioritization as a critical step in ensuring 
the CG strategically contributes to research needed to achieve global food security. However, using a 
lens of maximum impact for least cost doesn’t seem appropriate for a research portfolio where the 
scale of eventual impact is more compelling (while we realize for our development interventions, it is 
a common and useful approach).    We are concerned that it could lead to a focus on “low hanging 
fruit,” and not more transformational objectives.   
In addition, there seems to be a gap between these recommendations and the factors noted in the 
body of the document as drivers of food insecurity (issues around productivity, water, climate 
change, for example).  We hope that the executive summary can be revised to include these 
compelling issues as major factors supporting investment in CGIAR research.  
 
We agree that the SRF should be agreed upon before the 2nd call for CRPs is released. However, 
given the reality of the timing for each step in this process, we feel strongly that the current RF 
(Results Framework) development process should be supported and accelerated to ensure that the 
2nd Call will be timely and respond to the RF. 
 
CGIAR as Research Organization: We feel that the comparative advantage of the CGIAR is the 
scientific knowledge it generates. Maintaining this level of excellence – while shaping the research 
agenda more effectively, taking into account the diverse funders’ and Centers’ objectives -- will give 
the CGIAR a respected role in shaping world opinion on issues of food security, nutrition and 
environment.  It is important that the system maintains that as a base of its legitimacy in order to 
convene decision makers around complex topics.   
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